F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 20 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
SUZANNE MYERS, Administratix of the
Estate of Thomas James Myers, deceased;
SAMSON MYERS, individually, and
through Suzanne Myers, his parent and
Next Friend, and; SUZANNE MYERS,
individually,
Plaintiffs- Appellants,
v.
No. 97-6003
OKLAHOMA COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; J.D.
SHARP, individually and as Sheriff of the
Oklahoma County Sheriff’s Department;
SCOTT CANNON, individually and as a
Deputy Sheriff of the Oklahoma County
Sheriff’s Department; MARSHALL
MCDONALD, individually and as a
Deputy Sheriff of the Oklahoma County
Sheriff’s Department,
Defendants - Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D. Ct. No. 94-CV-246)
Submitted on the briefs:*
Carl J. Franklin, Norman, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Robert H. Macy, District Attorney, John M. Jacobsen, Assistant District Attorney, Office
of the District Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before TACHA, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
TACHA, Circuit Judge.
This case arises out of the tragic shooting death of Tom Myers by two officers of
the Oklahoma County Sheriff’s Department. Mr. Myers’s survivors, including his wife
Suzanne, sued the sheriff, the County, and the two officers who shot Mr. Myers. The suit
alleged that in shooting Mr. Myers, the defendants committed various torts and
constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
sheriff in his official capacity and the County. The plaintiffs now appeal that grant of
summary judgment. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I. Background
On April 3, 1993, Tom Myers and his wife Suzanne had an argument. Tom forced
Suzanne, their infant son, and Tom’s aunt out of the apartment in which they all were
*
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
2
staying. The three spent the night at Suzanne’s parents’ house. Although she knew that
her husband was drunk, armed with a .22 caliber rifle, and suicidal, Suzanne returned to
the apartment the next day. When Tom would not let her in, Suzanne requested police
assistance.
Officers of the Bethany Police Department and Oklahoma County Sheriff’s office
arrived on the scene and established contact with Mr. Myers in an attempt to prevent his
suicide. During a conversation with one of those officers, Mr. Myers fired a shot from his
rifle. Lieutenant Neil Troutman then took over the negotiations with Mr. Myers, speaking
to him by telephone several times during the course of the afternoon and evening. Mr.
Myers told Lt. Troutman that he was tired of living and that he wanted to die. On the
afternoon of April 4, the officers took a statement from Suzanne Myers and obtained an
Order of Detention and Forcible Entry from a special district judge of the Oklahoma
County District Court.
At approximately 8:00 p.m. Sheriff J.D. Sharp ordered entry into the apartment to
enforce the court order and to take Mr. Myers into protective custody. Officers Marshall
McDonald and Scott Cannon entered. According to the officers’ testimony, Mr. Myers
pointed his .22 rifle at them upon their entry into the apartment. Sgt. McDonald testified
that he yelled “Freeze, Police,” upon realizing that Mr. Myers was pointing the weapon at
him. Sgts. McDonald and Canon fired their weapons at Mr. Myers, killing him.
The plaintiffs sued Sheriff Sharp, the County, and Officers Cannon and McDonald
3
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Mr. Myers’s constitutional rights under the Fourth
and Eighth Amendments. The plaintiffs also sued the defendants for committing the torts
of assault, battery, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Sharp in his official capacity
and the County on the section 1983 and state law claims. The court reasoned that the
plaintiffs had failed to produce relevant evidence for the constitutional claims brought
under section 1983, and that Oklahoma law provided immunity on the state law claims.
The court, however, denied summary judgment for the sheriff in his individual capacity
and for Officers Canon and McDonald. The suit against the individual defendants went
to trial before a jury, and the defendant officers prevailed.1 The plaintiffs now appeal the
summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Sharp (in his official capacity) and the County.
II. The Constitutional Claims
The plaintiffs allege that the County violated Mr. Myers’s Fourth Amendment
rights because Officers Cannon and McDonald used excessive force in attempting to
apprehend Mr. Myers and because the County failed to train its officers in suicide
prevention, counseling the mentally ill, or treatment for substance abusers. The plaintiffs
1
The only constitutional claim addressed at trial was the Fourth Amendment claim
based on the alleged use of excessive force; the jury was not asked to decide whether the
individual officers committed an Eighth Amendment violation. See Appellees’ App.
