F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 22 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-3277
(D.C. No. 97-CR-40058-01-SAC)
RONNI JONES, (D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO, TACHA, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Ronni Jones appeals from the district court’s order detaining him before
trial, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142. “Appellate review of detention or release
orders is plenary as to mixed questions of law and fact and independent, with due
deference to the district court’s purely factual findings.” United States v.
Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353, 1355 (10th Cir. 1991).
Under § 3142, a district court must order the pretrial release of a criminal
defendant unless the court determines that such release will not assure the
defendant’s appearance or will endanger another person or the community.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). The parties agree that, due to the maximum penalties
possible for the crimes with which Jones is charged, a presumption arises
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) that “no condition or combination of conditions
will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of
the community.” Without discussing the risk of flight factor, the district court
concluded that defendant had not rebutted the § 3142(e) presumption, and that the
government had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Jones is a
danger to the community. See Stricklin, 932 F.2d at 1354-55 (discussing the
parties’ burdens under § 3142(e)).
On appeal, Jones contends that 1) he presented evidence which rebutted the
statutory presumption, 2) the government failed to prove that no conditions of
release will insure the community’s safety before trial, and 3) the district court
-2-
did not consider all of the factors listed in § 3142(g) and did not make findings
about possible conditions of release. After careful consideration of the parties’
briefs, defendant’s appendix, 1 and the applicable law, we conclude that the
district court correctly determined that defendant should be detained. The
evidence defendant proffered at his detention hearing did not counter the
presumption of dangerousness. Based on the language of the presumption, the
government was not required to prove that no conditions of release would ensure
the community’s safety, and the district court was not required to make findings
on that point. The district court’s order is thorough and correctly concludes both
that Jones did not rebut the presumption and that Jones is a danger to the
community. Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
1
The government’s motion to supplement the record on appeal with
documentation of Jones’ criminal history is denied.
-3-