F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 19 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MARVIN BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-2044
(D.C. No. CIV-96-968-JC)
NEW MEXICO DISTRICT COURT (D. N.M.)
CLERKS; VICKI AKENHEAD,
Managing Reporter; ANNETTE G.
ARAGON; and VIOLA W. LEWIS,
Official Court Reporters,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Marvin Brown, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff’s
complaint contends that he needed certain transcripts of an August 1992 hearing
in his criminal action in order to file a habeas petition. He contends he requested
these transcripts from the defendant court reporters, who first told him there was
no hearing on that date, but ultimately located and sent him the transcripts of the
hearing. He alleged that when he received the transcripts, they did not accurately
reflect all of the conversations during the hearing. Plaintiff asserted that the court
reporters purposely left out portions of the proceedings, allegedly to protect the
judge from “incriminating actions” taken during the hearing.
The district court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint sua sponte, prior to
service upon the defendants. Applying the rule of liberal construction for pro se
actions, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), the district court
construed plaintiff’s complaint as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district
court stated that plaintiff failed to allege that a federal right was violated or that
any such deprivation was caused by a person acting “under color of state law.”
The district court concluded that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief
-2-
could be granted and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2) and
Rule 12(b)(6) with prejudice.
On appeal, plaintiff contends the district court erred in dismissing his
complaint without first giving him an opportunity to cure any defects in his
complaint. We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. See Chemical
Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of the Army, 111 F.3d
1485, 1490 (10th Cir. 1997). We have not yet determined whether dismissal for
failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is reviewed for abuse of
discretion, see Schlicher v. Thomas, 111 F.3d 777, 779 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying
abuse of discretion standard to review a dismissal under § 1915(d), the precursor
to § 1915(e)(2)), or de novo, similar to the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6)
“failure to state a claim.” Because the district court’s decision was based on
failure to state a claim, rather than frivolousness, and relied on both § 1915 and
Rule 12(b)(6), we will apply the Rule 12(b)(6) de novo standard in this case.
Cf. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding
dismissals under new § 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A should be reviewed
de novo).
Plaintiff’s complaint did not reveal the nature of the hearing in question,
what was allegedly omitted from the transcripts, why the omission is necessary
to decide his habeas petition or how the alleged omissions or inaccuracies in his
-3-
transcript adversely affected him. Further, although the district court liberally
construed the complaint as seeking relief under § 1983, plaintiff failed to allege
any violation of a constitutional or other right or to specify any cause of action.
Nevertheless, although we have held that a district court may dismiss sua sponte
a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim, see McKinney v. Oklahoma,
925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991), we have also held that “[s]uch a dismissal is
appropriate only where it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not prevail
on the facts alleged, and allowing [him] an opportunity to amend [his] complaint
would be futile.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th Cir. 1997)
(quotations omitted); McKinney, 925 F.2d at 365.
Here, we cannot conclude that it is patently obvious that plaintiff could not
prevail on the facts alleged and allowing him an opportunity to amend his
complaint would be futile. See Forte v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1991)
(holding that civil rights claim that court reporter altered trial transcript was not
“indisputably meritless” and should not have been dismissed under § 1915
without giving plaintiff notice and an opportunity to amend his complaint). Some
courts have recognized § 1983 claims based on allegations that a court reporter
altered criminal trial transcripts. See id. at 3 (claim not “indisputably meritless”);
Curro v. Watson, 884 F. Supp. 708, 719, 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (recognizing
§ 1983 due process claim to reasonably accurate criminal trial transcript based
-4-
on allegation that court reporters deliberately altered transcripts, but dismissing
on qualified immunity grounds), aff’d, No. 95-2327, 1996 WL 19172, at **1
(2d Cir. Jan. 16, 1996) (unpublished disposition); Odom v. Wilson, 517 F. Supp.
474, 476 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (allegation that court reporter who deliberately
watered-down charge to jury states cognizable § 1983 claim); see also Antoine v.
Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1993) (holding that court
reporters are not absolutely immune from damages liability); McCullough v.
Horton, 69 F.3d 918, 919 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding it was abuse of discretion
to dismiss as frivolous claim that court reporter failed to provide inmate with
transcript of his criminal trial); Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d 1473, 1476-77 (10th
Cir. 1994) (district court erred in denying leave to amend complaint to allege
§ 1983 claim that court reporters refused to prepare transcripts, holding that
qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that can only be raised after
defendants have been served).
“[P]laintiff does not have a constitutional right to a totally accurate
transcript of his criminal trial.” Tedford v. Hepting, 990 F.2d 745, 747 (3d Cir.
1993). “His constitutional rights would be violated only if inaccuracies in the
transcript adversely affected the outcome of the criminal proceeding.” Id.;
see also Colyer v. Ryles, 827 F.2d 315, 316 (8th Cir. 1987) (civil complaint for
damages was frivolous where plaintiff was not prejudiced by allegedly altered
-5-
transcript). 1 Plaintiff has not alleged facts indicating how the alleged
inaccuracies in his transcript prejudiced him. However, because “pro se litigants
are to be given reasonable opportunity to remedy the defects in their pleadings,”
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 n.3 (10th Cir. 1991), the district court erred
in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice, without first giving him an
opportunity to amend his complaint to cure any deficiencies. See Forte, 935 F.2d
at 2, 4 (holding that pro se prisoner plaintiff, who failed to indicate how alleged
transcript alterations prejudiced him, should have been granted leave to amend his
complaint against the court reporter so as to state claim); see also McKinney, 925
F.2d at 365 (“Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff with an arguable claim is ordinarily
accorded notice of a pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and an
opportunity to amend the complaint before the motion is ruled upon.”) (quoting
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329 (1989)).
Because it is not patently obvious that plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege
the violation of a federal right, the district court erred in dismissing it under
1
Moreover, plaintiff’s right to a free transcript in order to file his habeas
petition is not unconditional. A petitioner seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254
or 2255 must first demonstrate that his claim is not frivolous and that the
transcript is needed to decide the issue presented by the suit before the court is
required to provide him with a free transcript. See United States v. MacCollom,
426 U.S. 317 (1976) (plurality) (interpreting a § 2255 petition and 28 U.S.C.
§ 753(f)); Ruark v. Gunter, 958 F.2d 318, 319 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying the
MacCollom analysis to a § 2254 action).
-6-
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and Rule 12(b)(6). On remand, plaintiff should be afforded an
opportunity to amend his complaint to cure any deficiencies.
Accordingly, we VACATE and REMAND the action to the district court
for further proceedings. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
-7-