F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
DEC 16 1997
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 96-3307
CALVIN MOORE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 92-20071-01)
Leon Patton, Assistant United States Attorney, Kansas City, Kansas, for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
David J. Phillips, Federal Public Defender, Kansas City, Kansas, for Defendant-
Appellant.
Before EBEL, LOGAN, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
This case involving a small-time drug conspiracy among crack addicts in
Kansas City, Kansas, has bedeviled the district court there for nearly five years,
requiring three separate sentencing hearings. We now conclude that the evidence
in the record is sufficient as a matter of law to support the district court’s finding
that Moore’s uncharged, unconvicted, post-conspiracy drug deal was part of the
same course of conduct encompassed in the conspiracy for which Moore was
charged and convicted. As a result, we affirm.
I.
The facts of this case were reported in an earlier panel decision, see United
States v. Moore, 83 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 1996), and only those facts relevant to
the resolution of this appeal will be repeated here. In the fall of 1991, federal
investigators became aware of a network of drug dealers operating out of a house
in Kansas City, and over the course of six months, undercover agents made five
purchases, for a total of 65 grams, of cocaine base (crack cocaine) from the
group. The largest single purchase was the last one, on March 5, 1992, for 22.6
grams of crack.
The investigation then entered a six-month hiatus as agents worked on
other cases, but in the fall of 1992, investigators decided it was time to put
Moore’s network out of business. Over the course of four days in early
September 1992, undercover agents negotiated and ultimately agreed with Moore
to purchase nine ounces of crack for $8,100. This was a much larger quantity
than any of their previous controlled buys from Moore. When the agents arrived
to pick up their purchase, Moore’s accomplice told them that Moore could only
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supply the crack one ounce at a time. The agents insisted on talking to Moore
directly about the change in the agreement, but when everyone emerged from the
house to use a car phone outside, the waiting surveillance team mistakenly
believed the transaction was complete, and they arrested Moore’s accomplice.
The nine ounces of crack cocaine never arrived at the house, and when
investigators searched the house, they did not find even the one ounce that had
been promised.
Moore subsequently pled guilty to one count in a six-count indictment, that
is, a conspiracy beginning October 3, 1991 and ending March 5, 1992. The
September 1992 deal for nine ounces of crack was not included in any count in
the indictment. Finding that Moore’s sentence calculation should include the
September 1992 deal, the district court sentenced Moore to 188 months in prison.
Thereafter, Moore’s trial counsel failed to file a timely appeal, and Moore
subsequently brought a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (habeas corpus) alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court granted Moore’s motion,
vacated his original sentence, and reimposed a 188-month sentence so that Moore
might have the opportunity to appeal the sentence.
On appeal, this circuit reversed and remanded the case because the district
court erroneously believed it was without jurisdiction to reevaluate the original
sentence or to hear new evidence. See Moore, 83 F.3d at 1235. At the new
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sentencing hearing, the district court heard extensive evidence and decided to
reverse one of its original findings, that Moore was an organizer, leader, manager
or supervisor in the conspiracy. As a result, the court calculated Moore’s total
offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines at 34, with a Category I criminal
history score, resulting in an available sentencing range of 151 to 188 months.
The court sentenced Moore at the bottom of the range -- 151 months -- because of
the “nature of the offense and the fact that the Defendant has no serious record of
criminal offenses.” Moore now challenges his new sentence, contending that the
nine-ounce deal that was never consummated should not have been included in
the drug-amount calculation and a correct calculation would have resulted in an
offense level of 32, with an available sentencing range of 121 to 151 months.
II.
We review a district court’s legal interpretations of the Sentencing
Guidelines de novo, but the factual findings underlying the district court’s
calculation of the offense level may be reversed only if they are clearly erroneous.
See United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1477 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 136 (1996). The government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence the amount of drugs attributable to a defendant for sentencing
purposes. See United States v. Richards, 27 F.3d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1994). We
will not disturb a sentencing court’s factual findings unless they are “without
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factual support in the record, or if after reviewing all the evidence we are left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” United
States v. Garcia, 78 F.3d 1457, 1462 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States v.
Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir. 1990)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1888
(1996).
After ten years of living under the Sentencing Guidelines, it is uncontested
today that uncharged, unconvicted conduct may be considered by a district court
in calculating a sentence. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines
Manual, § 1B1.3, comment. (backg’d) (Nov. 1991) (“Conduct that is not formally
charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction may enter into the
determination of the applicable guideline sentencing range.”); see also United
States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 638 (1997) (per curiam) (holding that even
conduct for which the defendant is acquitted may be considered for sentencing
purposes). It is well-settled in this circuit that a sentencing court may look
beyond the offense of conviction and “may consider quantities of drugs not
alleged in calculating a defendant’s base offense level, provided the drugs were
part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of
conviction.” United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973, 978 (10th Cir. 1993).