(Verdict Form).
4
also assert that the County violated Mr. Myers’s Eighth Amendment rights because its
officers failed to tend to Mr. Myers’s serious medical needs. The plaintiffs appeal the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to Sheriff Sharp and the County with respect
to each of these claims.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal
standard as the district court. See Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 50 F.3d 793,
796 (10th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is appropriate if the plaintiffs have failed to
present evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the County or Sheriff
Sharp violated the relevant constitutional standards. See Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208,
1212 (10th Cir. 1996).
A. The Fourth Amendment Claims
1. The Effect of the Jury Verdict
The defendants argue that we should not undertake a de novo review of the record
with respect to the excessive force claim because the jury verdict in favor of the
individual officers precludes a finding that Sheriff Sharp (in his official capacity) or the
County2 is liable for violating Mr. Myers’s Fourth Amendment rights.
A plaintiff suing a municipality under section 1983 for the acts of one of its
2
"[A section 1983] suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal
official acting in his or her official capacity are the same.” Watson v. City of Kansas
City, 857 F.2d 690, 695 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72
(1985)). Thus, this opinion refers to the suit against the County and the suit against
Sheriff Sharp in his official capacity both as the “suit against the County.”
5
employees must prove: (1) that a municipal employee committed a constitutional
violation, and (2) that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the
constitutional deprivation. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
694 (1978). It is well established, therefore, that a municipality cannot be held liable
under section 1983 for the acts of an employee if a jury finds that the municipal employee
committed no constitutional violation. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S.
796, 799 (1986) (per curiam); Webber v. Mefford, 43 F.3d 1340, 1344-45 (10th Cir.
1994); Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 697 (10th Cir. 1988). In Heller:
the Supreme Court held that a jury verdict acquitting a Los Angeles
police officer of a charge of excessive force precluded the
imposition of liability on the City of Los Angeles for adopting a
policy condoning the use of excessive force. The Court reasoned
that where a municipality is "sued only because [it was] thought
legally responsible" for the actions of its officers, it is
"inconceivable" to hold the municipality liable if its officers inflict
no constitutional harm, regardless of whether the municipality's
policies might have "authorized" such harm.
Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Heller, 475
U.S. at 799).
In this case, the jury found that Officers Sharp, Cannon, and McDonald did not
use excessive force against Mr. Myers. This verdict seems to preclude a finding in
favor of the plaintiffs on either of their Fourth Amendment claims against the County,
because both those claims require a finding that the officers used excessive force.
As noted above, the plaintiffs’ first Fourth Amendment claim is based on the
6
straightforward theory that the officers used excessive force in attempting to take Mr.
Myers into protective custody and that County policies were the moving force behind
their use of such force. The plaintiffs’ second Fourth Amendment claim is that the
County failed to train its officers in the use of deadly force or handling persons who are
suicidal, mentally disturbed, and/or substance abusers. As the Supreme Court
explained in City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389-90, a municipality’s failure to train is in
general not enough to prove a constitutional violation. Instead, section 1983 plaintiffs
can use a municipality’s failure to train as one way to make the required showing that a
municipal policy or custom was the “moving force” behind an already established
constitutional deprivation. See id. at 389. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ failure to train
claims, like their basic excessive force claim against the individual officers, requires a
predicate showing that the officers did in fact use excessive force against Mr. Myers.
The jury’s finding that the individual officers were not liable would seem to foreclose
both Fourth Amendment claims against the County.
There is, however, one situation in which the Heller rule does not foreclose suit
against the County under the Fourth Amendment. If the jury based its verdict on the
ground that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, the Heller rule precluding
liability is inapplicable. In such a case, the jury may have found that the officers did
use excessive force, but that they were entitled to immunity because they acted
reasonably in light of existing law. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638
7
(1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (stating that an official is
protected by qualified immunity if the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in
light of clearly established legal rules). Although individual officers may receive the
protection of qualified immunity, “municipalities enjoy no such shield.” Watson, 857
F.2d at 697. Thus, if a jury returns a general verdict for an individual officer premised
on qualified immunity, there is no inherent inconsistency in allowing suit against the
municipality to proceed since the jury’s verdict has not answered the question whether
the officer actually committed the alleged constitutional violation. See id.
