F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
OCT 7 1997
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
J.B., individually, and for her minor
child, L.B.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 95-4197
WASHINGTON COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. No. 93-C-1038G)
Matthew Hilton, Matthew Hilton, P.C., Participating Attorney for Rutherford
Institute, Inc., Springville, Utah, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Richard A. Van Wagoner, (with Allan L. Larson on the briefs), Snow, Christensen
& Martineau, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before KELLY, McWILLIAMS, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
HENRY, Circuit Judge.
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, plaintiff J.B., individually and for her
minor child L.B., alleges that defendant, Washington County, violated J.B.’s and
L.B.’s constitutional rights when County employees, acting under the authority of
an ex parte order, seized L.B. for approximately eighteen hours. The purpose of
this seizure was to obtain an interview with the child outside her parents’
presence to investigate a report that the child’s father had sexually abused her.
Both parties submitted motions for summary judgment. The district court granted
summary judgment to defendant Washington County, from which J.B. and L.B.
now appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Washington County Deputy Pamela Humphreys was presented with a
dilemma when she received an eyewitness report that a seven year-old child, L.B.,
had been sexually abused by her father. Recognizing the need in such cases for
an interview with the child outside the presence of her parents, the County had
adopted a policy to interview children alleged to be victims of child abuse at
school. 1 In this case, however, the school interview procedure was not available
1
See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-101(16)(b) (1997) (protective services
provided by the Division of Child and Family Services are in part to “substantiate
evidence of neglect, abuse or exploitation”); Aplt’s App. vol. II, doc. 5 at 8 (Depo. of
Deputy County Attorney W. Brent Langston) (“If a child is going to school” it “would be
normal” to conduct an interview at school to substantiate allegations of in-home child
sexual abuse).
2
because L.B. was home-schooled. In accordance with the policies of the
Sheriff’s Office, Deputy Humphreys discussed the matter with County Sheriff
Glenwood Humphries. See Aplts’ App. vol II, doc. 4 at 4-6 (Depo. of Sheriff
Glenwood Humphries).
Deputy Humphreys consulted a member of the Utah Division of Family
Services, 2 Janalee Gregory, as required under Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. §§
62A-4a-105(1), (6); -106(1)(h) (the Division [of Child and Family Services’s]
responsibilities include administering protective services to children);
-101(16)(d)(i) (1996) (protective services defined as services provided “to bring
the situation to the attention of the appropriate juvenile court and law
enforcement agency” in cases of in-home perpetrators). Deputy Humphreys and
Ms. Gregory could not think of a workable approach for conducting a private
interview with L.B. See Aplts’ App. vol. II, doc. 3 at 17-18 (Depo. of Deputy
Sheriff Pamela Humphreys). Deputy Humphreys then sought advice from Deputy
County Attorney W. Brent Langston, who is authorized by statute to prosecute
any person charged with abuse or neglect before the juvenile court. See Utah
Code Ann. § 17-18-(7)(c) (1995). Deputy County Attorney Langston concurred
2
In April 1996, the Utah legislature renamed the “Division of Family
Services” the “Division of Child and Family Services.” See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-
101 (1997) (Amendment Notes).
3
that an interview was necessary and suggested they consult Juvenile Court Judge
Joseph Jackson. See Aplt’s App. vol. II, doc. 5 at 4, 11.
Judge Jackson recommended filing a petition with the juvenile court
requesting an order to remove L.B. from her home temporarily to conduct an
interview. See id. doc. 3 at 31-33, and ex. 2 (Deputy Sheriff Humphreys’s Supl.
Report). Deputy County Attorney Langston then prepared and filed a petition
alleging “on information and belief” that L.B. was an “abused child.” See J.B. &
L.B. v. Washington County, 905 F. Supp. 979, 983 (D. Utah 1995). Following the
ex parte hearing at which Deputy Humphreys testified, Judge Jackson issued an
order to take L.B. to shelter care where she would stay pending a hearing. See
Aplts’ App. vol. II, doc. 3 at 30-31.
Deputy Humphreys delivered the order to two uniformed police officers.
The officers went to J.B.’s home in the early evening and took L.B. to a
prearranged shelter home. See id., doc. 7 at 7-8 (Depo. of Officer Kurt Wright).