Moore does not challenge this well-settled principle.
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III.
A.
Moore has focused his argument in this appeal on the scope of section
2D1.4, the guideline for evaluating the amount of drugs attributable to a
conspiracy. 1 See U.S.S.G., § 2D1.4 comment. (n.1) (Nov. 1991). Section 2D1.4,
1
The parties also have disputed whether it was error for the district court to
use the Guidelines Manual that was effective November 1, 1992, rather than the
Manual effective November 1, 1991. The record indicates that the Court relied on
the November 1992 Manual even though the parties both agreed that the
appropriate Manual was the earlier one. (See R., vol. VIII, 1996 Sentencing Tr.,
324-25 (quoting language from the November 1992 Manual).)
Moore claims he was prejudiced by this mistake. He argues that because of
the terminology and structure of the 1991 guideline on drug conspiracies, the
calculation of his sentence should have been limited to his “offense of
conviction.” Moore argues that this prejudice arises from the fact that 1992
guideline for conspiracies eliminated the terminology and structure of the 1991
guideline. Compare U.S.S.G., § 2D1.4, comment. (n.1) (Nov. 1991) with
U.S.S.G., § 2D1.1, comment. (n.12) (Nov. 1992).
We note, however, that the Sentencing Commission said the change
between the 1991 and 1992 guidelines merely “clarifie[d] and simplifie[d] the
guideline provisions dealing with attempts and conspiracies in drug cases.”
U.S.S.G., App. C, Amend. 447 (Nov. 1992) (effective Nov. 1, 1992). Other
courts have held that Amendment 447 made no substantive change for sentencing
of conspiracies. See, e.g., United States v. Hendrickson, 26 F.3d 321, 330 n.6 (2d
Cir. 1994); United States v. Crawford, 991 F.2d 1328, 1332 n.3 (7th Cir. 1993).
In Moore’s case, though, we need not determine whether Amendment 447
effected a substantive change in the law because we resolve this case on other
grounds. As we discuss below, regardless of the scope of the conspiracy
guideline in section 2D1.4 (Nov. 1991), the district court appropriately considered
the uncharged September 1992 deal as “relevant conduct” under section 1B1.3
(Nov. 1991). Thus, the more important question for this case is not the wording
of the conspiracy guideline, but rather the requirements for finding uncharged
activity to be “relevant conduct.” For purposes of this appeal, there is no material
difference between the 1991 and 1992 Manuals on the scope of relevant conduct.
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however, is not the end of the analysis. This provision merely tells the district
court how to measure an amount of drugs that was under negotiation but not
actually delivered. See id. The next step for the district court is to follow the
Guidelines’ circuitous instructions for determining whether this negotiation
should be considered “relevant conduct.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(b) (“After
determining the appropriate offense guideline section . . . , determine the
applicable guideline range in accordance with § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).”).
Turning to the relevant conduct guideline, the district court is then directed to
review section 3D1.2(d), the guideline for grouping multiple offenses. See
U.S.S.G., § 1B1.3(a)(2) (Nov. 1991). 2 In the end, this hopscotch through the
Manual requires the district court to make specific findings first, that “the offense
[is] the type of offense that, if the defendant had been convicted of both offenses,
would require grouping with the offense of conviction,” and second, that “the
offense [i]s ‘part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan.’”
United States v. Taylor, 97 F.3d 1360, 1363 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting U.S.S.G., §
1B1.3(a)(2)).
We treat the determination of whether uncharged conduct is “groupable”
with the offense of conviction as a conclusion of law. See id. at 1363 (holding
2
The November 1992 Manual has a similar reference to the guideline for
grouping offenses. See U.S.S.G., § 1B1.3(a)(2) (Nov. 1992).
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that an appellate court may make a conclusion of law on the grouping question
despite the lack of a district court finding on the question). Thus, in this case, we
review the grouping issue de novo. The second requirement for determining
relevant conduct -- whether the offense is part of the same course of conduct or
common scheme -- is a pure factual question for which the district court must
make specific findings to support its sentence. See United States v. Crockett, 82
F.3d 722, 729-30 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that factual findings generally are
required, but the error in that case was harmless because the defendant’s actual
sentence would have been no different without the challenged unconvicted
conduct).
