F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 12 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOSEPH ROBERT SAAVEDRA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
No. 96-2113
JOHN THOMAS, Warden; (D.C. N.M.)
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE (No. CIV-94-170-JP)
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Joseph Robert Saavedra appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition.
We affirm.
I.
Saavedra was convicted of two counts of armed robbery, two counts of
conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and aggravated assault. These charges
stemmed from the August 31, 1988, robberies of Roger Ward at Allsup’s Store
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
and Edna Maes at Rio Grande Oil. His codefendant, Oracio Mares, entered into a
plea agreement and testified for the prosecution at Saavedra’s trial. Saavedra’s
convictions were affirmed on direct appeal to the state court. Two habeas
petitions in state court were denied. Saavedra filed his federal § 2254 petition on
February 16, 1994. The district court denied one claim on June 12, 1995, and
then denied the remaining claims on April 22, 1996.
II.
On appeal, Saavedra contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct that
violated his due process rights, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel,
that the trial court engaged in conduct so prejudicial that it violated his due
process rights, and that his rights to due process were violated when the
prosecution induced his codefendant to enter into a plea agreement in exchange
for testimony against Saavedra.
Prosecutorial misconduct
To be entitled to habeas relief for prosecutorial misconduct, a petitioner
must show there was a violation of federal constitutional rights that so infected
the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process. Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1473 (10th Cir. 1994). Allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct present mixed issues of law and fact that are subject to
de novo review. Id.
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Saavedra argues the prosecution engaged in misconduct violative of his due
process rights by inducing his codefendant Mares to accept an improper and
highly favorable plea agreement contingent upon testimony implicating Saavedra. 1
Mares faced a sentence of seventy-four years’ imprisonment if convicted of all
charges, but the government agreed to recommend a sentence of eighteen years’
imprisonment if Mares pleaded guilty to armed robbery, or a sentence of three
years’ probation if Mares pleaded guilty and testified against Saavedra.
Saavedra cites United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527 (8th Cir. 1984),
in support of his argument. In Waterman, the panel reversed the district court’s
denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition, holding because Waterman’s accomplice
had entered into a plea agreement contingent upon the contents and results of his
testimony, the invitation to perjury was so great that Waterman was denied a fair
trial. Saavedra’s reliance on the panel’s decision in Waterman is misplaced,
however, because the Eighth Circuit considered the case en banc and affirmed the
district court. Id. at 1533. The opinion relied upon has no precedential value.
United States v. Gomez, 810 F.2d 947, 957 (10th Cir. 1987).
The plea agreement between Mares and the government is not a part of the
record on appeal, but trial testimony did not indicate the agreement was
1
Saavedra also asserts the plea agreement violated New Mexico’s habitual
offender statute. However, federal habeas relief is not available for violations of state
law. Lujan v. Tansy, 2 F.3d 1031, 1035-36 (10th Cir. 1993).
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contingent on specific results. Mares testified the agreement required him to
testify truthfully, and that his plea could be rejected based on how he testified.
See Gomez, 810 F.2d at 956 (testimony of accomplice who agreed to testify
truthfully in exchange for government’s agreement to support Rule 35 motion was
admissible). Saavedra offers no evidence that Mares’ agreement was improperly
contingent. See United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 196-201 (1st Cir. 1985)
(plea agreement that predicated accomplice’s sentence reduction on value or
benefit of his cooperation not impermissible inducement to lie).
Saavedra argues, in the alternative, the court should have specifically
instructed the jury concerning the nature of Mares’ plea agreement and the risk of
perjury it created. Saavedra cites Dailey, where the First Circuit held when an
accomplice has struck a plea agreement, the jury should be informed of the exact
nature of the agreement, defense counsel should be permitted to cross-examine
the accomplice about the agreement, and the jury should be specifically instructed
to weigh the accomplice’s testimony with care. 759 F.2d at 196. Here, the court
admitted the plea agreement into evidence and defense counsel cross-examined
Mares about the plea agreement. The court also gave the following jury
instruction:
You alone are the judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given to the testimony of each of them.
