F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 2 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOANNE S. BIRGE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-2158
(D.C. No. CIV-95-1507-JP)
KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, (D. N.M.)
Social Security Administration, in his
official capacity, *
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before TACHA, KELLY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Kenneth S. Apfel is substituted for
Shirley Chater, former Commissioner of Social Security, as the defendant in this
action.
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Joanne Birge appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration, on her Title VII disparate treatment gender discrimination claim.
Ms. Birge asserts that the Commissioner did not hire her as an administrative law
judge (ALJ) while hiring less qualified males.
I. BACKGROUND.
A. The ALJ Hiring Process.
To be selected for an ALJ position, an applicant must complete a series of
applications with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Applicants
considered most qualified are then selected for an interview, after which OPM
evaluates all of the information and gives each candidate a numerical rating
between 70 and 100. The candidates are then listed as eligible for selection.
When there is an available ALJ position, OPM places the eligible candidates on a
certificate showing each candidate’s rank, which is provided to the agency.
When the Social Security Administration decides to fill an ALJ position, its
Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) sends the eligible candidates a list of
available job locations and requests their location preferences. The OHA
interviews candidates and prepares a list of the three highest ranked eligible
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candidates on the certificate for each available location. The appointing officer is
to fill the vacancy from among the highest three eligible candidates on the
certificate; however, qualified veterans and other “preference eligibles” must be
selected if such person is ranked higher than a nonpreference eligible.
Subsequent vacancies are filled from the remaining three highest ranked eligible
candidates requesting a preference for the available location. An appointing
officer is not required to consider an eligible candidate who has been considered
for three separate appointments from the same or different certificates for the
same position.
B. Ms. Birge’s Application.
Ms. Birge, who is a New Mexico state court judge, applied for an ALJ
position in 1993 and was given a score of 93.8. Ms. Birge was interviewed by a
panel of three OHA employees, including Jose Anglada, the official responsible
for making the final hiring recommendation to the Commissioner. Ms. Birge was
included on four certificates of eligible candidates, and was considered three
times on each certificate. Ms Birge was never selected for an ALJ position. In
some instances, male candidates with higher scores were selected, but in at least
four instances, male candidates with lower scores than Ms. Birge’s were selected.
In two cases, female candidates with lower scores than Ms. Birge’s were selected.
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After Ms. Birge was interviewed by OHA, but prior to the final hiring
selections, one of the ALJs from OHA’s Albuquerque office saw a news article in
the local paper about Ms. Birge’s conduct as a state court judge. He and another
Albuquerque ALJ forwarded this article and a subsequent news article about Ms.
Birge to Mr. Anglada. The first article, entitled “DA Says Judge Risking
Conflicts of Interest,” discussed the local district attorney’s request that Ms.
Birge stop hearing criminal cases because her husband was an attorney in the
local public defender’s office. The second article, entitled “Metro Judge’s Move
Irks DA, Clogs Court” stated that Ms. Birge had recused herself at the last minute
from forty criminal cases on her docket. The article included the district
attorney’s statements that he believed Ms. Birge issued the blanket recusal in
retaliation against him, and indicated that the last minute recusals could have
jeopardized some of the cases because of speedy trial deadlines. Mr. Anglada
stated that he decided not to select Ms. Birge for an ALJ position because these
news articles made him question Ms. Birge’s judicial temperament.
II. ANALYSIS.
A. Standard of Review.
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “We review de novo the grant of summary judgment
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and apply the same legal standards as the district court under Rule 56.”
Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1402 (10th Cir. 1997).
B. Framework.
To assert a claim of disparate treatment, Ms. Birge must show that she was
treated differently than other similarly situated nonminority applicants. See
Aramburu, 112 F.3d at 1403. To survive summary judgment on her Title VII
disparate treatment claim, Ms. Birge is required to produce evidence that she was
subjected to intentional discrimination based on her gender. See Texas Dep’t of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Randle v. City of
Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 452 (10th Cir. 1995). We evaluate Ms. Birge’s evidence
pursuant to the burden-shifting scheme first announced in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53;
Elmore v. Capstan, Inc., 58 F.3d 525, 529 (10th Cir. 1995) (McDonnell Douglas
format is applicable to the analysis of Title VII claims of disparate treatment).