In Moore’s case, he claims that the September 1992 deal was outside the
scope of the indictment, which alleged a conspiracy ending in March 1992, and
therefore should not have been included in his sentencing calculation. 3 As
Moore’s counsel stated during the 1996 sentencing hearing, “[T]here has to be a
3
There is some doubt as to whether Moore’s counsel adequately presented
the argument he raises here to the district court so as to put the district court on
notice as to the issue in contention. Despite this possible waiver of the argument,
we have considered the issue because the government makes no claim to us that
Moore waived the argument, and the record arguably can be interpreted as raising
the issue: During the 1996 sentencing hearing, Moore’s counsel argued against
considering the September deal as part of the same course of conduct as the prior
five crack purchases.
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stop to the case. I think the case stopped back in March of 1992. And -- and
what went on [thereafter] was a leap of faith.”
Based on the record before this Court, it is clear as a matter of law that
Moore’s September 1992 agreement to sell nine ounces of crack was an offense
that would be “groupable” with his conviction for conspiracy to distribute crack.
Cf. Taylor, 97 F.3d at 1364 (finding that a dismissed drug conspiracy count was
“groupable” with the drug manufacturing count to which the defendant pleaded
guilty). Section 3D1.2(d) makes grouping of certain drug offenses, including
distribution, mandatory. See U.S.S.G., § 3D1.2(d) (Nov. 1991). The application
note for this subsection requires the court to group a conspiracy or attempt charge
in the same manner as the underlying substantive offense. See id., comment.
(n.6). Thus, because Moore’s September 1992 agreement was an attempt to
distribute crack, it may be grouped together with his offense of conviction, i.e.,
conspiracy to distribute crack, as well as his other unconvicted offenses, i.e.,
distribution of crack.
When the district court discussed the inclusion of Moore’s September 1992
drug deal under Note 12 to § 2D1.1 (Nov. 1992) as part of the same course of
conduct as his earlier sales, it equated the inclusion of drug quantities under that
provision to the inclusion of drugs as relevant conduct. In that discussion, the
court said,
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There is no reason to conclude that offense there [in
Note 12 to § 2D1.1 (Nov. 1992)] does not include
relevant conduct, because that is precisely how offense
is defined in that guideline at U.S.S.G. Section 1B1.1,
Commentary Application Note 1-L. See U.S. v. Garcia,
69 F.3d at 810, Seventh Circuit case from 1995, which
uses [the] relevant conduct and negotiated amounts
provisions together, as well as U.S. v. Nichols, 986 F.2d
1199, Eighth Circuit, 1993.
The September 1992 drug deal can clearly be included for sentencing purposes as
relevant conduct under the 1991 version of the Sentencing Guidelines, which
Moore agrees is the correct version to use.
The legal standard for determining whether a defendant’s uncharged acts
are part of the same course of conduct as his offense of conviction is quite
generous. This circuit has adopted the view of the Second Circuit in
distinguishing between a “common scheme or plan” and the “same course of
conduct.” See Roederer, 11 F.3d at 979 (quoting United States v. Perdomo, 927
F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1991)). In assessing a defendant’s course of conduct, the
court is to consider such factors “‘as the nature of the defendant’s acts, his role,
and the number and frequency of repetitions of those acts, in determining whether
they indicate a behavior pattern.’ Similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity
are the significant elements to be evaluated.” Id. (quoting United States v.
Santiago, 906 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1991)).
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In Moore’s case, the record shows substantial similarity between his nine-
ounce crack deal in September 1992 and the smaller deals that comprised the
earlier conspiracy: The same undercover agents negotiated the deal, for the same
kind of illegal substance, using the same players in Moore’s crew of associates,
and relying on the trust and good faith that had developed from their earlier deals.
Although the amount of crack in the September 1992 was larger than ever before,
this difference does not outweigh the rest of the similarities with the earlier
activities.
As for the other Roederer factors of regularity and temporal proximity, we
believe that the six-month break in 1992 in Moore’s dealings with undercover
agents is insufficient to establish an interruption in his course of conduct. The
record establishes that on every occasion that undercover agents attempted to
arrange a purchase of drugs, Moore agreed and the deal eventually was
consummated. The regular pattern of drug purchases was interrupted only when
undercover agents decided for independent reasons to put the Moore investigation
into hiatus. However, when the agents resumed the investigation, they again met
with little difficulty in arranging a deal. Furthermore, the six-month hiatus does
not undermine the conclusion that Moore’s activity in September 1992 was
temporally proximate with the charged conspiracy in March 1992. See Roederer,
11 F.3d at 980 (finding temporal proximity in a course of cocaine dealing, despite
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a nine-month break in drug purchases during the buyer’s pregnancy). On the
basis of this record, we have come to a firm conviction that as a matter of law
Moore’s September 1992 deal for nine ounces of crack was part of the same
course of conduct as his earlier drug deals.
