UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 97-60842
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
MICHAEL ALEXANDER, also known as Sneaky, also known as,
Lowlow, also known as Anthony Johnson
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(3:97-CR-39-ALL-WN)
August 3, 1998
Before WISDOM, JONES, and E. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
A jury convicted Michael Alexander of armed carjacking, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119. He was 16 years old when he
committed the offense. The district court sentenced him to an 84-
month term of imprisonment. Alexander timely filed this appeal in
which he alleges three assignments of error: (1) the district court
*
Under 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
erred by certifying him as an adult for prosecution; (2) the
district court erred by admitting his confession into evidence
without first conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine its
voluntariness; and (3) his confession was not sufficiently
corroborated by other evidence. None of Alexander’s arguments is
persuasive. We affirm.
We review the district court’s decision to transfer Alexander
for adult prosecution for abuse of discretion, provided that the
court made specific findings with respect to certain criteria.2
Title 18 U.S.C. § 5032 requires the district court to consider the
following factors before transferring a juvenile for adult
prosecution: (1) the juvenile’s age and social background; (2) the
nature of the alleged offense; (3) the extent and nature of the
juvenile’s prior delinquency record; (4) the juvenile’s present
intellectual development and psychological maturity; (5) the nature
of past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s response to such
efforts; and (6) the availability of programs designed to treat the
juvenile’s behavioral problems. In the case at bar, the district
court made specific findings with respect to all six factors.
Especially in light of the seriousness of the crime with which
Alexander was charged, we cannot say that the district court abused
its discretion in granting the government’s transfer motion.
Alexander did not challenge the voluntariness of his
2
United States v. Bilbo, 19 F.3d 912, 915 (5th Cir. 1994).
2
confession in the district court. Accordingly, we review his
argument that the district court erred by failing to sua sponte
conduct a hearing on the issue of the voluntariness of his
confession for plain error.3 The district court did not commit
error, plain or otherwise. It would have been required to conduct
a hearing sua sponte only if “the evidence raised a genuine issue
of voluntariness.”4 It clearly did not. When Alexander testified
at his transfer hearing, he plainly admitted during cross-
examination that he confessed by his own free will.
Finally, we will not disturb the jury’s verdict if a rational
trier of fact could have found Alexander guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.5 At trial, the government adduced considerable evidence
that corroborated Alexander’s confession.6 The victim identified
Alexander as the man that stole his black Lexus automobile at
gunpoint, and Alexander’s cousin testified that he witnessed
Alexander driving a black Lexus on the same morning that the crime
took place. Alexander’s conviction is more than amply supported by
the evidence.
AFFIRMED.
3
See United States v. Iwegbu, 6 F.3d 272, 274 (5th Cir.
1993).
4
Id.
5
United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 607 (5th Cir. 1998).
6
See United States v. Garth, 773 F.2d 1469, 1479 (5th Cir.
1985).
3