The next morning, Deputy Humphreys and Ms. Gregory interviewed L.B. The
interview revealed no evidence of sexual abuse and L.B. was released to her
parents, seventeen and one-half hours after she was taken from her home. See id.
doc. 3, ex. 2; doc. 5 at 27-28. Thereafter, the juvenile court case was dismissed
on motion by the County Attorney’s office stating there was insufficient evidence
to believe that L.B. was an abused child.
4
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs pursue four claims on appeal. First, they contend that the
County’s employees violated their rights to procedural due process when they
removed L.B. from J.B.’s home. Second, they claim the removal of L.B. was a
reckless and deliberate interference with familial associational rights. Third, they
contend that the removal of L.B. violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be
secure against unreasonable seizures. Finally, plaintiffs allege that the policy
adopted by the County violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection. 3
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as the district court. Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 737 (10th Cir.
1997). Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
“We view the evidence and draw any inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” Coosewoon v. Meridian Oil
3
Plaintiffs do not appeal the district court’s rulings on their claims brought
under Utah state law.
5
Co., 25 F.3d 920, 929 (10th Cir. 1994). “‘Where the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,’ summary
judgment in favor of the moving party is proper.” Thomas v. International Bus.
Machs., 48 F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
I. County Policy or Procedure
The parties do not challenge the district court’s holding that the actions of
the officials involved are imputed to the defendant County as policy, procedure,
or custom of the County because the actions were authorized or ratified by the
authorized decision makers. See J.B., 905 F. Supp. at 985. The Supreme Court
has recently calibrated the test for determining what comprises a county policy, in
a failure to train setting, and we must evaluate its applicability here. 4 See Bryan
County v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1391 (1997) (stating that “we did not foreclose
the possibility that evidence of a single violation of federal rights, accompanied
by a showing that a municipality has failed to train its employees to handle
recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation, could
4
Although plaintiffs at one time argued that a failure to train was involved,
they have apparently abandoned that contention on appeal.
6
trigger municipal liability”) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 &
n.10 (1989)).
A plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a county under § 1983 must
identify a policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s injury. Bryan County, 117
S. Ct. at 1388. This “ensures that a [county] is held liable only for those
deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body
or of those officials whose acts may be fairly said to be those of the [county].”
Id. at 1387-88 (“municipalities and other local governmental bodies are ‘persons’
within the meaning of § 1983") (citing Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 689, 694 (1978)).
In addition to the identification of a county policy or custom, a “plaintiff
must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the [county] was the
‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the
[county] action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must
demonstrate a causal link between the [county] action and the deprivation of
federal rights.” Id.
In Pembauer v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), the Supreme Court
indicated that an authorized decision maker’s course of action “tailored to a
particular situation and not intended to control decision in later situations” may,
under certain circumstances, give rise to liability under § 1983. Id. at 481.
7
“Where a ‘plaintiff seeks to impose municipal liability on the basis of a single
incident, the plaintiff must show that the particular illegal course of action was
taken pursuant to a decision made by a person with authority to make policy
decisions on behalf of the entity being sued.’” Hollingsworth, 110 F.3d at 743
(quoting Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 994 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Pembauer,
475 U.S. at 483-85)). Here, unlike the failure to train allegations in Bryan
County, the decision to adopt the particular course of action to remove L.B. from
her home to interview her outside the home was “made by [the county’s]
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may be fairly said to represent official
policy.” Cannon v. City & County of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 877 (10th Cir. 1993);
see 905 F. Supp. at 985 n.7 (testimony of Washington County Sheriff Humphries
stating that he approved Deputy Humphreys’s actions “as being in accordance
with [County Sheriff’s Office’s] policies and procedures”). 5 Thus, the decision
was a “course of action consciously chosen from among various alternatives,”
which generally implies a policy. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823
(1985).
5
We have no doubt that the actions of Washington County Sheriff
Humphries, an authorized policy maker of Washington County, bound the County in this
case. See generally, Utah Code Ann. § 17-22-2 (Supp. 1996). Similarly, there is no
question that the police officers who executed the removal order acted under the direction
of Deputy County Attorney Langston and Sheriff Humphries. See Aplts’ App. doc. 5 at
9; Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1(1) (1995) (listing powers of county attorney).
