F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
APR 8 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 97-3035
v. (D. Kansas)
ELLIOTT SYLVESTER (D.C. No. 96-40052-01-DES)
THURMOND,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, McKAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Elliott Sylvester Thurmond pleaded guilty to two counts of
armed robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), and one count of use of a
firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
Enhancing his offense level for obstruction of justice, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, the
district court sentenced Mr. Thurmond to a prison term of 157 months.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Mr. Thurmond appeals his sentence, contending that the evidence supporting the
enhancement for obstruction of justice was obtained in violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.
The facts are not disputed. On April 5, 1996, Mr. Thurmond was arrested
pursuant to an indictment charging him with two firearms violations (the
“firearms charges”). At his detention hearing, defense counsel learned that
Mr. Thurmond was being investigated in connection with the bank robberies that
are the subject of the convictions in this appeal (which, for simplicity, we will
refer to as the “bank robbery charges” even though this group of charges also
included other charges related to firearms). The firearms and bank robbery
charges did not arise out of the same or related conduct.
Sometime after the detention hearing, it became clear that Mr. Thurmond
would be indicted on the bank robbery charges; so, on May 1, he instructed
counsel to initiate plea negotiations relating to the as-yet-uncharged bank
robberies. On May 3, defense counsel began plea negotiations on the bank
robbery charges, although no formal agreement was worked out. Defense counsel
next met with Mr. Thurmond on May 6, to discuss the plea negotiations, plea
colloquy, and sentencing guidelines. However, at the May 6 meeting, Mr.
Thurmond instructed counsel to discontinue plea negotiations on the bank robbery
charges. Mr. Thurmond was indicted on these charges on July 24, 1996, and
-2-
eventually pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in which the government
agreed to dismiss the firearms charges. The district court accepted the plea.
The reason Mr. Thurmond originally canceled plea negotiations was that he
was planning to hire illegal aliens to perjure themselves by confessing to both the
firearms charges and the bank robbery charges. As the Presentence Report
(“PSR”) notes, while Mr. Thurmond was in custody on the firearms charge, he
discussed this plan with his cellmate, who became a government informant and
who arranged several phone calls between Mr. Thurmond and an undercover
Kansas Bureau of Investigation (“KBI”) agent to discuss the plan. R. Vol. IV at
7. Mr. Thurmond also sent money on two occasions to the KBI agent to facilitate
the plan. Id. The PSR recommended that Mr. Thurmond’s plan to hire the illegal
aliens be considered obstruction of justice and that his offense level be increased
by two levels as a result. Over Mr. Thurmond’s objection, the district court
agreed.
On appeal, Mr. Thurmond does not challenge the court’s determination that
his conduct amounted to obstruction of justice. He contends instead that by
obtaining evidence of the obstruction through the informant, the government
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Arguing that his right to counsel
had clearly attached with regard to the firearms charges on which he had been
indicted, and for which he had been taken into custody, he claims that his right to
-3-
counsel also attached to any uncharged misconduct—i.e., the bank robbery
charges—which could affect his sentence. He further argues that his right to
counsel on the bank robbery charges had attached because he had already begun
plea negotiations on these charges, even though he had not yet been indicted on
them. Implicit in both arguments is his claim that the government deliberately
elicited incriminating information from him through the informant, see, e.g.,
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270-75 (1980); United States v. Johnson,
4 F.3d 904, 910 (10th Cir. 1993), a claim the government does not dispute. 1 Both
arguments raise a legal issue that we review de novo. See United States v.
Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1426 (10th Cir. 1997).
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel generally attaches “at or after the
initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991) (quotations omitted); see also United States
v. Baez-Acuna, 54 F.3d 634, 637 (10th Cir. 1995). Once this right attaches and
the defendant properly invokes the right by retaining or requesting counsel, see
id., the government may not “knowingly circumvent[] the accused’s right to have
counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent.” Maine
1
We note, however, that Mr. Thurmond makes no entrapment argument.
-4-
v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985); see also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S.
625, 636 (1986).
Ordinarily, the remedy for a violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is the exclusion at trial of any improperly obtained evidence.
See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964). Here, however, the
evidence was used not at trial, but at sentencing. Consistent with other circuits,
we have held that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to exclude
improperly obtained evidence at sentencing, at least so long as there is no
indication the evidence was illegally obtained to secure an increased sentence.
See United States v. Jessup, 966 F.2d 1354, 1356-57 (10th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Graves, 785 F.2d 870, 873-76 (10th Cir. 1986); accord United States v.
Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1338, 1344-45 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d
1256, 1260-63 (2d Cir. 1992).
Mr. Thurmond does not contend that the government obtained the evidence
to enhance his sentence, nor does he question the government’s explanation that
its purpose for using the informant was to discover the identities of two other
suspects in the bank robberies and the location of the proceeds. See Appellant’s
Br. at 4. Therefore, even if we assumed, arguendo, that Mr. Thurmond’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel on the bank robbery charges is one which applies to
the use of uncharged conduct at sentencing, and that such right had attached, and
-5-
that the government’s conduct therefore violated that right (issues which we find
unnecessary to resolve in this case), we would still find no basis to exclude the
resulting evidence at sentencing. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court
did not err in enhancing Mr. Thurmond’s sentence for obstruction of justice based
on the information obtained through the informant.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
-6-