F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 14 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LINDA D. TOOMBS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-7018
(D.C. No. CV-96-445-S)
KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, (E.D. Okla.)
Social Security Administration, *
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before BRORBY , McKAY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Kenneth S. Apfel is substituted for
John J. Callahan, former Acting Commissioner of Social Security, as the
defendant in this action.
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Linda D. Toombs filed a claim for supplemental security income
benefits on July 8, 1986, alleging a disability since December 31, 1984, due to
back problems. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled against
plaintiff on December 23, 1987, but on review, the Appeals Council remanded her
case for further consideration on July 20, 1989. After a second hearing, an ALJ
denied plaintiff’s claim at step five of the evaluation sequence on October 24,
1989. See generally Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988).
The ALJ decided that plaintiff could not return to any of her past work, but
nevertheless retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform the full
range of light work available in the national economy, and thus, was not disabled.
The Appeals Council denied review on July 5, 1996, making the ALJ’s decision
the final agency decision.
Plaintiff then brought this suit. The district court adopted the magistrate
judge’s recommendation that the agency’s decision be affirmed. Plaintiff appeals.
We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ (1) failed to accord the proper weight to
her treating physician’s findings and opinion, (2) failed in his duty to develop the
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record, and (3) failed to evaluate the evidence at step five under the correct legal
standard.
Our job on appeal is to “closely examine the record as a whole to determine
whether the [Commissioner’s] decision is supported by substantial evidence and
adheres to applicable legal standards.” Evans v. Chater, 55 F.3d 530, 531
(10th Cir. 1995). We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment
for that of the agency. See Kelley v. Chater, 62 F.3d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1995).
Weight Given to Dr. Sureddi’s Opinion.
One of plaintiff’s treating physicians, Dr. Sureddi, reported in October
1987 that he had treated plaintiff “on and off” since June 1986 for low back pain,
peptic ulcer disease with abdominal pain, pancreatitis with abdominal pain, neck
pain, and anxiety and depression. He stated that x-rays of plaintiff’s spine
showed narrowing at L4-5 indicating some degenerative disc disease. He
concluded that, as a result of these medical problems, it was his opinion that
plaintiff was totally disabled for any gainful employment. In September 1989, Dr.
Sureddi repeated his findings, stating that plaintiff’s condition had not improved
since 1987. Dr. Sureddi listed his areas of practice as general surgery and ear,
nose and throat diseases.
Plaintiff saw another treating physician in 1986, Dr. Grillo, an orthopedic
surgeon. Dr. Grillo reported that he considered plaintiff’s spinal x-rays to be
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normal, and that plaintiff’s muscle tone and strength were intact and normal, as
were her sensation and deep tendon reflexes. Dr. Grillo diagnosed plaintiff with
low back pain without objective signs of disease. Dr. Grillo noted that he could
not obtain a CT scan because plaintiff lacked the necessary funds. He returned
plaintiff to work on November 7, 1986. Plaintiff was also seen by Dr. Knapp,
a chiropractor, in September 1986, who found that plaintiff had a full range of
motion in her lower back.
The ALJ found that Dr. Sureddi did not provide any explanation or clinical
or diagnostic support for his opinion that plaintiff was totally disabled, nor did his
examination notes reveal any significant clinical findings to support this
conclusion. The ALJ considered the evidence from Dr. Sureddi and Dr. Grillo,
and concluded that overall, the medical evidence suggested that plaintiff has
little, if any, functional limitations as a result of her lower back complaints. The
ALJ credited Dr. Grillo’s opinion that plaintiff suffered from low back pain, but
that her complaints are unsupported by significant clinical or diagnostic findings,
explaining that, as an orthopedic specialist, Dr. Grillo was better qualified than
Dr. Sureddi to assess the severity of plaintiff’s back condition and ability to work.
The ALJ noted that Dr. Grillo’s negative examination findings were consistent
with Dr. Knapp’s evaluation that plaintiff had a full range of motion in her back.
