F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 17 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 96-1510
v. (D.C. No. 92-CR-334-B)
(D. Colo.)
ERIC G. MONCHECOURT,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Charlotte J. Mapes (Henry L. Solano, United States Attorney, with her on the
brief), Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Larry R. Keller (Charles R. Torres, Denver, Colorado, with him on the briefs), of
Keller & Lundgren, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before BRORBY, EBEL and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
Eric G. Monchecourt appeals from the district court's denial of his Rule
32(e) motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See Federal Rules of Criminal
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Procedure. Mr. Monchecourt also alleges the district court erred by failing to
recuse itself from ruling on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We have
jurisdiction under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b). 1 We affirm.
Background
On October 15, 1992, Mr. Monchecourt was charged with laundering of
monetary instruments, and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2. On October 30, 1992, Mr. Monchecourt entered into a
plea agreement with the government. Under the terms of this agreement, Mr.
Monchecourt agreed to provide truthful and candid testimony, and all relevant
documents in his control pertaining to the government's investigation of Power
Securities Corporation. 2 In exchange, the government agreed to a sentence of no
more than twelve months imprisonment, a fine of no more than $50,000, and no
restitution. On October 30, 1992, Mr. Monchecourt entered his plea in a change
1
Mr. Monchecourt's plea agreement predates the federal sentencing
guidelines regime.
2
Mr. Monchecourt was an owner, director and executive vice-president in
charge of sales and training for Power Securities Corporation. The government
alleged that brokers at Power Securities were engaged in an unlawful scheme to
use false or misleading statements and omissions to induce customers to purchase
or sell penny stocks, which the defendants secretly controlled and for which
brokers received kickbacks. See United States v. Marchese, 46 F.3d 1020, 1021-
22 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1105 (1995).
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of plea hearing during which District Judge Lewis T. Babcock administered a
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 protocol. Sentencing was postponed until after the trial of the
Power Securities principals.
As agreed, Mr. Monchecourt testified at the trial of Richard T. Marchese,
David R. Nemelka, Orville Leroy Sandberg, and Laura Lee Sorenson. 3 On April
15, 1996, at the conclusion of the bench trial before Judge Babcock, the district
court found Messrs. Marchese, Nemelka, and Sandberg not guilty, already having
dismissed Ms. Sorenson from the case on a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion. As part
of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the district court specifically
rejected Mr. Monchecourt's testimony, finding it incredible.
Subsequently, on June 27, 1996, Mr. Monchecourt filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, a motion the government opposed. After a hearing on
the matter, Judge Babcock denied Mr. Monchecourt's motion. Notwithstanding
the government's recommendation that Mr. Monchecourt receive a non-jail
sentence and no fine, Judge Babcock sentenced him to twelve months
3
Messrs. Marchese and Sandberg were identified as owners and directors
of Power Securities, Mr. Nemelka was a stock promoter, and Ms. Sorenson was
his assistant. Marchese, 46 F.3d at 1021.
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imprisonment and imposed a $10,000 fine.
Discussion
Mr. Monchecourt contends the district court erred when it denied his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e) provides that if a
motion to withdraw a plea is made before sentencing, as it was here, a district
court "may permit the plea to be withdrawn if the defendant shows any fair and
just reason." We review the district court's denial of Mr. Monchecourt's motion
to withdraw his guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d
413, 419 (10th Cir. 1996).
The burden is on Mr. Monchecourt to show a "fair and just reason" for
allowing withdrawal of his guilty plea. United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567,
1572 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1184 (1994). However, we have
held motions to withdraw guilty pleas prior to sentencing are to be viewed with
favor and freely allowed. Carr, 80 F.3d at 419-20 (citing multiple cases). In
determining whether Mr. Monchecourt has met his burden, we consider seven
factors: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted his innocence, (2) prejudice to
the government, (3) delay in filing defendant's motion, (4) inconvenience to the
court, (5) defendant's assistance of counsel, (6) whether the plea is knowing and
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voluntary, and (7) waste of judicial resources." Gordon, 4 F.3d at 1572. This
Court will not reverse unless Mr. Monchecourt can show the district court acted
"unjustly or unfairly." Id. at 1573.