Under this framework, Ms. Birge had the initial burden of showing a prima
facie case of discrimination. She met this burden by showing that she is a
member of a protected class; that she applied for and was qualified for an ALJ
position; that she was rejected despite her qualifications; and that the position was
filled by a male applicant. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 & n.6; Sanchez v. Philip
Morris Inc., 992 F.2d 244, 245 (10th Cir. 1993).
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The burden then shifted to the Commissioner to show a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for his employment decision. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at
254. If the Commissioner satisfies this burden, the burden reverts to Ms. Birge to
show that the Commissioner’s proffered reasons were not the true reasons for the
employment decision. Ms. Birge could meet this burden “either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence.” Id. at 256.
C. Legitimate, Nondiscretionary Explanation.
The Commissioner met his burden of production through evidence that Ms.
Birge was rejected because of the newspaper articles discussing her potential
conflict of interest and her last minute blanket recusal. Ms. Birge contends that
the Commissioner did not meet his burden because the given explanation,
according to Ms. Birge, is not a “legitimate” reason. Ms. Birge contends that the
decision not to hire her was merely the result of Mr. Anglada’s subjective
personal judgment that she lacked judicial temperament and, because the
Commissioner did not investigate the accuracy of the newspaper articles, his
reliance on unsubstantiated news articles injected “unrestricted caprice” and
“unrestrained subjectivity” into the otherwise objective federal merit selection
process. Therefore, Ms. Birge argues that the Commissioner’s proffered reason is
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not a rational explanation of his failure to hire her, nor is it a valid business
reason.
We rejected an argument similar to plaintiff’s “failure to investigate”
argument in Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, N.A., 60 F.3d 1486 (10th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1160 (1996). There, an employee was dismissed from her
position at a bank following newspaper revelations that her husband had been
charged with misappropriating funds at another bank. Id. at 1489. The
employer’s proffered explanation for terminating plaintiff was its fear of losing
customer confidence. Id. at 1490. The plaintiff argued that the bank failed to
produce a legitimate, nondiscretionary reason for her termination because it failed
to conduct an investigation into the allegations or the impact, if any, of the
publicity upon the bank’s customers, and therefore, the bank failed to justify, with
objective evidence, its assumption that her credibility would be questioned. Id.
We rejected plaintiff’s argument, explaining that, to meet its burden of
production, defendant is required only to proffer a reason that is not, on its face,
proscribed by Title VII. See id. at 1490-91; EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312,
1316 & n.4 (10th Cir. 1992).
“Title VII does not compel every employer to have a good reason for its
deeds; it is not a civil service statute.” Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1321 (quotation
omitted). An employer does not “need to litigate the merits of the reasoning, nor
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does it need to prove that the reason relied upon was bona fide, nor does it need
to prove that the reasoning was applied in a non-discriminatory fashion.” Id. at
1316; Panis, 60 F.3d at 1491. The fact that the Commissioner’s proffered
explanation rested, in part, upon a subjective determination by Mr. Anglada does
not mean the Commissioner failed to meet its burden of production. As the
Supreme Court pointed out in McDonnell Douglas itself, the mere fact that
subjective criteria are involved in the reason articulated by an employer does not
mean it cannot be accorded sufficient rebuttal weight to dispel the inference of
discrimination raised by the prima facie case. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 803.
Ms. Birge also contends that the Commissioner’s proffered reason is not
“legitimate” because it was an illegal explanation. She alleges it was
procedurally irregular under the federal merit selection process for the
Commissioner to select men with lower scores than hers. She also alleges the
Commissioner’s failure to investigate and verify the accuracy of the allegations
and implications in the newspaper articles violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a. Neither argument is persuasive.
