F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 15 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MICHAEL BANKERT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 97-2170
(D.C. No. CIV-95-864-SC)
JOHN SHANKS, Warden; (D. N.M.)
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , BARRETT , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his petition for writ
of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 1
Petitioner was convicted
in New Mexico state court of felony murder, trafficking by possession with intent
to distribute cocaine on an accomplice theory, and conspiracy to traffic by
possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation and denied the petition.
We review the district court’s denial of petitioner’s habeas petition de novo,
see Sinclair v. Henman , 986 F.2d 407, 408 (10th Cir. 1993), and we affirm.
On appeal, petitioner raises seven issues: (1) there was insufficient
evidence of constructive possession of cocaine to support petitioner’s conviction
of trafficking by possession with intent to distribute; (2) the jury instructions
violated petitioner’s due process rights because they unconstitutionally relieved
the prosecution of its burden of proving petitioner’s possession of the cocaine;
(3) he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel; (4) he was denied effective
assistance of appellate counsel; (5) there was insufficient evidence that the
underlying felony was committed under inherently dangerous circumstances;
(6) petitioner’s due process rights were violated by prosecutorial misconduct;
and (7) the erroneous second degree murder instruction was inherently confusing
1
We granted a certificate of probable cause in this case on February 13,
1998.
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for the jury. The facts of this case are set forth in the New Mexico Supreme
Court opinion affirming petitioner’s conviction, see State v. Bankert , 875 P.2d
370 (N.M. 1994), and we will not repeat them here.
Petitioner maintains that the state presented insufficient evidence of
constructive possession of the cocaine to support his conviction for trafficking
with intent to distribute cocaine on an accomplice theory. Because his conviction
was as an accomplice, petitioner acknowledges that the state’s burden was to
prove that he intended the crime be committed, the crime was committed, and
petitioner helped, encouraged or caused its commission. To that end, the state
was obligated to show that petitioner’s accomplice, Kathy Christison,
constructively possessed the cocaine. Contrary to respondents’ assertion, we
review the sufficiency of the evidence, a mixed question of law and fact, de novo.
See Case v. Mondragon , 887 F.2d 1388, 1392, 1393 (10th Cir. 1989).
Petitioner does not challenge the New Mexico Supreme Court’s or the
magistrate judge’s statement of the evidence on this point, but he does argue
that the stated evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding of possession.
We disagree. New Mexico law states that “[a]n accused has constructive
possession of narcotics found in the physical possession of his agent or any other
person when the defendant has the immediate right to exercise dominion and
control over the narcotics.” State v. Bauske , 525 P.2d 411, 413 (N.M. Ct. App.
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1974). The evidence shows that Ms. Christison paid for the cocaine, and, not
only did she have the immediate right to exercise control over the amount of
cocaine that was given her, she did exercise control to the extent she weighed
it and demanded that it be supplemented. As it happened, she and petitioner
chose to dispute the amount instead of accepting the lesser amount and, in the
course of demanding the full negotiated amount of cocaine, petitioner killed
Robert Martin. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding
regarding possession.
Petitioner also argues that there was insufficient evidence from which the
jury could have found he committed the underlying drug felony under inherently
dangerous circumstances. Again, we disagree. The evidence shows that, part way
into the drug deal, the participants traveled to a different location to complete the
transaction. Before entering the second location, but after it was apparent there
was a dispute as to the amount of cocaine, petitioner armed himself with a gun he
had hidden in the vehicle in which he was traveling. Later, during the dispute
over the amount of cocaine, the victim threw the money Ms. Christison had
tendered for the drugs onto the table and asked if she wanted it back, petitioner
held the gun to the victim’s neck insisting that they wanted the full amount of
cocaine, and then petitioner shot him. That petitioner chose to arm himself going
into the further drug negotiations and that he held the gun to the victim’s head in
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his attempt to get the full amount of cocaine is sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s finding that he committed the crime of trafficking with intent to distribute
under inherently dangerous circumstances.
