F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 6 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
THE ESTATE OF AMORY JOE
PEARCE, by and through the
executrix Sydney Gonzales; SYDNEY
GONZALES, an individual,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 97-6176
(D.C. No. CIV-95-1894-A)
BENJAMIN HARRIS, an individual, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant,
and
EDWARD KLEIN, an individual;
LONNIE SAPPINGTON,
an individual; GARY COBURN,
an individual; THE CITY OF NEW
CORDELL, a municipality,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, BARRETT, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendants on their civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
refusal to retain federal jurisdiction over their state wrongful death claims. We
affirm.
The parties are familiar with the facts in this case, and we provide only a
very brief summary here. Benjamin Harris shot and killed Amory Joe Pierce with
a revolver owned by defendant Edward Klein, 1 who was a police officer for
defendant City of New Cordell. Harris is the nephew of Klein and the son of
defendant Chief of Police Gary Coburn. The shooting occurred while Harris and
Pierce were in a vehicle owned by Klein. Klein kept the revolver in the vehicle,
which Harris had permission to use.
After the shooting, plaintiff Sydney Gonzales, Pearce’s mother and
personal representative of his estate, brought suit under § 1983 alleging that
defendants violated her constitutional right to familial association and the estate’s
1
We refer only to those defendants who are appellees as defendants.
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constitutional right to substantive due process. The district court granted
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The district court determined that
defendants did not violate Gonzales’ constitutional right to familial association
because she failed to show that defendants intended to interfere with her
relationship with Pearce.
The district court granted summary judgment on the substantive due process
claim first on the ground that as a matter of law no defendant’s conduct was
conscience shocking. Without conscience shocking conduct, the district court
necessarily rejected plaintiffs’ allegations of a state created danger. Also, the
district court concluded there was no evidence showing Coburn or the City
endorsed selective law enforcement or that they failed to provide adequate
training with regard to off-duty weapons. Finally, the district court determined
that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because
plaintiffs failed to show clearly established law governing their conduct. In a
later order, the district court exercised its discretion and dismissed plaintiffs’
state wrongful death claims without prejudice to refiling in state court.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue the district court erred in granting summary
judgment because (1) the City and Coburn are liable for their deliberate
indifference in failing to train and supervise police officers in the use and
securing of off-duty weapons and for their custom of selective law enforcement;
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(2) the individual defendants violated plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional
rights and are not entitled to qualified immunity; (3) defendants’ actions were
conscience shocking; (4) there was a state created danger; and (5) defendants
intended to interfere with Gonzales’ relationship with her son.
We review the grant . . . of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted). After
examining the briefs on appeal, plaintiffs’ appendix, and the relevant case law in
light of this standard, we conclude the district court thoroughly and correctly
addressed the issues. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its
order of April 10, 1997.
Plaintiffs also argue the district court abused its discretion in failing to
retain jurisdiction over their state claims. They maintain that if they are
unsuccessful in this appeal and this appeal is decided more than one year after the
district court’s decision, they will be forced to file an action in state court while
this appeal is pending or risk not having their state claims heard. We agree with
the district court’s determination in its order of April 28, 1997, that there would
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be no unfairness in requiring plaintiffs to pursue their state claims in state court.
We, therefore, conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. See Anglemyer v.
Hamilton County Hosp., 58 F.3d 533, 541 (10th Cir. 1995) (reviewing for abuse
of discretion); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that when all federal
claims are dismissed, district court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over
remaining state claims).
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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