In his Rule 32(e) motion to the district court, Mr. Monchecourt contended
only that his guilty plea was not supported by an adequate factual basis, and that
he himself had violated the terms of the plea agreement. On appeal, Mr.
Monchecourt now raises four specific allegations regarding the plea agreement,
and then asserts the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
withdraw his plea. He argues his plea was not voluntary and knowing because it
was induced by government misrepresentations and because it lacked an adequate
factual basis. He further alleges his guilty plea to a charge of aiding and abetting
cannot stand because the government failed to prove someone committed the
underlying substantive offense. Finally, Mr. Monchecourt contends the district
court failed to inform him that he would be unable to withdraw his guilty plea.
We will address these specific allegations and then turn to the more general
seven-factor analysis to determine whether the district court abused its discretion.
First, Mr. Monchecourt claims his due process rights were violated because
his guilty plea was induced by government misrepresentations and, therefore, was
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not voluntary and knowing. In essence, Mr. Monchecourt claims he pled guilty
because the government "promised" it could prove certain facts, and the
government "breached" the plea agreement when it failed to prove those facts,
i.e., when his alleged co-conspirators were acquitted.
Plea agreements are governed by contract principles. United States v.
Massey, 997 F.2d 823, 824 (10th Cir. 1993). Whether the government has
breached a plea agreement is a question of law we review de novo. Allen v.
Hadden, 57 F.3d 1529, 1534 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 544 (1995). The
United States Supreme Court has made it clear that "when a plea rests in any
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be
said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be
fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
Having thoroughly reviewed the record, particularly the Rule 11 hearing
and the terms of the plea agreement, we are satisfied the government did not
induce Mr. Monchecourt's guilty plea through the use of misrepresentations or
false promises. The government promised Mr. Monchecourt a sentencing cap; the
government and the district court honored that promise. The government did not
"promise" Mr. Monchecourt his alleged co-conspirators would be convicted. Nor
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does the acquittal of those individuals establish that the government could not
have proven its case against Mr. Monchecourt. Mr. Monchecourt's argument is
simply wrongheaded.
Second, Mr. Monchecourt argues his rights to due process have been
violated because his guilty plea lacked an adequate factual basis and was,
therefore, not knowing and voluntary. The gist of Mr. Monchecourt's argument is
that the district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the case of
United States v. Marchese, No. 93-CR-8 (D. Colo. Apr. 15, 1996), so undermine
certain statements in the plea agreement as to render the factual basis of his plea
agreement inadequate. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f) requires that "[n]otwithstanding the
acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such
plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for
the plea." The Advisory Committee Notes indicate the factual basis for a plea
may be developed by inquiry "of the defendant, of the attorneys for the
government and the defense, of the presentence report when one is available, or
by whatever means is appropriate in a specific case." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
Advisory Committee Notes (1974 Amendment note to subdivision (f)). A district
court's finding of a factual basis for a guilty plea is reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard. United States v. Graves, 106 F.3d 342, 343 (10th Cir. 1997).
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The district court scrupulously administered a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 protocol
at Mr. Monchecourt's October 30, 1992 change of plea hearing. At the Rule 11
hearing, Mr. Monchecourt ratified under oath the government's statement of the
case and the Defendant's Factual Statement, in which he allocuted to the essential
elements of money laundering. 4 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
During the Rule 32(e) motion hearing, the district court carefully
considered the impact of its findings in the bench trial of Mr. Monchecourt's
alleged co-conspirators on the factual basis for Mr. Monchecourt's guilty plea.
The district court concluded that while the evidence introduced against Mr.
