F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 9 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
AL YEAGER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-5053
(D.C. No. 95-CV-1045-E)
PURINA BENEFIT ASSOCIATION (N.D. Okla.)
LONG-TERM DISABILITY PLAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, McKAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff brought this action against the long-term disability plan of his
former employer, seeking disability benefits. Plaintiff was employed by a
subsidiary of Ralston Purina Company, which established the defendant plan to
provide long-term disability benefits for its employees. Plaintiff’s application for
long-term disability benefits was denied because the employer determined
plaintiff was not eligible for such benefits under the terms of the plan. Plaintiff
brought suit, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
defendant, finding that plaintiff was not eligible for benefits under the terms of
the plan.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and
apply the same standard as the district court. See Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1992). “Summary judgment is
appropriate if ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)). We affirm for the same reasons as set forth in the district court’s
opinion.
Plaintiff’s employment was terminated on May 13, 1994. Several days
before that, plaintiff became totally disabled. 1 The benefits provision of the
1
Plaintiff claims the date of his disability is May 5, 1994, and defendant
submits May 9, 1994. The difference between the two dates is irrelevant for
purposes of this appeal.
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eligibility section of the long-term disability plan provides that benefits will be
paid “[u]pon receipt of written proof as required by Section 5.1 demonstrating
that a Covered Employee, while covered under this Plan, became Totally Disabled
and remained so Totally Disabled during the Qualifying Disability Period.”
Appellant’s App. at 131. The Qualifying Disability Period is defined as “180
consecutive days of continuous Total Disability.” Id. at 128. Coverage
terminates under the plan when a “Covered Employee ceases to perform work as a
regular employee other than a result of a Total Disability . . ..” Id. at 130. We
agree with the district court that plaintiff was not eligible for benefits under the
plan because he did not 1) become totally disabled while he was a Covered
Employee; and 2) remain totally disabled while he was a Covered Employee for
the qualifying period (180 days).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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