In determining the credit to be given any witness, you should
take into account his truthfulness and his untruthfulness, his ability
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and opportunity to observe, his memory and manner while testifying,
any interest, bias or prejudice that he may have, and the
reasonableness of his testimony considered in the light of all the
evidence which has been presented in this case.
Trial Tr. Vol. III at 8-9 (emphasis added). The court did not, as recommended in
Dailey, specifically instruct the jury to weigh Mares’ testimony with care.
Dailey is distinguishable. Saavedra seeks habeas relief from a state court
conviction while Dailey was a direct appeal. Any requirement that a trial court
specifically instruct a jury to weigh an accomplice’s testimony with care is not a
constitutional requirement and is not sufficient to entitle a petitioner to relief
under § 2254. Scrivner v. Tansy, 68 F.3d 1234, 1239 (10th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied 116 S. Ct. 1277 (1996). Federal habeas proceedings “may not be used to
set aside a state conviction on the basis of erroneous jury instructions unless the
errors had the effect of rendering the trial so fundamentally unfair as to cause a
denial of a fair trial in the constitutional sense.” Hunter v. New Mexico, 916 F.2d
595, 598 (10th Cir. 1990).
“The established safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system leave the
veracity of a witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of his
testimony to be determined by a properly instructed jury.” Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966). In Hoffa, the court held the fact that a government
informant was under federal indictment and may have had motives to lie did not
render his testimony constitutionally inadmissible. The necessary safeguards
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were fulfilled in that the informant was subjected to rigorous cross-examination,
and the trial court gave a general credibility instruction. Because these same
safeguards were present in the instant case, Saavedra’s claim of denial of due
process fails.
Testimony of Parole Status
Saavedra also accuses the government of eliciting evidence of his parole
status from Mares, in violation of the trial court’s order in limine which excluded
evidence of prior convictions. During trial, the government asked Mares about a
letter he had written in which he stated Saavedra was not with him during the
1988 armed robberies. 2 Mares testified he had given the letter to Saavedra’s
girlfriend:
Q. And to your knowledge she was going to give it to
Joseph Saavedra?
A. Yes.
Q. Who was going to do what with it?
2
Saavedra asserts in a footnote that the government violated New Mexico law by
assisting Mares in testifying falsely. He submits that because the prosecutor was aware of
Mares’ statement vindicating Saavedra, New Mexico’s rules of professional conduct
prohibited the prosecutor from offering Mares’ testimony that Saavedra participated in
the robberies. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 16-304. To the extent such a claim is even addressable
in a § 2254 petition, the claim is without merit. Mares initially told police officers that
Saavedra participated in the robberies and testified that his subsequent letter to the
contrary was a lie concocted at Saavedra’s direction. There is no evidence the
government assisted Mares in testifying falsely.
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A. To try to--if he was going to, you know, take it to court,
this Court, this--his charge to court for trying to get
them dropped, or to try to keep them from getting a
parole hearing or something.
Trial Tr. Vol. I at 207. Saavedra moved for mistrial on the basis that Mares’
reference to Saavedra’s parole status violated the court’s order in limine. The
court instructed the jury to disregard the last few words of Mares’ statement. The
court then questioned Mares outside the presence of the jury:
Q. . . . You were--you made a statement just a moment ago
concerning an attempt to help Mr. Saavedra on his
parole violation hearing, something to that effect. Were
you instructed not to go into that?
A. He just asked me not to mention that he was on parole
because it was--
Q. Okay. So Mr. Martinez asked you--
A. Because it might pertain to the case.
Q. Why did you say that, do you know?
A. Slip of the tongue. It was the truth. I am trying to tell
the truth and the questions were coming out pretty fast.
Id. at 209. The court concluded Mares’ reference to Saavedra’s parole status was
inadvertent and refused to grant a mistrial.
