F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 30 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
BILLY W. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 96-1103
(D.C. No. 91-WY-1321-AJ)
DENVER, CITY AND COUNTY OF, (D. Colo.)
a municipal corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY and HENRY, Circuit Judges, and DOWNES, ** District Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable William F. Downes, District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
This appeal arises from plaintiff’s claims against the City and County of
Denver (the City) pursuant to the Age Discrimination and Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and for various constitutional violations.
Plaintiff applied for a job with the city as an information specialist when he was
fifty-five years old. Plaintiff was not chosen for the job; in fact, he did not make
it past the second-tier of the evaluation process and did not receive an interview.
A thirty-five year-old woman, whom plaintiff claims was less qualified than he,
was hired to fill the position. Based on these facts, plaintiff claims he was the
victim of age discrimination. He filed amended complaints in which he alleged
various constitutional violations; all of those claims were dismissed prior to trial.
Plaintiff’s ADEA claims were presented to a jury, and, finding no discrimination,
the jury returned a verdict for the City. The district court denied plaintiff’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
Plaintiff appeals the district court’s judgment, and we affirm.
We have reviewed the record, and we hold that all of plaintiff’s allegations
of error are meritless. Plaintiff presents several points of error by his appointed
trial counsel. “[T]he right to counsel in a civil case is not a matter of
constitutional right,” and the “appropriate remedy for allegedly incompetent
representation is a malpractice suit.” MacCuish v. United States, 844 F.2d 733,
735-36 (10th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted).
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Plaintiff also argues error in the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury
regarding willful age discrimination. The district court found no evidence of
willful behavior to justify submission of such an instruction and did not abuse its
discretion by refusing a willful violation instruction. See United States v.
Starnes, 109 F.3d 648, 650-51 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 96-9185, 1997 WL
333342 (U.S. June 27, 1997). We also find no merit in plaintiff’s conflict of
interest argument. Not only did plaintiff waive objection to any potential conflict
in a written status report, the matter was also addressed in open court at the status
conference, and the record shows the potential conflict was resolved. Further, the
record contains no evidence of judicial misconduct either in the court’s conduct
during the trial or in its dismissal of certain constitutional claims before trial.
On de novo review, we hold that the district court did not err in denying
plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, and neither did it abuse its
discretion in denying the motion for new trial. See Patton v. TIC United Corp.,
77 F.3d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2525 (1996). Finally,
plaintiff complains that the City’s attorney made prejudicial and inflammatory
statements in his closing statement. We note that plaintiff fails to point out the
exact language to which he objects, but, in any event, plaintiff made no objection
at trial, and we find no plain error. Cf. Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus.Inc., 11
F.3d 957, 960 (10th Cir. 1993) (failure to object to evidence). Finally, plaintiff
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did not suffer a due process violation because of the timeline of this case. All
trial delays are explained by the docket sheet, and, in fact, several were at
plaintiff’s request.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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