F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 29 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MICHAEL C. BINGHAM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 96-6270
(D.C. No. 95-CV-448-L)
DYNAIR FUELING INC., (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Michael C. Bingham sued his former employer, DynAir Fueling,
Inc., in Oklahoma state court, claiming he was wrongfully discharged in violation
of Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 35 (West 1992) for his absence from employment due
to jury service. Alleging diversity jurisdiction, DynAir, a Delaware corporation,
removed the case to federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Bingham then
amended his complaint to allege further that DynAir wrongfully terminated him in
order to avoid its safety and maintenance responsibilities in violation of
Oklahoma and federal public policy. The district court’s order granted summary
judgment in favor of DynAir on all claims, and Bingham appeals. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Bingham had been employed by DynAir as an aircraft refueler for eight
years when DynAir terminated him in September 1994. In May 1994, Bingham
had been selected for jury service on a lengthy murder trial which did not end
until October 1994. While on jury duty, Bingham performed his jury service on
Monday through Thursday, and worked at DynAir on Saturday and Sunday of
each week. On August 27, 1994, while Bingham was working, Bingham
overloaded a fuel truck, causing five gallons of jet fuel to spill. DynAir
terminated Bingham a few days later, claiming his negligence had caused the
spill.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the district court's order granting summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir.
1995). Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c). An issue of material fact is genuine where a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the party opposing summary judgment. Wolf, 50 F.3d at 796
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In applying
the summary judgment standard, we must examine the factual record and
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-movant.
Wolf, 50 F.3d at 796.
JURY SERVICE RETALIATION CLAIM
Analytical Framework
To establish a prima facie case of wrongful discharge under Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 38, § 35, the discharged employee must show (1) employment; (2)
absence from employment by reason of the employee's having been required to
serve as a juror; and (3) discharge from employment because of absence due to
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jury service. Brown v. MFC Fin. Co. of Oklahoma, 838 P.2d 524, 526 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1992). After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts
to the employer to rebut the inference that its motives were retaliatory by
articulating that the discharge was for a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason. See
Buckner v. General Motors Corporation, 760 P.2d 803, 806 (Okla. 1988)
(explaining burdens of production and persuasion in workers’ compensation
retaliatory discharge claims under Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85, § 5, adopted by Brown,
838 P.2d at 527, for application to jury service retaliatory discharge claims under
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 35). Once the employer comes forward with a non-
retaliatory reason for the discharge,
the employee may carry the burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the discharge was retaliatory in nature if he or she proves the
discharge was ‘significantly motivated’ by retaliation for [his]
exercise of statutory rights or by showing that the employer's
proffered reason for the discharge is a pretext.
Brown, 838 P.2d at 527 (citing Buckner, 760 P.2d at 807, 810.)
The district court held that Bingham failed to establish a prima facie case.
As we will discuss below, this conclusion is correct, but the district court
mistakenly permitted plaintiff to attempt to establish the third element of a prima
face case, that is, discharge from employment because of absence due to jury
service, by presenting evidence either that the discharge was “significantly
motivated” by retaliation for the employee’s jury service or that the employer's
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proffered reason for the discharge is a pretext, citing Brown, 838 P.2d at 527.
Brown had summarily adopted the analytical framework describing the burdens of
production and persuasion articulated in workers’ compensation retaliatory
discharge claim cases under Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85, § 5, without describing that
framework in any detail. See Brown, 838 P.2d at 527. It is clear from
Oklahoma’s workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge cases that in order to
establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff must first present
evidence sufficient to support a “legal inference” that his or her termination was
“significantly motivated by retaliation for the employee’s exercise of statutory
rights,” here, the performance of jury duty. Buckner, 760 P.2d at 810; see also
Wallace v. Halliburton Co., 850 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Okla. 1993); Taylor v. Cache
Creek Nursing Ctrs., 891 P.2d 607, 610 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994). A plaintiff may
not establish a prima facie claim merely by showing that the employer’s proffered
reason is unworthy of credence. See Blackwell v. Shelter Mutual Ins. Co.,
No. 96-6169, 1997 WL 150061, at *4 n.2 (10th Cir. Apr. 1, 1997) (holding same,
interpreting Oklahoma’s workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge cases).