Monchecourt's co-conspirators did not meet the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, it was "substantial" and did meet the preponderance standard. The
4
The Defendant's Factual Statement provides:
The defendant, ERIC G. MONCHECOURT, admits that he
knowingly caused a transfer of $25,935.00 from David Nemelka's
control to the account of Ven Roc Capital Corporation on October
14, 1987. The defendant also caused a transfer of $25,000 from Ven
Roc Capital Corporation's account to the account of Power Securities
Corporation on October 27, 1987. The defendant further admits that
he knew that the funds which he caused to be transferred represented
the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, that is, securities fraud
and mail fraud. The defendant knew that the transfer of the funds
was designed to conceal and disguise the source and the ownership of
the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity.
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district court further concluded the government's evidence was sufficient to carry
the case to the trier of fact, and enhanced rather than eroded the factual basis of
Mr. Monchecourt's plea. Moreover, the district court found Mr. Monchecourt's
self-incriminating testimony at the bench trial also enhanced the factual basis for
the guilty plea. The district court satisfied itself that an adequate factual basis for
Mr. Monchecourt's guilty plea existed at the time the plea was taken and at the
time of his Rule 32(e) motion. In view of the record before us, we cannot say the
district court's finding of an adequate factual basis for the guilty plea is clearly
erroneous. Mr. Monchecourt's claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary
must fail.
Third, in an argument not presented to the district court, Mr. Monchecourt
asserts his guilty plea was to a charge of aiding and abetting and cannot stand
because the government failed to prove someone committed the underlying
substantive offense. Mr. Monchecourt allocuted to the facts of and pled guilty to
the charge of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) as well as
aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2. In addition to the explicit terms of the
plea agreement, the district court made it quite clear to Mr. Monchecourt that the
primary charge was money laundering. This argument is unavailing.
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Finally, in yet another new argument on appeal, Mr. Monchecourt contends
the district court erred when it failed to inform him he would be unable to
withdraw his guilty plea if the sentencing court did not follow the government's
sentencing recommendation in all particulars. Notwithstanding the fact the plea
agreement is designated a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C) agreement, Mr.
Monchecourt would have us believe the agreement is actually a "hybrid"
agreement entitling him to the notice provisions afforded under Rule 11(e)(1)(B). 5
While this court can appreciate his distress at being sentenced to twelve
months imprisonment and a $10,000 fine after receiving a no-jail, no-fine
sentencing recommendation from the government, Mr. Monchecourt provides us
with no basis for concluding his was a hybrid plea agreement. By its terms, Mr.
Monchecourt's plea agreement was entered pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(e)(1)(C). We also note that in taking his plea, the district court was careful to
ensure Mr. Monchecourt understood both the terms of the agreement and the
finality of his plea. The district court specifically referred to the sentencing cap
and informed Mr. Monchecourt the sentence to be imposed from the cap
5
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2) provides in relevant part: "If the agreement is
of the type specified in subdivision (e)(1)(B), the court shall advise the defendant
that if the court does not accept the recommendation or request [for a particular
sentence] the defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw the plea."
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downward was the court's decision alone. The district court specifically inquired
into whether Mr. Monchecourt and his counsel had thoroughly reviewed the
possible penalties and consequences of a guilty plea, and was assured they had.
Mr. Monchecourt bargained only for a sentencing cap and he received the benefit
of that bargain. The district court had no further obligation to inform Mr.
Monchecourt that he would be unable to freely withdraw his plea.
Having addressed Mr. Monchecourt's specific allegations, we now consider
generally whether he has shown there is a fair and just reason for allowing
withdrawal of his guilty plea under our seven-factor analysis. See Gordon, 4 F.3d
at 1572. Having seen his colleagues at Power Securities acquitted, Mr.
Monchecourt now asserts his innocence, so the first factor weighs in his favor,
notwithstanding his earlier inculpatory admissions. The second factor, prejudice
to the government if he is allowed to withdraw his plea, weighs heavily against
Mr. Monchecourt. The district court expressed concern as to whether the statute
of limitations had run on much of Mr. Monchecourt's chargeable conduct. His
alleged co-conspirators have been acquitted so the government can provide no
incentive to secure their testimony against Mr. Monchecourt. Finally, the
government would have to expend considerable resources to try Mr. Monchecourt
in a trial the district court predicted would be long and complex. While some
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degree of prejudice to the government is inevitable from a plea withdrawal, here
it is significant. See Carr, 80 F.3d at 420.