Saavedra argues his case is analogous to United States v. Sands, 899 F.2d
912 (10th Cir. 1990), a direct appeal. In Sands, the government agreed to advise
its witnesses not to mention the fact that Sands had been in a penitentiary. The
government asked a witness where Sands had lived during the time the witness
knew him and the witness responded Sands had been in prison. Sands moved for
a mistrial, but the motion was denied. This court held the district court erred in
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not granting the motion for mistrial, and that while the prosecutor’s conduct may
not have risen to the level of misconduct, it certainly bordered on negligence.
Sands is distinguishable from the present case. The trial court in Sands
found the prosecutor had not properly anticipated the witness’ answer to his
question. Here, there was no such finding. The prosecutor in this case reasonably
could have expected an answer to the effect that Mares had written the letter to
try to get the current charges against Saavedra dropped, rather than to benefit
Saavedra in a parole violation hearing. The government is normally not
responsible for unsolicited, non-responsive remarks from its witnesses. See
United States v. Copeland, 51 F.3d 611, 616 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 199
(1995).
The federal court may overturn a state court conviction only when the
defendant’s constitutional rights have been violated. Coleman v. Brown, 802
F.2d 1227, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986). To establish a constitutional violation from
improper admission of testimony, the testimony must have been so prejudicial in
the context of the proceedings as a whole as to deprive the defendant of the
fundamental fairness essential to the concept of due process. Nichols v. Sullivan,
867 F.2d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 1989). Given the strength of the government’s
case against Saavedra, including identification by the two victims and the
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testimony of Saavedra’s accomplice, Mares’ reference to Saavedra’s parole status
was not so prejudicial as to deprive Saavedra of due process.
Ineffective assistance of counsel
Saavedra contends he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel. To obtain reversal of a conviction on the basis of
ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show his counsel’s
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his
defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This requires
showing counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial.
Whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question
of law and fact which we review de novo. United States v. Prows, 118 F.3d 686,
691 (10th Cir. 1997).
Saavedra claims that prior to trial he discussed with his attorney tattoos he
had on his chest, arms, and hands. According to Saavedra, he told his attorney he
did not want to show the tattoos to the jury because they would think he was an
ex-convict. Saavedra alleges his attorney nevertheless forced him to display the
tattoos to the jury during cross-examination of Ward. Saavedra concedes his
attorney may have had a reason for the demonstration, such as to impeach Ward’s
description of Saavedra, but since Ward testified Saavedra wore a jacket covering
his entire chest, there was no reason to display his chest to the jury.
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Saavedra sets out his recollection of the tattoo display in an affidavit
attached to his brief in support of his § 2254 petition. There is no reference to
any such demonstration in the trial transcript. Even if the demonstration
occurred, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Rogers v. United States, 91
F.3d 1388, 1392 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 1000 (1997). Saavedra
has not overcome the presumption that the demonstration constituted sound trial
strategy. Here, counsel’s strategy could have been to display the tattoos to
impeach Ward’s description of Saavedra, which omitted any reference to tattoos.
Saavedra also asserts “defense counsel failed to impeach Mares effectively
with the improper plea agreement, failed to appeal all objections made at trial,
and failed to move for a mistrial when the only disinterested witness identified
Mares, not Saavedra as the robber.” Appellant’s Br. at 24. He argues the
cumulative effect of counsel’s omissions denied him a fair trial.
Saavedra’s counsel thoroughly cross-examined Mares with regard to his
plea agreement. Saavedra does not indicate what questions counsel should have
asked or what objections counsel should have appealed, and he cites no authority
that requires an attorney to appeal all objections made at trial. As for his
contention that counsel failed to move for mistrial “when the only disinterested
witness identified Mares, not Saavedra as the robber,” it is not clear to which
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witness he refers since he fails to reference the trial transcript. Both Ward and
Maes identified Saavedra as one of the robbers.
Trial Court’s Conduct
Saavedra claims the trial judge “displayed a hostile demeanor toward the
defense, openly yelling at defense counsel during trial.” Appellant’s Br. at 25.
