F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 11 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MICHAEL MINTZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-3081
(D.C. No. 93-CV-3535-RDR)
GARY L. HENMAN, Warden; (D. Kan.)
FRANCISCO DELMURO, M.D.;
GILBERTO MEJIA; (NFN)
(HAROLD) HARRELL, Assistant
Warden; THOMAS V. (KRAJENKA);
KRAJENTA; TERRY L. CAIN;
JOSEPH M. MENDEZ; THOMAS S.
HYDE; MICHAEL (TALBOT)
TOLBERT; AND GREGORY G.
HOUGH,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Michael Mintz, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s entry
of summary judgment in favor of defendants on his civil rights claims. Plaintiff
concedes that, in responding to defendants’ motion, he did not come forward with
evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact. See Kaul v. Stephan, 83
F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing standard for evaluating merits of a
summary judgment motion). He asserts, however, that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment in spite of his request for additional time to conduct
discovery, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). 1 After reviewing the district court’s
ruling for abuse of discretion, see International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v.
Wyoming Coal Ref. Sys. Inc., 52 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir. 1995), we affirm.
1
Rule 56(f) provides:
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the
party’s opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment
or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
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Fed R. Civ. P. 56(f) allows a party opposing a motion for summary
judgment to seek deferral of a ruling pending discovery of essential facts. See
Committee for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1521-22 (10th
Cir. 1992). The rule is not “invoked by the mere assertion that discovery is
incomplete or that specific facts necessary to oppose summary judgment are
unavailable.” Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d 828, 833
(10th Cir. 1986). A party requesting additional time must provide an affidavit
“identifying the probable facts that are not available,” listing the steps “taken to
obtain these facts,” and explaining “how additional time will enable him to rebut
movant’s allegations of no genuine issue of fact,” Committee for the First
Amendment, 962 F.2d at 1522 (quotation omitted). “The purpose of the affidavit
is to ensure that the nonmoving party is invoking the protections of Rule 56(f) in
good faith and to afford the trial court the showing necessary to assess the merit
of a party’s opposition.” Id. (quotation omitted). If the party seeking deferral has
been dilatory, “no extension will be granted.” Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency
of Sandy City, 998 F.2d 1550, 1554 (10th Cir.1993).
Here, defendants filed their summary judgment motion on March 5, 1996.
Acting pro se, plaintiff responded on March 21 with conclusory statements
unsupported by any evidentiary matter. At a pretrial hearing held April 17,
plaintiff indicated that no further discovery was necessary. On August 16, 1996,
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an attorney entered his appearance for plaintiff and asked for the court’s
permission to submit an out-of-time response to the summary judgment motion.
The district court granted the request. On the December 9, the attorney filed a
memorandum opposing the motion. The memorandum disputed defendants’
version of certain material facts, but noted that plaintiff could not yet produce
opposing affidavits and asked for “a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or discovery to be taken as envisioned by Rule 56(f).” Appellant’s App.
at 112, 113, 114. No affidavit accompanied the memorandum.
“[C]ounsel’s unverified assertion in a memorandum opposing summary
judgment does not comply with Rule 56(f) and results in a waiver.” Committee
for the First Amendment, 962 F.2d at 1522. Moreover, even if plaintiff’s
counseled memorandum may be construed as the requisite affidavit, the
submission does not meet the requirements of Rule 56(f). For instance, the
memorandum provides no information on the steps plaintiff had already taken to
obtain discovery. Finally, the record reflects that plaintiff was dilatory. He made
no attempt to obtain discovery, even during the four-month period between
counsel’s entry of appearance and the filing of the memorandum.
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Under the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) motion. The judgment of the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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