Only if the plaintiff has proven a prima facie case and the employer has
articulated a legitimate reason for the plaintiff’s termination, may the plaintiff
still prevail by meeting the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
discharge was retaliatory in nature by proving either that the discharge was
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“significantly motivated” by the plaintiff’s absence due to jury service or that the
employer's proffered reason for the discharge is a pretext. See id.
Evidence Presented
The evidence Bingham presented in an attempt to demonstrate a legal
inference that he was discharged from employment because of absence due to jury
service consisted solely of the fact that DynAir was obligated to pay overtime to
workers covering for Bingham while he was on jury service, and Bingham’s
testimony that he thought his supervisor, Bruce Jones, became “short and surly”
with him after he started jury service, and once mentioned that he could not go to
the race track on his usual day off because he had to work those days in order to
cover for Bingham’s absence. We agree with the district court that nothing can
be legally inferred from this evidence.
The mere fact DynAir had to pay overtime to cover for Bingham, by itself,
does not raise an inference that Bingham was terminated for his jury service.
Bingham’s belief that Jones’ attitude towards him changed after he began jury
service is “pure speculation.” See Thompson v. Medley Material Handling, Inc.,
732 P.2d 461, 464 (Okla. 1987); see also Blackwell, 1997 WL 150061, at *6
(plaintiff’s claims that she “got the feeling” from her supervisor’s “mannerism”
that he did not want her to file a workers’ compensation claim insufficient to raise
inference of retaliatory discharge under Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85, § 5). Nor does
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the statement by Jones that he could not go to the race track raise an inference
that Bingham’s subsequent termination was related to his jury service because it
did not relate to Bingham’s job or the subsequent termination decision, nor was
Jones the decision-maker in the termination. See Cone v. Longmont United Hosp.
Ass'n, 14 F.3d 526, 531-32 (10th Cir. 1994).
There was no evidence Bingham’s supervisors or others at DynAir
pressured Bingham about his jury service or otherwise sought to prevent him from
performing his jury duty, see Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119,
121 (Pa. 1978) (jury question where plaintiff presented evidence his employer
fired him for not trying harder to get excused from jury service), or ever
mentioned or indicated in any way that his job was in jeopardy because of his jury
service, see Thompson, 732 P.2d at 464, and Taylor, 891 P.2d at 610 (both
concluding prima facie case of workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge claim
not established where no evidence that supervisors made any reference to
termination as a result of filing claim). In comparison, in Brown, the only
Oklahoma decision applying Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 35, the Oklahoma Court of
Appeals held that a jury question was presented where plaintiff presented
evidence that the defendant-employer, who had fired the plaintiff while she was
on jury duty, told her to return to work or else she would lose her job. 838 P.2d
at 527. Bingham must do more than show that his termination occurred at the
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same time as his jury service. See Large v. Acme Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 790 P.2d
1086, 1088 (Okla. 1990); Thompson, 732 P.2d at 464 and Taylor, 891 P.2d at 610
(all Oklahoma workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge claims holding that
the evidence that the employee was fired contemporaneously with a workers’
compensation claim, by itself, is insufficient to raise a legal inference that the
firing was significantly motivated by retaliation). The facts alleged by Bingham
provide no inference of a causal connection between his termination and his jury
service. Thus, the district court correctly concluded Bingham failed to establish a
prima facie case of termination for jury service in violation of Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
38, § 35.
Even assuming Bingham’s evidence had been sufficient to demonstrate a
prima facie case, DynAir responded by presenting evidence of a facially
non-retaliatory reason for terminating Bingham’s employment: that Bingham
negligently caused a jet fuel spill. Bingham failed to create a genuine issue of
material fact that DynAir’s stated basis was pretext. Pretext is shown by “such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or contradictions in
the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact
finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the
employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.” Morgan v.
Hilti, Inc., No. 96-5111, 1997 WL 118531, at *3 (10th Cir. Mar. 18, 1997)
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(quotation omitted)). “[M]ere conjecture that [the] employer's explanation is a
pretext for intentional discrimination is an insufficient basis for denial of
summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768,
772 (10th Cir. 1988)).
Bingham based his pretext claim on his assertions that (1) he was not
negligent in spilling the fuel, pointing to a dispute as to whether he performed the
required precheck of the automatic shut-off valve which might have determined
the valve was not operable; (2) DynAir’s stated reason for firing him conflicts
with Jones’ testimony that he might not have been fired if he had reported the
spill; and (3) he could not have complied with DynAir’s reporting requirements
because he was not aware of the oil spill. We agree with the district court that
this evidence did not raise a factual issue regarding pretext.
The disputes over whether Bingham did the required precheck of the valve
or knew about the fuel spill do not raise genuine issues as to material facts
because there is no evidence that DynAir did not believe Bingham negligently
caused the spill. The relevant inquiry is whether Mr. Estrella, DynAir’s executive
vice president responsible for the termination decision, reasonably believed
Bingham was negligent in failing to take adequate steps to prevent the oil spill.
There is no evidence that Estrella did not actually believe Bingham was negligent
and instead used the spill as a pretext for an otherwise retaliatory discharge.
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Bingham may disagree with DynAir’s decision, but such disagreement does not
constitute pretext. Bingham’s evidence regarding his performance shows, at
most, that DynAir may have exercised its business judgment erroneously;
however, “an employer's exercise of erroneous or even illogical business
judgment does not constitute pretext.” Reynolds v. School Dist. No. 1, 69 F.3d
1523, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995). In the absence of evidence of an improper motive,
Bingham has not met his burden of showing that DynAir’s reason was a pretext
for retaliation.
Finally, as to Jones’ statement that Bingham might not have been
terminated if he had reported the spill, while it is true that this court has inferred
pretext when an employer changed its reason for terminating an employee, Cole v.
Ruidoso Mun. Schs., 43 F.3d 1373, 1380-81 (10th Cir. 1994), there is no evidence
in this case that DynAir ever changed its position that Bingham was fired for
negligently causing the spill. Even assuming that Jones’ statement was more than
a purely speculative remark and actually reflected DynAir’s position, the two
explanations would not constitute “fundamentally different justifications” for
DynAir’s action such as “would give rise to a genuine issue of fact with respect to
pretext.” See Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1993). We
conclude that no reasonable jury could find pretext based upon the evidence
Bingham presented.
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PUBLIC POLICY CLAIM
Under Oklahoma law, when an employment contract is of indefinite
duration, it is terminable at will by either party, and “an employer may discharge
an employee for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong,
without being thereby guilty of legal wrong,” Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24,
26 (Okla. 1989). However, Oklahoma recognizes a judicial exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine where an employee is discharged for refusing to act
in violation of an established and well-defined public policy or for performing
acts consistent with clear and compelling public policy. See Burk, 770 P.2d at 29.
The exception only applies “in a narrow class of cases in which the discharge is
contrary to a clear mandate of public policy as articulated by constitutional,
statutory or decisional law” and the public policy exception must be “tightly
circumscribed.” Id. at 28-29.
Bingham asserts he was terminated in order to cover up evidence that
DynAir continued to use trucks with inoperable automatic shut-off valves
allegedly in violation of federal safety and maintenance laws and regulations.
However, there is no evidence in this case that Bingham ever refused to act in
violation of any safety or maintenance laws or regulations, ever complained to
any supervisor about any illegal safety or maintenance violations, reported any
such violations to any outside law enforcement officials, or performed any act
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consistent with a clear and compelling public interest with respect to the alleged
violations. 1 We agree with the district court that Bingham failed to present
evidence sufficient to state a Burk claim. As Bingham raised no separate
argument regarding his federal public policy claim, our conclusions concerning
his state public policy claims dispose of this claim as well.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
1
Moreover, even if Bingham had reported these alleged violations,
Oklahoma has not concluded whether good faith reporting of employer infractions
of rules, regulations or the law pertaining to the public health, safety or general
welfare would state a Burk claim. See Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 787
n.7 (Okla. 1995).
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