In this case, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity, but the district court denied that motion. See Myers v. Oklahoma
County Bd., 80 F.3d 421, 424-26 (10th Cir.) (concluding that defendants could not take
interlocutory appeal of district court denial of summary judgment), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 383 (1996). The defendants may have attempted to raise the issue at trial as well.
See Quezada v. County of Bernalillo, 944 F.2d 710, 718 (l0th Cir. 1991) (“Defendants
who are unsuccessful in having a lawsuit dismissed on qualified immunity grounds
before trial may reassert the defense at trial or after trial.”).
On the record before us, we are unable to determine the grounds for the jury’s
decision. The jury verdict form was a general one. The form instructed the jury only
to declare the defendants “liable” or “not liable” on the use of excessive force claim.
In addition, neither party placed a copy of the jury instruction in the record. Therefore,
8
it is possible that the jury based its decision on qualified immunity. With that
ambiguity lurking, the Heller rule does not foreclose the suit against the County.
2. The Excessive Force Claim
a. Failure to Train
As noted above, a plaintiff suing a county under section 1983 for the actions of
one of its officers must demonstrate two elements: (1) a municipal employee
committed a constitutional violation, and (2) a municipal policy or custom was the
moving force behind the constitutional deprivation. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. We
hold that the plaintiffs have not produced sufficient evidence with regard to the second
element to withstand the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiffs argue that the County’s failure to adequately train its officers on
the use of deadly force and in dealing with mentally ill or suicidal persons satisfies the
second element of the Monell test. Inadequate police training may, in some
circumstances, result in constitutional liability for a municipality. However, “[o]nly
where a failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a
municipality—a ‘policy’ . . . —can a city be liable for such failure under § 1983.” City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). Therefore, as the district court noted, in
order for liability to attach to a municipality, the failure to train must amount to
“deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into
contact.” Id. at 388; see also Houston v. Reich, 932 F.2d 883, 888 (10th Cir. 1991)
9
(declaring municipality liable “[w]here there is essentially a complete failure to train,
or training is so reckless or grossly negligent that future misconduct is almost
inevitable.”).
With the above principles in mind, we have said that in order to establish a
municipality’s liability for inadequate training on the use of force, a plaintiff must meet
a four-part test. See Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 841 (10th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1165 (1998).
[A] plaintiff must show (1) the officers exceeded constitutional
limitations on the use of force; (2) the use of force arose under
circumstances that constitute a usual and recurring situation with
which police officers must deal; (3) the inadequate training
demonstrates a deliberate indifference on the part of the city towards
persons with whom the police officers come into contact, and (4)
there is a direct causal link between the constitutional deprivation
and the inadequate training.
Id. at 841-42.
The plaintiffs cannot satisfy the third element here. They contend that the
County’s policy on the use of deadly force reflects a deliberate indifference towards
Mr. Meyers because it authorized officers to use deadly force where such force is in
fact constitutionally prohibited. We reach the opposite conclusion. The relevant
portions of the policy are in accord with constitutional standards, making it impossible
to conclude that the policy reflects a deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.
The most relevant provision states that officers may use deadly force:
To protect themselves or others when the deputies have probable
10
cause to believe that they or others are in danger of death or serious
bodily harm and that the use of deadly force is reasonably necessary
to protect themselves or others.
Appellants’ App. Ex. J at 2. The evidence is undisputed that the officers did not resort
to deadly force until they announced themselves as police and found Mr. Myers aiming
his firearm in their direction. The County policy was well within constitutional bounds
in authorizing the use of deadly force at that point. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.