8
Washington County’s actions were tailored to accommodate its interest in
investigating the sexual abuse allegations that involved a home-school child. This
decision, properly made by the County’s authorized decision makers, “surely
represents an act of official government ‘policy’ as that term is commonly
understood.” Pembauer, 475 U.S. at 481.
We conclude the district court correctly found “that the actions taken by
Deputy Sheriff Humphreys and Deputy County Attorney Langston constituted a
‘policy, procedure or custom’” of Washington County. 905 F. Supp. at 985.
II. Deprivation of Constitutional Rights
A. Procedural Due Process
Plaintiffs argue that the procedure that the County personnel employed to
remove L.B. from her home did not comport with the constitutional requirements
of procedural due process. They object to the ex parte discussion with Judge
Jackson that took place before a court petition was filed. They also assert that the
court documents did not explain why L.B. was being taken to shelter care, or
provide information sufficient to permit them to prepare for a hearing. They also
claim that the County’s procedures to obtain an untainted interview with L.B.
9
were unsuccessful, because L.B.’s father spoke with her privately before she left
for the shelter home.
To determine what process is constitutionally due, we look to three
somewhat flexible demands of procedural due process:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.”).
It is undisputed that J.B.’s liberty interests in the custody, care, and
management of her children are of paramount importance. See Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1981) (“[U]ntil the State proves parental unfitness,
the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination
of the natural relationship.”). L.B. also enjoys a liberty interest requiring that
procedural due process accompany her confinement. See Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (holding that juvenile pretrial detention implicates due
process rights); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600-01) (1979) (holding that a
child has a “substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for
10
medical treatment” under the Fourth Amendment). As the district court noted,
“[t]he bonds of a unitary family are the foundation of society.” 905 F. Supp. at
986.
We recognize that “[t]he forced separation of parent from child, even for a
short time, represents a serious impingement” upon both the parents’ and child’s
rights. Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 346 (4th Cir. 1994). “Of course, the child
also has obvious and compelling interests in his personal welfare and safety,
which are opposed to those of his parents when they pose the threat to the child’s
safety.” Id.
On the other side of the balancing equation lies the compelling interest of
the government, acting as parens patriae, in protecting children from physical and
sexual abuse. See Jordan, 15 F.3d at 346 (noting that “the “Commonwealth as
parens patriae also has at stake compelling interests--those in the safety and
welfare of its children”); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766-67 (observing that “[t]wo
state interests are at stake in parental rights termination proceedings--a parens
patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child and a fiscal
and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings”).
The government also shares the interests of the parent and child in preserving
their family’s integrity. Santosky, (stating that “the parens patriae interest favors
preservation, not severance, of natural familial bonds”). Without deciding which
11
of these two significant interests is weightier, we agree with the district court that
“considerable deference should be given to the judgment of responsible
government officials in acting to protect children from perceived imminent danger
or abuse.” 905 F. Supp. at 986 (citing Jordan, 15 F.3d at 348).
Having recognized the importance of both the private and governmental
interests, we turn to the last factor in the Mathews balancing, and examine the
procedures used here, and the cost and benefit of additional procedures. In this
case of first impression for Washington County officials, the officials had few
options but to attempt an interview with L.B. outside of her parents’ zone of
influence.
“While there is always a risk of error when an emergency removal of a
child from his parents’ custody is required, the [County] has substantially reduced
that risk at the threshold by the imposition of significant substantive limitations
upon the removal authorization.” Jordan, 15 F.3d at 346. It is undisputed that the
County officials obtained a judicial order authorizing the temporary removal of
L.B. from her home.
1. Ex parte communications
Plaintiffs object to the way County officials obtained the shelter care order,
particularly to the officials’ initial consultation with Juvenile Court Judge Joseph
12
Jackson. Judge Jackson’s ex parte receipt of information before, rather than after,
the time the County’s agents filed the petition is not significant under these
circumstances.
