F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SEP 24 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
THOMAS TIGHE,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v. No. 97-1046
(D.C. No. 95-D-638)
J.W. BOOKER, Warden, (D. Colo.)
Respondent-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, MCKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Respondent appeals the district court’s decision granting petitioner habeas
corpus relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2241, concluding that he was entitled to credit
against his federal sentence for the time he spent awaiting the disposition of
federal charges pending against him, while in federal custody pursuant to a writ
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. See 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (repealed, but
applicable to offenses committed prior to November 1, 1987). 1 Upon de novo
review, see United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d 653, 654 (10th Cir. 1989)
(addressing 18 U.S.C. § 3585, which superseded § 3568), we affirm.
While serving a state sentence in Louisiana, state officials, on January 7,
1990, transferred petitioner to federal custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum to face federal drug charges. He remained in the control of
federal authorities for approximately thirty-one months, until he pled guilty and,
on July 29, 1992, received a federal sentence of ten years’ imprisonment to run
concurrently with the state sentence. Petitioner was subsequently returned to state
custody.
Section 3568 provided that “[t]he Attorney General shall give . . . credit
toward service of [a] sentence for any days spent in custody in connection with
the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed.” In light of the length of
petitioner’s federal detention awaiting the disposition of the federal charges, the
1
Neither party disputes that § 3586 is the applicable statute.
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district court did not err in determining that that time was time spent “in custody
in connection” with those federal charges such that petitioner was entitled to
credit for that period of time against his resulting federal sentence. See Brown v.
Perrill, 21 F.3d 1008, 1009-10 (10th Cir.), opinion supplemented on reh’g, 28
F.3d 1073, 1074-75 (10th Cir. 1994). The fact that state authorities also credited
that period of incarceration against his state sentence is of no moment in this
case. See Brown, 21 F.3d at 1010. Respondent’s further attempts to distinguish
Brown are unpersuasive.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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