The third factor, delay in filing the plea withdrawal motion, is a tossup. As
the district court noted, the unique and protracted circumstances of the underlying
case made considerable delay inevitable. However, Mr. Monchecourt did wait
until two months after his colleagues at Power Securities were acquitted before
filing his withdrawal motion, which could suggest manipulation. See, e.g.,United
States v. Vidakovich, 911 F.2d 435, 439-40 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1089 (1991); Carr, 80 F.3d at 420. The fourth factor, inconvenience to the
court, while not particularly compelling, weighs against Mr. Monchecourt. See
Carr, 80 F.3d at 420-21.
The fifth factor, defendant's assistance of counsel, does not weigh in favor
of Mr. Monchecourt. Mr. Monchecourt has never claimed ineffective assistance
of counsel. To the contrary, he expressed satisfaction with his counsel during the
Rule 11 hearing and retained them on appeal. We have already concluded the
plea was voluntary and knowing, so the sixth factor cannot weigh in Mr.
Monchecourt's favor. To the extent waste of judicial resources should be
considered, similar to inconvenience to the court, it weighs against Mr.
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Monchecourt. See Carr, 80 F.3d at 421. Taken together, the seven factors weigh
against Mr. Monchecourt. He has failed to show the district court acted unjustly
or unfairly in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Consequently,
under the circumstances of this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the district
court's denial of Mr. Monchecourt's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
However, Mr. Monchecourt also alleges the district court erred by failing to
recuse itself from ruling on his Rule 32(e) motion because Judge Babcock's
impartiality was in question and he had a personal bias against Mr. Monchecourt.
See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (discussing circumstances requiring disqualification of
judges). Since Mr. Monchecourt did not move for recusal, we review under a
plain error standard. United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269, 273 (10th Cir. 1995).
We use an objective test, asking "'whether a reasonable person, knowing all the
relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality.'" United States
v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Hinman v. Rogers, 831
F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987)), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1033 (1993).
In arguing for recusal, Mr. Monchecourt primarily relies on Judge
Babcock's credibility assessment of Mr. Monchecourt's testimony in the Marchese
bench trial, particularly focusing on the Judge's description of Mr. Monchecourt
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as a "crass liar." Each remark Mr. Monchecourt points to was made in the course
of ongoing judicial proceedings and did not rely on any "extrajudicial source."
See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 549-51 (1994) (explicating
extrajudicial source doctrine). Judicial opinions formed in the course of current
or prior proceedings will not support a recusal motion "unless they display a
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible."
Id. at 555. While unflattering to Mr. Monchecourt, Judge Babcock's remarks
describing him as a liar do not display the "deep-seated" antagonism that would
render fair judgment impossible. Cf. United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1416
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1169 (1995) (concluding judge's determination
that a defendant had not been candid was "no basis for disqualification").
Finally, Mr. Monchecourt contends Judge Babcock's decision to disregard
the government's sentencing recommendation evidences a clear inability to render
fair judgment. When he entered his guilty plea, Mr. Monchecourt was informed
the sentence to be imposed from the cap downward was the court's decision alone.
The term of imprisonment imposed, twelve months, is within the cap and the
$10,000 fine is well below the cap. Again, we find no evidence of disqualifying
bias or prejudice. Thus, we are unable to conclude a reasonable person would
doubt the impartiality of the district judge.
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We hold Mr. Monchecourt's guilty plea was voluntary and knowing and the
district court's denial of his plea withdrawal motion was proper. We find no
evidence the district court should have recused itself from ruling on Mr.
Monchecourt's motion. Therefore, the decision of the district court is
AFFIRMED, and we remand this case to the district court for such other
proceedings as may be required.
Entered for the Court
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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