To sustain an allegation of bias by the trial judge as a ground for habeas relief, a
petitioner must “factually demonstrate that during the trial the judge assumed an
attitude which went further than an expression of his personal opinion and
impressed the jury as more than an impartial observer.” Brinlee v. Crisp, 608
F.2d 839, 852-53 (10th Cir. 1979). Saavedra’s bare assertion, with no reference
to the trial transcript, fails to demonstrate bias on the part of the trial judge.
Saavedra also contends the trial court’s admission of a photograph array
violated his due process rights. He asserts a photograph display presented to
Ward and Maes before trial was unconstitutionally suggestive because the
photograph of Saavedra was glaringly different from the other four photographs
in the display. He was the only individual wearing a tank top with visible
tattoos. 3
3
While Saavedra’s tattoos may have rendered his appearance different from the
other men in the display, Ward testified that he saw no tattoos on Saavedra.
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Determining the constitutionality of a pretrial identification procedure
involves a two-step analysis; first, the court must determine whether the
procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, and if found to have been unnecessarily
suggestive, the court must weigh the corrupting influence against the reliability of
the identification. Grubbs v. Hannigan, 982 F.2d 1483, 1489-90 (10th Cir. 1993).
Whether admission of pretrial identification testimony violated due process is
reviewed de novo, although the underlying facts found by the state court are
entitled to a statutory presumption of correctness pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Id. at 1489 n.5.
Here, the trial court found two of the photographs “might be a little bit
different, but not to the point that they are impermissibly suggestive. If you look
at the profiles and you look at the face, direct face, then even the additional
photos may have some general similarities.” Tr. of Mar. 15, 1989, Proceedings at
33. Our review of the state court’s factual findings is precluded by Saavedra’s
failure to include the photograph display in the record on appeal. Therefore,
based on the record before us, we cannot conclude the display violated Saavedra’s
right to due process.
Saavedra also contends the trial court violated his right to due process by
limiting his voir dire of the jury. His attorney posed the following question
during voir dire: “Do you think that someone being very drunk or being very high
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would have any effect on their memory at all?” Trial Tr. Vol. I at 63. The trial
judge interrupted, stating he would not permit him to go into such hypothetical
and philosophical matters. Later, after asking if any of the potential jurors had
strong feelings about plea bargains, defense counsel asked a particular juror
whether he could think of a reason why someone might lie. The trial judge called
counsel to the bench and stated he would not permit such irrelevant questions.
The trial judge is responsible for insuring a defendant is not denied his
Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. United States v. Gillis, 942
F.2d 707, 709 (10th Cir. 1991). To guarantee an impartial jury, it is often
necessary for the voir dire examination to include specific questions concerning
particular sources of possible juror bias. Id. at 710. The trial court retains great
latitude, however, in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire.
Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 424 (1991).
Saavedra submits that because the prosecution relied so heavily on Mares’
testimony, it was important to uncover any prejudices that might have affected the
jurors’ ability to judge Mares’ credibility. The trial judge restricted Saavedra
from asking the venire “hypothetical” questions. He permitted questioning about
knowledge of cocaine abuse, how addicts get money to pay for cocaine, and the
effect of the passage of time on memory. He also allowed Saavedra to explain
plea agreements and to ask the potential jurors if they had strong feelings about
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plea bargains. Saavedra has not shown that limitations on voir dire resulted in a
biased jury or otherwise prejudiced his defense.
III.
We GRANT the certificate of probable cause 4 and AFFIRM the denial of
the petition.
Entered for the Court
MARY BECK BRISCOE
Circuit Judge
4
Because Saavedra filed his petition in the district court prior to the effective date
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the Act’s provisions which require
issuance of a certificate of appealability before petitioner may proceed on appeal are
inapplicable to this case. United States v. Kunzman, 125 F.3d 1363, 1364 n.2 (10th Cir.
1997).
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