We recognize that ex parte communications may be fraught with peril, and
that judges must take great care with respect to ex parte communications even in
the most exigent of circumstances, but we can find nothing in the record to
suggest that Judge Jackson abandoned the impartial judicial role. The factors that
determine “whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate to the nature of the
act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the
expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial
capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978).
In this unique factual setting, the record indicates that rather than take
action upon unsworn statements, Judge Jackson suggested the filing of a petition
and the holding of a hearing--acts clearly within the jurisdiction invested in him.
See Aplts’ App. vol II, doc. 3 at 31, 33. By acting upon sworn statements and
signed pleadings, Judge Jackson diminished the risks traditionally posed by ex
parte communications. Absent any evidence that the Judge took improper action,
we are reluctant to cast doubt upon the Judge’s conduct, or to find that this
procedure violated a constitutional right in any way.
13
2. Insufficiency of the court order
Although the court order did not inform plaintiffs of the reason L.B. was
being taken to shelter care, the police officers who took her informed her parents
that there had been a report of child abuse and there would be a hearing within
48 hours. A post-deprivation hearing was not held, however, because the child
was released to her parents the following morning. 6 Therefore, plaintiffs’ claim
that they might not have been able to prepare for a hearing because of the scant
order is too speculative for our review. Cf. Whitemore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.
149, 160-61 (1990) (holding that speculative theory of possible injury insufficient
to establish injury in fact under Article III’s case or controversy requirement).
3. Reliability of the interview
Although the risk of erroneous deprivation for seventeen and one-half
hours existed, we agree with the district court that the reliability of an out-of-
6
The then-relevant statute, Utah Code. Ann. § 78-3a-306(4)(a) (1994)
(amended 1995), provided for a mandatory post-deprivation hearing following an
emergency removal of a child which lasted 48 hours or more to determine the validity of
continuing state custody of the child. The detention here lasted less than 18 hours,
therefore no hearing was required.
The very existence of this statute indicates the attempt by the Utah legislature to
provide safeguards in this kind of case. “States across the country have struck the same
or similar balance when confronted with the . . . question [of how to balance private and
public interests with the requirements of procedural due process].” Jordan, 15 F.3d at 351
and nn. 17-19 (citing state statutes involving emergency removal of a child that provide
for an interim period before a post-deprivation hearing must be held).
14
home interview to investigate the eyewitness sexual abuse allegations is of
overriding importance, and the risks of a tainted interview in the home or the
returning a child to an abusive situation are enormous. See 905 F. Supp. at 987.
Plaintiffs claim that the adopted procedure was not completely free of
parental influence because L.B.’s father was able to speak privately with L.B.
before the interview. The alternative approach submitted by plaintiffs, however
(asking L.B.’s parents to permit a private interview to take place in the home),
appears even more infeasible and uncertain. J.B.’s testimony reflects that
parental permission for a private interview within L.B.’s home was uncertain, and
in any event the point of removal of the child from the home was to conduct the
interview in an influence-free environment. Plaintiff J.B. also admits that had the
officers simply asked to interview L.B., that she “wouldn’t say yes.” Aplts’ App.
vol. I, doc. 6 at 37 (Depo. of J.B.). This only belies plaintiffs’ claim that the
officials should have requested parental consent to an at-home interview.
In retrospect, Washington County employees could have, as the district
court noted, chosen an alternative route, “such as conducting the interview in the
shelter care center sooner and without requiring overnight detention.” 905 F.
Supp. at 987 n.13. Given the extraordinary situation facing them, we conclude
that the procedures employed were reasonably calculated to balance the
competing interests and to achieve an interview with the child untainted by either
15
parent’s influence. See Hollingsworth, 110 F.3d at 739 (“Removal of children
from the custody of their parents requires predeprivation notice and a hearing
‘except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is a
stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.’”) (quoting
Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377, 1385 (10th Cir. 1989) (internal
quotations omitted)). Cf. Doe v. Hennepin County, 858 F.2d 1325, 1326-29 (8th
Cir. 1988) (holding no constitutional violation occurred where children removed
from home after reports of sexual abuse, post-deprivation hearings were held the
following day, and children were subsequently kept from home for 16 days and
returned to home after reports of abuse proved unfounded). Accordingly, we
agree with the district court that the Washington County officials’ actions did not
violate plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights.