Ms. Birge has not presented any evidence that the Commissioner’s selection
was either illegal or irregular. The relevant merit selection provisions gives the
appointing authority discretion to select from among the highest three eligible
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candidates so long as the sole basis is merit and fitness. See 5 U.S.C. § 3318(a);
5 C.F.R. § 332.404. The Commissioner’s proffered explanation is based on merit
and fitness. Further, Ms. Birge has not cited any authority for her assertion that
the Commissioner’s proffered explanation violates the Privacy Act. Moreover,
“even if [the Commissioner’s] justification was in fact unlawful under a different
statute than [Title VII, he] satisfied its burden of production under McDonnell
Douglas by rebutting the inference that [he] acted out of discriminatory animus.”
Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc, 3 F. 3d 1419, 1434 (10th Cir. 1993). We
agree with the district court’s conclusion that the Commissioner met his burden to
come forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failing to hire Ms.
Birge.
D. Pretext.
We also agree with the district court that Ms. Birge has not produced
sufficient evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact concerning
whether the Commissioner’s proffered explanation for failing to hire her is
unworthy of belief. Pretext can be shown in employment discrimination cases by
“such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence
infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.”
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Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotations omitted).
In a disparate treatment case, pretext can be shown by evidence that other
similarly situated nonminority employees were treated differently for the same
behavior. See Elmore, 58 F.3d at 530; Aramburu, 112 F. 3d at 1403-06
(discussing disparate treatment requirement that employee be “similarly
situated”).
Ms. Birge did not present any evidence that she was “held to a unique
standard and thus treated less favorably than male [candidates].” Cole v. Ruidoso
Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1381 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994). Ms. Birge contends that the
Commissioner’s reliance on the newspaper articles was unreasonable because he
did not investigate the accuracy of the articles or give her a chance to explain her
side of the story. She presented no evidence, however, that her treatment was
different from that afforded male applicants. To the contrary, Mr. Anglada
testified that unsolicited information had been received on male applicants and
that, as in Ms. Birge’s case, the male applicants were not given a chance to
explain any negative information received.
Further, Mr. Anglada testified attempts were made to contact the chief
judge of Ms. Birge’s court in order to investigate the allegations in the news
articles, without success. Even if the Commissioner should have done more to
investigate the accuracy of the news articles about Ms. Birge, an employer’s
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failure to follow internal procedures “does not necessarily suggest that the
employer was motivated by illegal discriminatory intent or that the substantive
reasons given . . . were pretextual.” Randle, 69 F.3d at 454 & n.20.
An employer does not violate Title VII by choosing among equally
qualified candidates, so long as the decision is not based on unlawful criteria.
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259. Ms. Birge has not presented evidence that she was
overwhelmingly better qualified than the other candidates. Mr. Anglada testified
that, in contrast to Ms. Birge’s application, nothing negative came to his attention
with respect to the candidates selected for ALJ positions. Absent evidence that
one candidate is “overwhelmingly better qualified,” pretext cannot be shown
simply by comparing plaintiff’s qualifications with those of the successful
applicant. See Sanchez, 992 F.2d at 247-48; Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 944
F.2d 743, 747 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that mere disagreement with employer’s
evaluation of which geologists were best qualified, standing alone, could not
support finding of pretext); Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768, 772
(10th Cir. 1988) ( “As courts are not free to second-guess an employer’s business
judgment, this assertion [that plaintiff was equally or more qualified] is
insufficient to support a finding of pretext.”).
There is no evidence that the Commissioner’s decision was not actually
made on the basis of the news articles. Notwithstanding the presumption of
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discrimination that arises after a plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, “the
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (quotation and alteration
omitted). A “plaintiff’s ‘mere conjecture that [her] employer’s explanation is a
pretext for intentional discrimination is an insufficient basis for denial of
summary judgment.’” Panis, 60 F.3d at 1491 (quoting Branson, 853 F.2d at 772;
alteration in original). Ms. Birge presented neither direct evidence of the
Commissioner’s discriminatory motive, nor indirect evidence which would call
into question the Commissioner’s motives. See Elmore, 58 F.3d at 530.
Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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