1, 11 (1985) (stating that deadly force may be used if an "officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or
to others"); Romero v. Board of County Comm'rs, 60 F.3d 702, 704 (10th Cir. 1995)
("An officer's use of deadly force in self-defense is not constitutionally
unreasonable."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 776 (1996). There is no reasonable inference
that the relevant portion of the County policy demonstrated a “deliberate indifference”
to the rights of Mr. Myers and others in his situation.
The plaintiffs’ stronger argument is that the moving force behind the alleged
constitutional violation was not the County’s policy on force, but the minimal amount
of training on dealing with armed persons who are suicidal, mentally ill, and/or
substance abusers. The plaintiffs argue that the County’s lack of a policy on handling
situations involving armed suicidal or mentally ill persons demonstrated a deliberate
indifference towards those persons, and the lack of a policy led the officers to
unreasonably enter the apartment and create the need to use force against Mr. Myers.
11
The record, however, does not create a reasonable inference that the County’s
policy, or lack thereof, on dealing with armed, suicidal persons amounts to deliberate
indifference towards those persons. The record contains the County’s voluminous
training materials relating to the mentally ill, portions of which deal with suicide
prevention and substance abuse. See Appellants’. App. Ex. K. Furthermore, contrary
to the plaintiffs’ assertions, the training records of the officers involved in this incident
demonstrate that they received training in this area. See Appellants’. App. Ex. M
(training records). The plaintiffs submitted no evidence demonstrating that the
County’s policy showed deliberate indifference towards mentally ill or suicidal
persons. The only evidence to that effect in the record before us is a deposition of the
plaintiffs’ expert, which was not before the district court when it made its decision on
summary judgment. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we do not consider
materials not before the district court. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Weisman, 27 F.3d 500, 506 (10th Cir. 1994).
b. Actions of Sheriff Sharp as County Policy
The plaintiffs make one brief additional argument that County policies are
responsible for the alleged constitutional harm to Mr. Myers. According to the
plaintiffs, the actions and directives of Sheriff Sharp represented County policy, and
therefore the County is liable for the constitutional harm that arose from his actions. It
is true that “municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where . . . a deliberate choice to
12
follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or
officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in
question.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986); id. at 481 (“If the
decision to adopt [a] particular course of action is properly made by [the] government's
authorized decisionmakers, it surely represents an act of official government 'policy' as
that term is commonly understood.”).
The defendants do not deny that Sheriff Sharp, as the supervising law
enforcement officer, was a final policymaker with respect to the decision to enter the
apartment. See id. at 483 n.12 (offering sheriffs as examples of official policymakers
with respect to law enforcement activities). Thus, there is no dispute in this case that
the County, through Sheriff Sharp, was the “moving force” behind the decision to enter
the apartment. If that decision—the decision to enter the apartment—resulted in a
constitutional violation, the County would be liable. The decision to enter the
apartment itself—as opposed to the decisions that occurred once the officers were
inside the apartment, which the Sheriff did not direct and for which the County is not
responsible—cannot be the basis of an excessive force claim in this case.
All claims of excessive force are “analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and
its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a ‘substantive due process’ approach.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The pertinent question is whether
Sheriff Sharp’s decision to order the officers into the apartment was objectively
13
reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them. See id. at 397.
“The excessive force inquiry includes not only the officers’ actions at the moment that
the threat was presented, but also may include their actions in the moments leading up
to the suspect’s threat of force.” Allen at 119 F.3d at 840. We must therefore
determine whether the facts support an inference that the decision to enter the
apartment unreasonably created the need to use such force. See Sevier v. City of
Lawrence, 60 F.3d 695, 699 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Alexander v. City and County of
San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1994) (analyzing claim of excessive
force). In doing so, we bear in mind that actions leading to a confrontation, such as the
decision to enter the apartment, must be more than merely negligent to be
“unreasonable” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment inquiry. See Sevier, 60 F.3d at
699.
The decision to enter the apartment was reasonable as a matter of law. The
officers had spent hours attempting to resolve the situation through non-confrontational
communication with Mr. Myers, to no avail. They had secured a court order
authorizing them to take Mr. Myers into protective custody. They entered the
apartment in order to execute that order. These factors all point to the reasonableness
of their conduct. Cf. Medrano v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 1499, 1504 (9th Cir.