B. Substantive Due Process
Plaintiffs’ right of familial association is included in the substantive due
process right of freedom of intimate association, which is “consonant with the
right of privacy.” Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993). The
right is based on the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. See id. Evaluation
of a party’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights requires a
“balancing [of the party’s] liberty interests against the relevant state interests.”
16
Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982). Accordingly, we must weigh
plaintiffs’ rights of familial association against Washington County’s interest in
protecting children within its jurisdiction from sexual abuse.
Undeniably, plaintiffs have a substantial interest in the right to associate
with their family. “Family relationships ‘by their nature, involve deep
attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom
one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs, but
also distinctly personal aspects of one’s life.’” Arnold v. Board of Educ. of
Escambia County, 880 F.2d 305, 312-13 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984)).
As to Washington County’s interest, the Supreme Court has noted that
governmental entities have a “traditional and ‘transcendent interest’” in protecting
children within the county from abuse. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855
(1990) (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968)). Accord New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (stating “[t]he prevention of sexual
exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of
surpassing importance”). As the district court aptly observed, the “[i]nvestigation
of child abuse allegations ‘deserves no less attention’” than the protection of
children from abuse. 905 F. Supp. at 988 (quoting Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1548).
17
In evaluating these competing interests, we have observed that “[n]ot every
statement or act that results in an interference with the rights of intimate
association is actionable.” Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1548. The conduct or statement
must be directed “at the intimate relationship with knowledge that the statements
or conduct will adversely affect that relationship.” Id.
Here, plaintiffs have sounded a constitutional claim by alleging that the
conduct of the County officials was directed at the family relationship with
knowledge that it would adversely affect that relationship. “[I]t is evident that
there was interference with plaintiffs’ rights of familial association” because
“L.B. was physically removed from her home and from her parents for a period of
almost 18 hours,” which “included an overnight stay in a pre-arranged shelter
home.” 905 F. Supp. at 988. Therefore, we proceed to “examine the evidence to
determine the severity of the alleged infringement, the need for the defendant’s
conduct, and any possible alternatives.” Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1548.
Plaintiffs recognize that the County officials had a duty to investigate the
report of child sexual abuse. They do not allege that the officials were motivated
by any other purpose apart from investigation. Rather, they claim that the
officials failed to use the least disruptive procedure to interview the child.
We agree with the district court that while the County’s “objectives might
have been accomplished within a shorter period, there is no evidence that [the
18
County officials] intended or directed their conduct in this matter at the familial
relationship of L.B. and J.B. with knowledge that such conduct would adversely
affect the relationship as required by [this court].” 905 F. Supp. at 988 (citing
Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1546, 1548). “Absent such evidence of wilfulness or intent,”
the district court appropriately determined that no genuine issue of material fact
exists as to plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims. Id. We similarly conclude
that the County officials’ conduct did not impermissibly interfere with plaintiffs’
right of familial association.
III. Fourth Amendment Violations
Plaintiffs claim that L.B.’s court-ordered removal from her home to a
shelter home for the purposes of investigating allegations of sexual abuse violated
their Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs assert that (1) plaintiff J.B. has
standing under the Fourth Amendment; (2) the order issued by Judge Jackson was
not supported by probable cause; (3) Judge Jackson did not act as a neutral and
detached magistrate; (4) the order was not specific as to the location where L.B.
could be seized; and (5) the execution of the order was unreasonable. We affirm
the district court’s grant of summary judgment against plaintiffs on these claims.
We address each contention in turn.
19
A. Standing
It is well established that “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights
which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.”
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). The gravamen of
plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim in this case is the court-ordered seizure of
L.B. The district court was correct in ruling that plaintiff mother, J.B., may not
assert a derivative or vicarious claim based on L.B.’s Fourth Amendment injuries.
But the court below did not focus on the separate claim of J.B., alleging her own
distinct injuries as a result of the seizure of her seven-year-old daughter. While it
is clear that constitutional protection afforded a parent against a child’s seizure in
these circumstances may be found in the Fourteenth Amendment, Curnow ex rel.
Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that “a
parent who claims loss of the companionship . . . of his or her child” raises a
claim based on the Fourteenth, not Fourth Amendment); Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1547
(holding that familial right of association is found in Fourteenth Amendment),
there may be circumstances in which a parent has Fourth Amendment standing to
challenge a seizure involving a minor child. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H.
Israel, Criminal Procedure § 9.2 at 732-33 and nn. 26-28 (1984) (noting that the
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure "provides that a defendant has
20
standing with respect to searches of or seizures from various persons with whom
the defendant has" a spousal, parental, or sibling relationship where a "common
zone of privacy" was intruded upon). Cf. Hollingsworth, 110 F.3d at 739
(limiting representative standing to parents where child included as plaintiff).
But see Tenebaum v. Williams, 862 F. Supp. 962, 973 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting
that "the Court is not aware . . . of any federal decision which has held that a
parent may legitimately assert an individual, as distinct from representative,
Fourth Amendment claim based upon the seizure of a child"). Neither the cases
cited by the parties nor those found by the court precisely address the issue.
However we need not reach the question because J.B. does have standing under
the Fourteenth Amendment to assert a claim that would, if she were successful,
result in full compensation for any harm suffered.
The district court was also correct in holding that the County officials’
temporary removal of L.B. from her home is a seizure which implicates L.B.’s
own Fourth Amendment rights. See Van Emrick v. Chemung County Dep’t of
Social Servs., 911 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that “when the procedures
undertaken at the initiative of a state official serve primarily an investigative
function . . . Fourth Amendment and bodily integrity interests of the child are
implicated”). We conclude that L.B. does have standing to challenge her removal
from her home. Therefore, we must determine whether the seizure in this case is
21
consistent with the limitations on governmental authority contained in the Fourth
Amendment.
B. Probable Cause
Plaintiffs argue that the temporary removal of L.B. from her home for
questioning by the authorities violated the Fourth Amendment because the agents
of Washington County lacked probable cause to believe that L.B. had been
abused. Specifically, plaintiffs complain that the principal source of information
supporting probable cause, the informant’s statement to Deputy Humphreys,
contained inaccurate information, and that Deputy Humphreys inadequately
investigated the informant’s claims. 7
A threshold question is the proper standard for evaluating the
constitutionality of the seizure. The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the
temporary removal of children in cases of suspected abuse or neglect is governed
by the probable cause standard. It could be argued that such removal is based on
“‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,’” O’Connor v.
7
For example, plaintiffs argue that the informant erroneously claimed that
J.B. and L.B. were on vacation at the time the allegation was made and that the father did
not have employment outside the home. See Aplts’ App. vol. II, doc. 3 ex. 1 at 2
(incident report).
22
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
351 (1985)), and therefore permissible in the absence of probable cause. See e.g.,
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,115 S. Ct. 2386, 2396-97 (1995) (upholding
scheme of suspicionless drug testing of student-athletes under special needs
doctrine); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347-348 (permitting warrantless search of student’s
purse grounded in reasonable suspicion of presence of cigarettes; state’s interest
in maintaining discipline in schools provides special need beyond criminal law
enforcement obviating need for probable cause).
Though the district court at one point suggested that a standard less than
traditional probable cause might be proper in evaluating the seizure in this case,
see 905 F. Supp. at 990 n.15 (“This ruling is directed only at the facts of this
case. In other cases, the duty of government officials to investigate the veracity
of an anonymous informant might be more feasible, and a higher degree of
probable cause would be required.”), the district court actually invoked the
traditional probable cause formulation of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238
(1983) (emphasizing that the judge must make a “practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances . . . . there is a fair probability”
that the facts to which the probable cause determination is addressed exist). The
district court also cited approvingly to Tenebaum, 862 F. Supp. at 975-76, which
applied the traditional probable cause standard in circumstances similar to those
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here. Moreover, it did not anywhere state that a lesser quantum of suspicion of
wrongdoing, such as the reasonable suspicion standard, would suffice to justify
this seizure. Thus, the record in this case supports the view that the district court
found probable cause for the seizure of L.B.
Before discussing the record, two preliminary observations are in order.
