F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 18 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ROBERT SHAWN TREFF,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-4110
(D.C. No. 97-CV-95-G)
VELTA LOTT, officer at the Iron County (D. Utah)
Correctional Facility; JIMMIE
STEWART, Director at the Iron County
Correctional Facility; BRENT
WITTIKIEND, Sergeant at the Iron
County Correctional Facility; GAYE
KEENE, Sergeant at the Iron County
Correctional Facility; BRAD SPENCER,
officer at the Iron County Correctional
Facility; JAMES MITCHELL, officer at
the Iron County Correctional Facility;
LEE HULET, officer at the Iron County
Correctional Facility; KEVIN NITZEL,
investigator for Utah Department of
Corrections; JAY LOWE BARTON,
Inmate Placement Program Facility for the
Utah Department of Corrections,
individually, and in their personal and
official capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BRORBY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Robert Shawn Treff, a Utah state prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action. We exercise
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Treff’s complaint alleged he was removed from his regular cell on June 2, 1995,
and placed in a special cell on “TRO” status for allegedly committing one or more
disciplinary infractions, and that he remained on “TRO” status until the charges were
resolved on June 28, 1995. Treff alleged his due process and equal protection rights were
violated because his confinement on “TRO” status was unjustified and the disciplinary
charges were not resolved in a timely manner. He further alleged his Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated because the special cell
was “inherently unsafe, unmonitored and punitive in nature,” and because he was denied
direct sunlight, showers, and yard time on several occasions. He also alleged defendants’
actions caused “great emotional stress, loss of his job, loss of schooling, loss of a proper
and accurate evaluation for redetermination of his sentence, loss of visitation and equal
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privileges of similarly situated inmates.” Complaint at 11.
Although Treff paid the full filing fee, the district court sua sponte dismissed the
complaint before it was served on defendants, finding the complaint failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Treff contends on appeal the district court acted
improperly in sua sponte dismissing his complaint, and that payment of the full filing fee
entitled him to service of his complaint on defendants.
We reject Treff’s arguments. The 1996 Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
“was intended to curtail what was perceived to be the over involvement of federal courts
in managing state prison systems,” and “to stem the tide of frivolous prisoner suits.”
Hadix v. Johnson, ___ F.3d ___, 1998 WL 177343 *4 (6th Cir. 1998). The PLRA added
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires a district court to “review, before docketing, if
feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The district court is required
to dismiss a prisoner’s civil complaint if it concludes it “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
Because Treff satisfied the definition of “prisoner” in § 1915A(c) and he filed a
civil suit against employees of a governmental entity, § 1915A(a) required the district
court to conduct an initial screening of the complaint prior to service on the named
defendants, notwithstanding the fact that Treff had paid the filing fee. Moreover, because
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the court concluded the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, it was required to dismiss the complaint pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1). In short, we
conclude the court acted properly in dismissing the complaint without first allowing
service on defendants.
As for the merits of Treff’s complaint, which we review de novo, we agree that it
fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,
114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997) (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Kidd v. Taos Ski
Valley, Inc., 88 F.3d 848, 854 (10th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).
Treff’s twenty-six days of disciplinary segregation failed to encroach upon a due process
liberty interest because it did not “impose[] atypical and significant hardship on [Treff] in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484
(1995). Nor did the disciplinary confinement violate Treff’s equal protection rights.
Unless Treff is a member of a suspect class or a fundamental right is at stake (neither of
which Treff alleged), disparate treatment need only be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. Riddle v. Mondragon, 83
F.3d 1197, 1207 (10th Cir. 1996). Maintaining jail security is a legitimate governmental
purpose, and prison officials have wide discretion to determine measures to be taken to
preserve order and security in a detention facility. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-
85 (1987). Determining a particular inmate (in this case Treff) has committed
disciplinary infractions and imposing corresponding disciplinary segregation are certainly
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within that discretion and do not violate equal protection. The allegations in the
complaint concerning conditions of confinement fail to demonstrate Treff was denied
“the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities,” or that any of the defendants acted
with “deliberate indifference” to his health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994).
AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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