1992) (finding officer’s decision to enter a bathroom reasonable where the person
inside was suffering from drug overdose, he could not be talked into leaving, and he
14
was apparently unconscious at the time of entry). There is no evidence in the record to
suggest the decision to enter was an instance of the use of excessive force.
B. The Eighth Amendment Claim
In addition to the Fourth Amendment arguments, the plaintiffs also allege that
the County violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide attention to Mr.
Myers’s serious medical needs. In the context of a prison setting, the Eighth
Amendment right to medical care is violated if (1) prison officials manifest a deliberate
indifference to an individual’s medical needs, and those needs are serious. See Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Although the Eighth Amendment applies only to convicted inmates, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees pretrial detainees the same degree of
medical attention as the Eighth Amendment provides for inmates. See Martin v. Board
of County Comm’rs, 909 F.2d 402, 406 (10th Cir. 1990). Even assuming that Mr.
Myers was a “pretrial detainee” and that Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment standards
were violated by the officers in this case, summary judgment in favor of the County
nonetheless was appropriate.
As we noted above, in order to hold a municipality liable for an employee’s
constitutional violations, a plaintiff must show not only that a constitutional violation
occurred, but also that some municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind
the violation. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385. The record is simply devoid of any
15
evidence showing that a County policy was the moving force behind the alleged
constitutional violation. Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim.
III. State Tort Claims
In addition to filing claims for relief under section 1983, the plaintiffs also sued
the County for violations of Oklahoma state tort law. The district court found that the
County was immune from tort liability under various provisions of the Oklahoma
Governmental Tort Claims Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155 (West Supp. 1997).
The plaintiffs’ appeal of this decision presents a question of statutory interpretation that
we review de novo. See Duke v. Department of Agriculture, 131 F.3d 1407, 1409
(10th Cir. 1997) (reviewing question of government immunity under the Federal Tort
Claims Act de novo). We agree with the district court that at least one provision of the
Oklahoma Tort Claims Act provides immunity for the County. Therefore, we uphold
the district court’s decision.
The relevant provision of the Oklahoma Tort Claims Act provides that:
The state or a political subdivision shall not be liable if a loss or claims
results from:
...
(6) . . . the failure to provide, or the method of providing, police, law
enforcement or fire protection.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(6) (West Supp. 1997). The Oklahoma Supreme Court
recently addressed the same situation presented in this case and held that immunity
16
attaches. In Schmidt v. Grady County, 943 P.2d 595, 597-98 (Okla. 1997), a police
officer took a woman into custody in order to prevent her from harming herself or
others. The officer placed the woman in his patrol car. The officer did not restrain the
woman with a seatbelt or handcuffs, and on the way to the station the woman sustained
injuries when she either jumped or fell from the police car. See id. at 596. The woman
sued in federal district court, and the district court certified the following question to
the Oklahoma Supreme Court:
Does Section 155(6) of Title 51 of the Oklahoma Statutes immunize
a political subdivision from liability for damages for personal
injuries an individual sustained as a result of a negligent act or
omission of the political subdivision’s law enforcement personnel
while acting within the scope of their employment in taking the
individual into protective custody and transporting her to county jail?
Id. at 596. Grady answered the question affirmatively, holding that under section
155(6) a county is immune from liability arising from the negligent acts of its
employees in taking individuals into protective custody. See id. at 598. In this case, as
in Grady, we are concerned with an act committed by law enforcement personnel while
attempting to take an individual—Mr. Myers— into protective custody. Grady is
indistinguishable from this case, and its holding controls us here. Therefore, even if
the officers had committed the alleged torts, the County would be immune under
Grady.
17
Conclusion
The evidence in this case provides no reasonable basis for determining that
County policies caused the alleged constitutional injuries of Mr. Myers. Furthermore,
Oklahoma’s Governmental Tort Claims Act immunizes the County from tort liability
for the officers’ actions in the death of Tom Myers.
We AFFIRM.
18
Myers v. Oklahoma County Board of County Commissioners
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 1998-08-20
Citations: 151 F.3d 1313
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion