F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 11 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LAWRENCE J. ESPINOSA,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
No. 96-2077
(D.C. No. CIV-92-698-MV)
JOE WILLIAMS, Warden,
(District of New Mexico)
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, HENRY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
In January 1987, Lawrence Espinosa was indicted by a New Mexico grand
jury on numerous charges arising out of the murder of Oscar Barajas and an
attempted armed robbery at a Howard Johnson’s motel in Albuquerque.
Following a two-day jury trial, Espinosa was convicted of felony murder,
attempted armed robbery, kidnapping and false imprisonment. He was sentenced
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions
of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
to life imprisonment plus fifteen years and six months. On July 6, 1992, Espinosa
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 which was
dismissed with prejudice. Espinosa now appeals this dismissal. He maintains
that his attorneys’ performance at trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel and that certain instructions given to the jury
regarding felony murder warrant reversal of his conviction. We exercise
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and affirm.
I
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of
law and fact which is reviewed de novo. Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1474
(10th Cir. 1995). In order to prevail, Espinosa must satisfy both parts of the test
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984): “First, the
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. . . . Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” As
this circuit has interpreted Strickland, Espinosa must demonstrate
that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that but for counsel’s deficiencies a reasonable
probability exists the proceedings would have resulted in a different
verdict. Restated, [he] must show his attorney’s performance was
both substandard and prejudicial to his defense, taking into account
the strength of the government’s case. Trial strategies necessarily
evolve without the benefit of hindsight. Accordingly, we afford a
high level of deference to the reasonableness of counsel’s
performance in light of all the circumstances at the time of the
-2-
alleged error. The ultimate inquiry, of course, focuses on the
fundamental fairness of the proceeding.
United States v. Maxwell, 966 F.2d 545, 547-48 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
In evaluating counsel’s performance, we are mindful that there is a “wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Moreover, “prejudice” in this context means that “counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
Id. at 687. Unless both elements of Strickland are satisfied, “it cannot be said
that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that
renders the result unreliable.” Id.
Espinosa points to numerous omissions to demonstrate defense counsel’s
substandard performance. 1 They include the failure to impeach the state’s
primary witnesses, to file motions in limine, to object to prejudicial testimony,
and to present evidence concerning a possible third person at the crime scene.
A
The critical witnesses linking Espinosa to the crime were co-defendant and
admitted accomplice, Simon Aragon, and Espinosa’s friend, Henry Alderete.
Espinosa contends trial counsel’s cross-examination of Aragon and Alderete was
1
Prior to denying Espinosa’s habeas petition, the district court conducted an evidentiary
hearing examining this claim, a transcript of which is included in the record on appeal.
-3-
inadequate and that counsel failed to call certain witnesses to impeach their
testimony.
With respect to Espinosa’s claim of ineffective cross-examination, we note
that defense counsel emphasized to the jury that Aragon and Alderete received
significant concessions from the state in return for their testimony. Counsel
emphasized that both were admitted heroin addicts and convicted felons.
Additional impeachment evidence therefore would have been of minimal utility to
Espinosa.
Even were we to accept Espinosa’s contention that trial counsel could have
sought prospective witnesses more earnestly, our review of the record reveals that
these witnesses would have had little impact on the outcome of the trial. As
discussed above, counsel had already put into question Aragon and Alderete’s
credibility. Moreover, had they testified, each of the uncalled witnesses would
have presented testimony contradicting Aragon and Alderete’s testimony, but only
as regarding Espinosa’s whereabouts and activities well before or well after the
commission of this crime. Their testimony—even if believed by the jury—would
have had only peripheral impeachment value.
. B
Espinosa contends trial counsel unreasonably failed to file motions in
limine to exclude certain evidence. Deciding whether to file such motions “is
-4-
clearly part of the process of establishing trial strategy. A defendant may prevail
on an ineffective assistance claim relating to trial strategy only if he can show
counsel’s strategy decisions would not be considered sound.” Jones v. Stotts, 59
F.3d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1995). We agree with the district court’s assessment that
counsel did not err by not filing motions in limine. Counsel were
experienced with the practices and procedures of the trial judge and
raised [evidentiary matters] in pretrial conference. The judge
advised that objections should be made at trial . . . . There are
alternative ways of bringing concerns to the court’s attention besides
the filing of papers.
Vol. I, Doc. 120 at 25; see Evidentiary Hr’g Tr. 1-3-95 at 82-83, 129, 146, 154,
274-75.
C
At trial, Aragon testified he saw Espinosa in jail following the murder, and
spontaneously added that Espinosa was in custody for a different charge, “trying
to rob a taxicab or assaulting a taxicab or something like—.” Trial Tr. at 114.
Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the
motion on the grounds that the prosecution had taken steps to prevent disclosure
of this information, and that defense counsel could have acted more diligently in
opposing the line of questioning leading to Aragon’s unsolicited statement.
We agree with Espinosa that counsel’s sluggish reaction could be described
as substandard attorney performance under Strickland. However, we do not find
prejudice of a constitutional magnitude. No further reference was made to this
-5-
outburst and, in light of the other evidence presented, there does not appear to be
“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 2
D
A witness to the crime informed police that, in addition to the two male
intruders, there may have been an Hispanic female present at the crime scene.
Espinosa maintains his attorneys failed to properly investigate his suggestion to
them that Aragon’s girlfriend, Frances Montoya, may have been the third suspect
in question. In evaluating this claim, we note that defense counsel is required “to
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
Counsel explained during the evidentiary hearing that members of the
defense team conducted an investigation but were unable to locate Montoya.
Espinosa countered by introducing the testimony of an investigator with the
Federal Public Defender’s office, who had been able to do so several years later.
When asked whether it was easy to locate Ms. Montoya, however, the investigator
stated, “[n]ot really.” Evidentiary Hr’g Tr. 12-14-94 at 118. Thus we cannot
conclude that counsel’s investigation was unreasonable.
2
Espinosa also contends that trial counsel erred in failing to object to the introduction of
evidence at several other times during the trial. We conclude, after reviewing the record, that
defense counsel’s performance as to these evidentiary matters did not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland.
-6-
Trial counsel’s ability to conduct a more thorough investigation was
substantially impeded by Espinosa’s mercurial version of events. He initially told
his attorneys that he was the third person at the scene, later admitted he was the
gunman, and later still resorted to the alibi he now asserts, namely that he spent
the night in question with an unidentified man. Espinosa’s failure to provide his
attorneys with more consistent information bars the conclusion that defense
counsel failed in their investigative duties. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
Espinosa contends defense counsel’s opening statement improperly
theorized about a third person’s involvement in the crime. 3 Espinosa claims this
constitutes substandard lawyering because it left the possibility of a third
participant, perhaps Espinosa, “just hanging out there.” Appellant’s Br. at 39.
We disagree. “[T]o rise to the level of constitutional ineffectiveness, [counsel’s]
decision . . . must have been completely unreasonable, not merely wrong, so that
it bears no relationship to a possible defense strategy.” Hoxsie v. Kerby, 108
F.3d 1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 66
U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1997) (No. 96-9364). Counsel was aware that a third
suspect could—and probably would—be mentioned during the course of trial and
may have mentioned the third person in order to pre-empt the issue. Additionally,
3
For purposes of analysis, we accept as true Espinosa’s contention that a third suspect was
mentioned during the defense’s opening statement. Apparently, however, that statement was
never transcribed. See Evidentiary Hr’g Tr. 12-14-94 at 30-31. Consequently, it is not contained
in the appellate record.
-7-
the testimony regarding the third person at the scene described the individual as
“20 to 23 years old . . . [a] Spanish female . . . shorter than [the witness] in build,
had a light complexion, black, medium-length hair [which was] pulled back [with]
no bangs.” Trial Tr. at 162. It is unlikely the jury would have inferred that that
person was Espinosa. Finally, counsel’s reference to a third suspect may have
benefitted the defense by casting doubt on Aragon’s testimony that only he and
Espinosa were involved in the commission of these crimes.
Even were we to assume counsel’s performance in this case fell outside the
wide range of professionally competent assistance, such errors would not
undermine our confidence in the outcome. We cannot say that Espinosa was
deprived “of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687. Consequently, we affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss Espinosa’s
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
II
Several years after Espinosa was convicted, the New Mexico Supreme
Court reexamined the state’s felony murder statute in State v. Ortega, 817 P.2d
1196 (N.M. 1991). The Ortega court construed the statute “as requiring proof that
the defendant intended to kill the victim (or was knowingly heedless that his or
her acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm)” thus
removing the statute from the “threat of unconstitutionality.” Id. at 1204-05.
-8-
Felony murder in New Mexico therefore requires a finding of intent to kill, as
thus defined, in addition to the intent to commit the underlying felony. See State
v. Hernandez, 846 P.2d 312, 329 (N.M. 1993). On appeal, Espinosa argues that
the jury instructions in his case were improper because they did not require a
finding that he possessed the requisite intent to kill. We need not decide whether
Ortega applies retroactively because, even assuming it does and that the
instructions were thus flawed, our independent review of the record leads us to
conclude that such assumed error does not mandate habeas relief here.
The Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Roy, 117 S.Ct. 337 (1996)
(per curiam), addresses a similar legal issue and demarcates the parameters of our
analysis. In Roy, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that an erroneous
jury instruction mandated habeas relief. Id. at 338. The instruction at issue in
Roy was erroneous under state law because it did not inform the jury that to
sustain a guilty verdict, the jury must find that the defendant had intended to aid
in the commission of the crime. As is the situation in this appeal, the Roy Court
noted that “[n]o one claims that the error at issue here is of the ‘structural’ sort”
and the Court characterized this “error in the instruction that defined the crime,”
as a “trial error.” Id. at 339. As such, the appeal was “a case for application of
the ‘harmless error’ standard as enunciated in Brecht [v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619 (1993)] and O’Neal [v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995)].” Id.
-9-
Under Brecht, a federal court reviewing a state court determination in a
habeas corpus proceeding should apply the “harmless error” standard enunciated
in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946)—“whether the error ‘had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’”
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776); see Roy, 117 S.Ct.
at 338. In O’Neal, the Supreme Court added that, in applying this standard in a
habeas proceeding, if a reviewing court “is in grave doubt as to the harmlessness
of an error,” the habeas “petitioner must win.” 513 U.S. at 437; see Roy, 117
S.Ct. at 338.
The jury in this case was instructed that it could only find Espinosa guilty
of felony murder if it found that: (1) defendant committed kidnapping and caused
the death of Mr. Barajas; or (2) defendant attempted to commit armed robbery and
caused the death of Mr. Barajas; or (3) someone caused the death of Mr. Barajas
and defendant was an accomplice to kidnapping and/or attempted armed robbery. 4
The jury was also instructed that to find Espinosa guilty of kidnapping, it had to
find “defendant took or restrained [the kidnapping victim] by force; [and] . . .
defendant intended to hold [the kidnapping victim] for service against her will.”
R. Proper at 71.
4
All three of these instructions are erroneous under Ortega because none requires a
finding that the defendant not only “caused” the death of Oscar Barajas, but also intended to do
so.
-10-
The jury returned a guilty verdict as to felony murder, kidnapping and
attempted armed robbery. 5 The jury also returned a unanimous special
interrogatory verdict, finding that Espinosa committed murder in the course of
both kidnapping and attempted armed robbery, and that he used a firearm in the
course of the kidnapping.
Espinosa argues that, because the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on
the element of intent to kill, the jury could have impermissibly found Espinosa
guilty of murder based on accomplice liability—regardless of his intent to cause
the death of Mr. Barajas. We are not persuaded. Under the kidnapping
instruction given, the jury could not have found the defendent guilty of
kidnapping as an accomplice. Our review of the record demonstrates that the only
evidence presented to the jury is that the principal kidnapper was the gunman.
Thus, the jury necessarily found that Espinosa was the gunman.
In Ortega, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that,
intent to kill in the form of knowledge that the defendant’s acts
“create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm” to the
victim or another, so that the killing would be only second degree
murder . . . if no felony were involved, is sufficient to constitute
murder in the first degree when a felony is involved . . . .
Ortega, 817 P.2d at 1205; see State v. Lopez, 920 P.2d 1017, 1020 (N.M. 1996)
(“[O]ur felony-murder rule is best described as elevating the crime of second-
5
The jury was also instructed on one count of false imprisonment, as to which it also
returned a guilty verdict.
-11-
degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed during the
course of a dangerous felony.”); see also N.M. Stat. Ann., § 30-2-1(B) (Michie
1978) (defining murder in the second degree). A jury in New Mexico can imply
malice if it finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was committed by
means of a deadly weapon. See State v. Vigil, 533 P.2d 578, 583 (N.M. 1975);
State v. Anaya, 460 P.2d 60, 62 (N.M. 1969).
Viewing the jury’s findings in conjunction with a review of the record we
find the erroneous instructions harmless. All the evidence shows that the gunman
possessed the intent required for felony murder under New Mexico law. The
record indicates that the gunman was aware that his acts created, at the very least,
a strong possibility of great bodily harm. Eyewitnesses presented unrefuted
testimony that the masked gunman entered the motel, pointed a gun at several
individuals, pressed the gun to the head of the kidnapping victim, and made
several threats to shoot bystanders if they did not comply with his orders. The
murder victim was shot twice, once in the back, when he came to the aid of the
kidnapping victim.
Based on this uncontroverted evidence and on New Mexico state law, we
are not in grave doubt but that the jury’s verdict encompassed a finding that
defendant had the intent required for felony murder. Thus, we do not agree that
the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict.
-12-
AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
-13-