F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 27 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ELISEO PELICO VICENTE,
Petitioner,
v. No. 96-9544
(Petition for Review)
IMMIGRATION & (INS No. A73 737 696)
NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondent.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner seeks review of a final order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) denying petitioner’s request for asylum and withholding of
deportation. 1 The BIA found that petitioner did not qualify as a refugee, and
therefore, was ineligible for asylum, because he had not established the requisite
“well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A).
We review the BIA’s determinations of law de novo, and we review its
factual findings about an alien’s refugee status under the substantial evidence
rule. See Refahiyat v. United States Dep’t of Justice INS, 29 F.3d 553, 556 (10th
Cir. 1994). We must uphold the BIA’s determination that petitioner was not
eligible for asylum if it is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(4). We may
1
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, alters the availability, scope, and
nature of judicial review in INS cases. However, because petitioner’s deportation
proceedings commenced before April 1, 1997, and the final decision of the BIA
issued before October 31, 1996, neither IIRIRA’s permanent “new rules,” nor its
interim “transitional rules,” apply to this case. See id. §§ 306(c)(1), 309(a), (c)(1)
& (4), as amended Pub. L. No. 104-302, § 2, 110 Stat. 3657, set out in notes to 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1252. In contrast, provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, may
apply to INS cases commenced, like this one, before AEDPA’s enactment on
April 24, 1996, see Fernandez v. INS, 113 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 1997), though
none of these appear pertinent to this petition for review, which does not involve
deportation for criminal activity addressed by AEDPA.
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reverse the BIA’s determination only if the evidence is “so compelling that no
reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 484 (1992).
Petitioner, a Quiche Indian, is a citizen and native of Guatemala. He
entered the United States without inspection in December 1993, after leaving
Guatemala and living in Mexico for four months. Petitioner conceded
deportability at his deportation hearing, but claimed that he had a well-founded
fear of being persecuted by guerillas on account of his political opinion if he
returned to Guatemala. Petitioner testified that the guerillas frequently came to
his village, rounded up all the young men, and tried to recruit them. Petitioner
said that twice he was taken by the guerillas and beaten, but he managed to
escape. While in hiding after his second escape, petitioner learned that the
guerillas had gone to his parents’ home looking for him. Fearing what the
guerillas would do to him if they found him, petitioner fled the country.
The BIA found that, even if petitioner’s testimony were entirely credible,
the evidence did not establish persecution on account of petitioner’s political
opinion; the guerillas were not concerned with petitioner’s political opinion, but
with recruiting able-bodied young men to help their cause, see id. at 482 (noting
that the persecution must be “on account of the victim’s political opinion, not the
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persecutor’s”). Our review of the record does not compel a contrary determination.
Petitioner argues that his resistance to recruitment constituted political
opinion, because when he told the guerillas he did not want to join them, they
beat him. Petitioner’s testimony, however, did not establish that there was any
expression of political opinion on his behalf. Instead, it showed that he resisted
recruitment because he did not want to be involved in killing people or other
violent acts and because of his home and family. Moreover, even if petitioner
held a political opinion, the evidence did not compel a conclusion that the
guerillas persecuted petitioner because of that political opinion, rather than
because he refused to fight with them. See id. at 483.
We, therefore, conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
determination that petitioner did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution.
This determination is fatal to petitioner’s claim for withholding of deportation, as
well. See Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1578 (10th Cir. 1994). The petition
for review is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
James E. Barrett
Senior Circuit Judge
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