First, probable cause “is a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts,” Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, and the value
of informants’ tips in establishing probable cause is as varied as the myriad of
fact situations in which they arise. Nevertheless, courts traditionally have
distinguished between anonymous tipsters, whose motives and bases of
knowledge are unknown to the investigating officers, and ordinary citizens who
identify themselves and report crimes to the police. Although the courts have
eschewed rigid rules, the probable cause case law emphasizes the importance of
corroboration of some amount of the anonymous tipster’s information in
establishing probable cause, see e.g., United States v. Hinojos, 107 F.3d 765, 768
(10th Cir. 1997) (discussing necessary corroboration of anonymous tip to
establish reasonable suspicion); United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 120 (4th
Cir. 1996) (discussing corroboration necessary to support search warrant based on
anonymous tip); United States v. Johnson, 64 F.3d 1120, 1126 (8th Cir. 1995)
(same), while presuming the reliability of citizen informants. See e.g., United
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States v. Decoteau, 932 F.2d 1205, 1207 (7th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that probable
cause exists when an officer receives information from an ordinary citizen who
claims to have witnessed a crime, and whom the officer reasonably believes is
telling the truth).
Second, appellate courts reviewing probable cause determinations owe
substantial deference to the judicial officer making the initial probable cause
determination. See United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir.
1996) (citing United States v. Williams, 45 F.3d 1481, 1485 (10th Cir. 1995)). As
the Supreme Court explained, the job of the appellate court “is to ensure that the
magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] that probable cause
existed.’” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 271 (1960)).
In the typical probable cause review case, a magistrate has made a finding
of probable cause to issue a warrant (either for search or arrest). The situation in
this case is analogous. Deputy Humphrey’s petition to the juvenile court was, for
our purposes, tantamount to an application for an arrest warrant, while Judge
Jackson’s order to take L.B. to a shelter home was tantamount to an arrest warrant
issued by a magistrate. In evaluating the reasonableness of this seizure, under
Fourth Amendment principles, we owe the same deference to Judge Jackson’s
determination supporting the removal order that we would owe to a magistrate’s
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finding of probable cause in issuing a warrant. See e.g., Cusumano, 83 F.3d at
1250 (noting that “we give ‘great deference’ to the decision of the issuing
magistrate” in determining whether probable cause supported the issuance of a
search warrant) (quoting Williams, 45 F.3d at 1485).
Under the totality of the circumstances, see Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, we
agree with the district court that there was probable cause to temporarily remove
L.B. from her home for questioning. The informant, whose identity was known to
Deputy Humphreys, see Aplt’s App. doc. 3 at 8, gave an eyewitness account of
the alleged sexual abuse. Judge Jackson questioned the investigating officer
regarding the statements of the informant, prior to entering the removal order. Id.
at 983. Under these circumstances, we hold that Judge Jackson was entitled to
conclude that there was probable cause to temporarily remove L.B. from the home
for questioning.
Plaintiffs miss the mark in arguing that certain information provided by the
eyewitness was incorrect, and that Deputy Humphreys failed to corroborate the
informant’s statements. The incorrect information was immaterial to the
allegations of sexual abuse. Because Deputy Humphreys knew the eyewitness’s
identity, and thus was able to assess that person’s veracity, corroboration was
unnecessary in this case. See Decoteau, 932 F.2d at 1207 (considering an
identified informant’s tip, the court noted that “if it seems reasonable to the
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police to believe that the [ordinary citizen] eyewitness was telling the truth, they
need not take any additional steps to corroborate the information regarding the
crime before taking action”).
C. Neutral and Detached Magistrate
Similarly, plaintiffs cannot prevail on the basis of their argument that Judge
Jackson’s order was invalid because he was not a neutral arbiter of probable
cause, but an active participant in the investigative process. The Fourth
Amendment may be violated when the judge abandons the judicial role and acts as
“‘an adjunct law enforcement officer.’” See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
914 (1984) (quoting Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1979)).
However, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the circumstances of
this case do not warrant the conclusion that Judge Jackson lacked the neutrality or
detachment required by the Fourth Amendment. While plaintiffs contend that it
was improper for Judge Jackson to discuss the case ex parte with Deputy County
Attorney Langston and Deputy Humphreys before the petition was filed, they do
not allege that Judge Jackson commandeered a law enforcement role. There is
nothing in the record that suggests that Judge Jackson overstepped his judicial
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capacity. These circumstances do not call into question Judge Jackson’s
neutrality or detachment.