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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to accord controlling weight to
Dr. Sureddi’s opinion that she was totally disabled. Dr. Sureddi’s opinion was
not dispositive. See Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d
1027, 1029 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that a treating physician’s opinion that
claimant is disabled is not dispositive because final responsibility for determining
disability is reserved to the Commissioner). The ALJ concluded, with record
support, that Dr. Sureddi’s opinion was unsupported and outweighed by the other
medical evidence in the record. “It is error to give an opinion controlling weight
simply because it is the opinion of a treating source if it is not well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques or if it is
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record.” SSR-96-2p,
1996 WL 374188, at *2; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2). The ALJ provided
specific, legitimate reasons for the weight given to Dr. Sureddi’s opinion. See 20
C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2); Goatcher v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs. , 52 F.3d 288, 290 (10th Cir. 1995) (ALJ must give specific, legitimate
reasons for disregarding a treating physician’s disability opinion). The ALJ
correctly noted that because Dr. Grillo is an orthopedic specialist, his opinion
regarding plaintiff’s back complaints is entitled to more weight than that of a
nonspecialist such as Dr. Sureddi. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(5) (specialist’s
opinion entitled to more weight than nonspecialist’s). Thus, the ALJ accorded the
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appropriate weight to Dr. Sureddi’s opinion. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion,
nothing indicates the ALJ rejected plaintiff’s treating physician’s opinion and
substituted his own opinion for the medical evidence.
Need for Consultative Examination .
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ should have ordered a consultative
mental examination based on the evidence in the record that she suffered from
depression. The only evidence in the record concerning depression consists of
Dr. Sureddi’s statement in his medical report that he had treated plaintiff for
chronic anxiety and depression. Plaintiff did not list anxiety or depression as
a basis for disability in her applications for benefits. Moreover, plaintiff did not
mention having anxiety or depression, nor did she claim that these symptoms
contributed to her disability, during either of her hearings.
In order to raise an issue requiring further investigation, the claimant must
first present some objective evidence suggesting the existence of a condition
which could have a material impact on the disability decision requiring further
investigation. See Hawkins v. Chater , 113 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 1997).
Isolated and unsupported comments by plaintiff are insufficient to raise the
suspicion of the existence of a nonexertional impairment. See id. Plaintiff did
not present objective evidence supporting the claim that she suffers from
depression, nor does the record suggest a reasonable possibility of severe
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impairment. Because plaintiff was “represented by counsel at the administrative
hearing, the ALJ [was] entitled to rely on [plaintiff’s] counsel to structure and
present [her] case in a way that [plaintiff’s] claims [were] adequately explored.”
Id. Consequently, the ALJ was not required to obtain a consultative examination
based upon the unsupported statement that Dr. Sureddi had treated plaintiff for
depression, which was never asserted by plaintiff as a basis for her disability. See
Diaz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 898 F.2d 774, 778 (10th Cir. 1990)
(refusing to remand for consultative examination where claimant had failed to
present “objective evidence supporting the conclusion that he suffers from
depression”). Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the fact that this case was resolved
at step five does not alter our analysis in this case with respect to the ALJ’s duty
to develop the record.
Step Five Burden of Proof.
Finally, plaintiff contends that, because the ALJ failed to give controlling
weight to Dr. Sureddi’s opinion or to obtain a consultative examination with
respect to her alleged depression, the ALJ failed to shift the burden of proof to
the Commissioner at step five of the five-step evaluation process. See Williams,
844 F.2d at 751 (holding that burden at step five is on Commissioner). As we
explained above, the ALJ accorded Dr. Sureddi’s opinion the proper weight and
was not obligated to obtain a consultative examination; thus, this contention is
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without merit. In finding that plaintiff retains the RFC to perform the full range
of light work, the ALJ considered the findings and opinions of her treating
physicians, according them appropriate weight. There is no objective evidence in
the record to indicate functional limitations on plaintiff’s ability to perform light
work. The ALJ’s finding that plaintiff retains the RFC to perform light work is
supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the Commissioner’s decision must
stand. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Circuit Judge
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Toombs v. Apfel
Combined Opinion