Next, petitioner takes issue with two jury instructions. First, he argues that
his due process rights were violated because jury instruction number 10 relieved
the state of its burden of proving the element of possession. The portion of the
instruction that petitioner disputes states: “Two or more people can have
possession of a substance at the same time.” R. Vol. III at 134. We fail to see
how so instructing the jury relieved the state’s burden of proving possession by
petitioner’s accomplice. It merely clarified for the jury that, if it determined that
someone else had possession of the cocaine, that did not preclude a finding that
Ms. Christison simultaneously had possession. The instruction did not, as
petitioner argues, permit the jury to assume that Ms. Christison possessed the
cocaine, despite having physically returned it to the seller. The instruction is
consistent with New Mexico law, pursuant to which Ms. Christison could be
found to have possessed the cocaine even when she no longer had physical
possession of the drugs, because she had paid for them and had the immediate
right to exercise control. See Bauske , 525 P.2d at 413. Petitioner has failed to
demonstrate that this jury instruction so infected his trial as to render it
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fundamentally unfair in violation of petitioner’s due process rights. See Maes v.
Thomas , 46 F.3d 979, 984 (10th Cir. 1995).
Petitioner also argues that the second degree murder instruction erroneously
included provocation language that was inherently confusing to the jury.
Petitioner did not object to the instruction at trial. We agree with the magistrate
judge and the New Mexico Supreme Court that giving the instruction, regardless
of whether it was correct under New Mexico law, was not fundamental error.
The jury was given a “step-down” instruction that it should only consider the
second degree murder instruction if it found petitioner not guilty of felony
murder. See R. Vol. III at 142-43. The jury did find petitioner guilty of felony
murder, and, therefore, the second degree murder instruction did not enter into
the jury deliberations. See United States v. Coleman , 7 F.3d 1500, 1506
(10th Cir. 1993) (stating that the court can assume the jury followed the law).
Petitioner maintains that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel was violated and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the
matter. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, petitioner must
show both that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced petitioner’s
defense, that is, that there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s errors,
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland v.
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Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). Mainly, petitioner claims that his
trial counsel was ineffective for choosing not to present any defense witnesses.
The record shows that this was a tactical strategy that is “virtually
unchallengeable.” Id. at 690. In addition, petitioner does not show that, had his
counsel presented defense evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different. Petitioner has shown neither deficient
performance by counsel nor prejudice to his defense.
Petitioner also alleges ineffective assistance of counsel regarding three
specific trial occurrences. He complains that counsel did not raise a properly
worded objection to jury instruction number 10, that counsel raised no objection
to the second degree murder jury instruction, and that counsel pursued an
improper line of questioning regarding Chester Smith, a convicted drug dealer
who was also involved in the circumstances surrounding the murder. Petitioner
has shown no prejudice resulting from these alleged errors by counsel.
Petitioner also claims ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
He alleges that his appellate counsel neglected to raise a number of meritorious
issues, only specifically citing ineffective assistance of trial counsel and
prosecutorial misconduct. Petitioner has shown neither deficient performance
nor prejudice regarding the unnamed issues. We have held herein that petitioner’s
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct issues are
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meritless, and, therefore, appellate counsel was not deficient for declining to
include them. See United States v. Cook , 45 F.3d 388, 392-93 (10th Cir. 1995).
Finally, petitioner points to several instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
He complains that the prosecutor, in entering into immunity agreements with two
of the witnesses, somehow implicitly required the witnesses to give perjured
testimony; that the prosecutor improperly linked petitioner with Chester Smith;
and that the prosecution knowingly presented perjured testimony. Absent an
allegation of deprivation of a more specific constitutional right, prosecutorial
misconduct does not warrant habeas relief “unless the conduct complained of
made petitioner’s trial so fundamentally unfair as to deny him due process.”
Mahorney v. Wallman , 917 F.2d 469, 472 (10th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted).
Petitioner’s claims do not meet this high burden. The immunity agreement of
which petitioner complains provides immunity in exchange for truthful testimony.
Petitioner has pointed to no evidence, but only makes a bald assertion, of any
agreement to provide perjured testimony. Whether or not the witnesses actually
testified truthfully is a credibility matter within the province of the jury.
In addition, petitioner was already linked to Chester Smith because Mr. Smith
was involved in the circumstances of the murder. As the magistrate judge found,
the prosecution had the burden to establish a drug transaction, and evidence of
Chester Smith’s known drug dealings was relevant to his role in the transaction.
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Finally, petitioner does not support his conclusory allegation that the prosecution
presented perjured testimony to represent the victim as an innocent bystander with
any citation to the record. Even if petitioner’s allegation of perjured testimony
were true, petitioner’s own representation of the evidence shows that the jury
could not have reasonably believed any such perjured testimony. None of
petitioner’s claims establish the fundamental unfairness of his trial.
We AFFIRM the denial of the petition for habeas relief. We grant
respondent’s motion to accept his answer brief as timely filed.
Entered for the Court
James E. Barrett
Senior Circuit Judge
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