D. Insufficient Specificity of the Ex Parte Order
Plaintiffs also allege that the order was constitutionally infirm because it
did not describe the location from which L.B. was to be seized. They argue that
the order permitted the County’s agents to seize L.B. wherever they may have
found her, even without her parents’ knowledge. The particularity requirement
for a seizure warrant must specify the “persons or things to be seized.” U.S.
Const. amend IV. Plaintiffs misread the particularity requirement for a search
warrant, which requires a description of “the place to be searched,” id., to extend
to a seizure. However, there is no requirement that a seizure warrant describe
with particularity the location of the person to be seized.
E. Execution of Order
Plaintiffs final objection to the shelter care order is the manner in which it
was executed. They maintain that the execution of the order was unreasonable
because it was executed late in the day so that L.B. was required to stay in shelter
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care overnight, the officers did not provide the parents with much information,
and a less intrusive method could have been used to obtain the interview.
As noted earlier in this opinion, we agree with the district court that
although “different procedures may have been taken that would have been less
intrusive, such as conducting the interview in the shelter care center sooner and
without requiring overnight detention,” the procedures adopted by the County
“constitute[d] a permissible balancing of the substantial private and public issues
at stake.” J.B., 905 F. Supp. at 987 n.13. Because the analysis under procedural
due process applies to plaintiffs’ arguments in the Fourth Amendment context, we
also reject plaintiffs’ claims here.
IV. Equal Protection
Plaintiffs final claim is that their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal
protection of the laws were abridged by the County’s removal of L.B. from her
home. They claim that L.B. is a member of a “suspect class” of children whose
parents choose to school them at home. They maintain that the County treated
L.B. differently than children not schooled at home. Plaintiffs further raise a
substantive due process claim that J.B. was exercising her fundamental right to
school her child at home, and the County’s policies impermissibly interfered with
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that right. Lastly, plaintiffs allege that they were penalized for exercising their
fundamental right to school L.B. at home.
“[U]nless a classification warrants some form of heightened review because
it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an
inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that
the classification rationally further a legitimate state interest.” Nordlinger v.
Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). “While home school families impelled by deep-
seated religious convictions might be the type of ‘discrete and insular minorit[y]’
to which Justice Stone referred in footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the broad secular category of individuals who
prefer to school their children at home is not.” Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d
1039, 1043 (8th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiffs do not assert that the County’s adopted policy is aimed at
Murphy’s first category of individuals. Because the policy undeniably affects the
“broad secular category of individuals” who home-school their children, we
examine whether the County officials’ actions rationally furthered a legitimate
state interest. As stated above, the County had an important interest in
investigating the report of child abuse, and the means used to effect a private
interview with L.B. rationally furthered that interest and were not unduly
intrusive under these circumstances.
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Plaintiff J.B. also contends that the County interfered with her fundamental
right to direct the upbringing and education of her child. See e.g. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972). Although the exercise of this right “may be
fairly characterized as [an] exercise[] of familial rights and responsibilities . . .
[parents] have no constitutional right to provide their children with private school
education unfettered by reasonable government regulation.” Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976).
The conduct of the County officials did not impede the exercise of J.B.’s
right to home-school L.B. As the district court noted, “[i]nstead, [the County]
employees merely chose a different method of dealing with the child abuse
allegation as a result of [p]laintiffs’ different circumstances.” 905 F. Supp. at
991. We agree with the district court that “[t]he classifications in this case, and
the conduct of defendant’s employees based thereon, do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.” Id.
CONCLUSION
This is a difficult case, pitting the fundamental rights of parents and
families--rights that are in Griffin’s terms, “consonant with the right of privacy”--
against the awesome responsibilities of a county to investigate child abuse, a most
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reprehensible and ever-increasing problem. 983 F.2d at 1547. Though it is
possible, with hindsight, to suggest improvements in the procedures utilized by
Washington County, in our judgment, the County’s good faith efforts did not
result in a violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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