B.
The parties spend much of their briefs arguing over the applicability of
Footnote 4 in Reyes, specifically the statement there that a quantity of drugs
under negotiation may not be included in sentencing as relevant conduct unless
there is evidence that the defendant actually possessed or distributed the drugs.
Reyes, 979 F.2d at 1408 n.4. Moore believes that in light of this footnote,
because there was no evidence that he actually possessed or distributed the
disputed nine ounces of crack, this deal cannot be included in his sentence. This
Court, however, views Footnote 4 as pure dictum, and thus, the statement is not
controlling.
Reyes involved a defendant who had pleaded guilty to one count of using a
telephone to facilitate a cocaine distribution conspiracy. Id. at 1406-07. The
defendant accepted the court’s finding that ten ounces of cocaine purchased by his
co-conspirators could be attributed to him, but he challenged the inclusion of
another pound of cocaine that the government claimed he negotiated to sell to
government agents. See id. at 1407-08, 1407 n.2. The Reyes panel reversed the
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defendant’s sentence solely on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to
conclude an actual negotiation or agreement occurred. Id. at 1410-11. The court
specifically acknowledged in Footnote 4 that it need not reach the question of
whether the pound of cocaine could be considered relevant conduct. See id. at
1408 n.4. The finding that there was no negotiation or agreement meant that there
was no activity -- such as the alleged negotiation -- that could be considered
“conduct,” let alone whether it would be “relevant” for sentencing.
In support of our view that Footnote 4 is not controlling, we note the
holdings from other circuits that uncharged amounts of drugs in a drug conspiracy
may be attributed to a defendant as relevant conduct even if he never actually
possessed or distributed the drugs. See, e.g., United States v. Ynfante, 78 F.3d
677, 680-82 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding a sentence based on an agreement to sell
two ounces of cocaine even though only one ounce was delivered); United States
v. Garcia, 69 F.3d 810, 818-20 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding a sentence based on
negotiations to deliver four kilograms of cocaine); United States v. Davern, 970
F.2d 1490, 1493-95 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding a sentence based on agreement to
buy 500 grams of cocaine when only 85 grams were actually delivered). 4
4
Even the defendant in Reyes conceded this point, that a negotiated amount
of drugs may be included in a sentencing calculation even if the defendant did not
actually possess or distribute those drugs. See Reyes, 979 F.2d at 1408. This
concession by the defendant confirms our conclusion that the court’s discussion in
Footnote 4 is dicta.
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IV.
Moore raises an alternative argument in this case that the district court
erred in finding that he fully intended and was capable of delivering the nine
ounces of crack negotiated in the September 1992 deal. Moore contends that
there was insufficient evidence to support this factual finding under Application
Note 1 for section 2D1.4. 5
During the 1996 sentencing hearing, the district court found that the last
negotiation between Moore and undercover agents resulted in a firm agreement,
“virtually a bilateral contract.” The court found that Moore intended to deliver
the nine ounces of crack, and that he was capable of filling this order even though
it was more than ten times the amount of any previous purchase.
These factual findings are not clearly erroneous. There is ample evidence
in the record to support the district court’s view that even if Moore could not
deliver the nine ounces all at once, the offer to deliver the crack in one ounce
5
The district court actually relied on language in the 1992 Manual that is
identical, although located elsewhere, to the 1991 guideline. See U.S.S.G., §
2D1.1 (n.12) (Nov. 1992). The provision in both guidelines reads:
[W]here the court finds that the defendant did not intend
to produce and was not reasonably capable of producing
the negotiated amount, the court shall exclude from the
guideline calculation the amount that it finds the
defendant did not intend to produce and was not
reasonably capable of producing.
U.S.S.G., § 2D1.4 comment. (n.1) (Nov. 1991); U.S.S.G., § 2D1.1 (n.12) (Nov.
1992).
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installments showed an intent and capacity to fill the order. For example, the
government’s undercover agent testified that the course of negotiations with
Moore indicated a capacity to deliver up three to four ounces a week, and Moore
never indicated an intent not to ultimately deliver all nine ounces. Consequently,
we reject Moore’s argument that the district court’s inclusion of the nine ounces
was improper under section 2D1.4.
V.
In light of our conclusion that the record supports a conclusion that as a
matter of law, Moore’s uncharged, unconvicted, post-conspiracy drug deal should
be considered as relevant conduct in his sentence, we AFFIRM.
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United States v. Moore
Combined Opinion