F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 3 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 97-1347
(D. Ct. No. 97-CR-101-B)
OSCAR GUSTAVO NUNEZ- (D. Colo.)
DURAN, also known as Oscar
Gustavo Duran-Nunez, also known as
Oscar Duran,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , HENRY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
Defendant Oscar Gustavo Nunez-Duran appeals an order of the district
court sentencing him to a term of forty-six months in prison followed by three
years of supervised release. He also appeals the court’s denial of his motion to
reconsider the sentence. The imposed sentence resulted from defendant’s plea of
guilty to violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2) by reentering the United States
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
after having previously been deported subsequent to an aggravated felony
conviction.
First, defendant argues that the district court erred in refusing to grant his
motion for downward departure. He claims that the sentencing court
impermissibly “traded” its inclination to grant defendant’s motion for a one level
reduction in the criminal history category for the government’s proposed § 5K1.1
sentence reduction recommendation. Second, defendant asserts that the use of
the same prior convictions to calculate both the defendant’s criminal history
category and the base offense level constitutes a violation of the multiple
punishment clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We
affirm.
I.
Defendant Nunez-Duran was involved in a series of drug-related incidents
in Oregon during 1995 and 1996. While serving his sentence on those
convictions, defendant received a final deportation order from the Immigration
and Naturalization Service and voluntarily left the United States in July of 1996
in lieu of being deported. In January of 1997, defendant was arrested in Denver,
Colorado on a drug-related charge. On motion of the government, the district
court dismissed the federal criminal complaint issued in that incident after the
return of the indictment in this matter. Defendant pled guilty to the charge of
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reentering the United States after having been deported subsequent to an
aggravated felony conviction in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). The
plea agreement provided that in exchange for defendant’s cooperation in the
investigation of another individual, the government would recommend a sentence
at the low end of the applicable guideline range. The district court sentenced
Nunez-Duran to a term of forty-six months in prison.
II.
At the sentencing hearing, defendant sought a downward departure from
the Sentencing Guideline Criminal History Category IV on grounds that the
category overstated the seriousness of his criminal history since he was only a
low-level, drug-dependent substance dealer. The government moved for a
sentence reduction pursuant to § 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, based on Defendant’s substantial assistance. The district court
granted the government’s motion but denied the defendant’s motion for an
additional downward departure.
Defendant argues on appeal that the court should have considered these
reductions separately and erred in refusing to grant a further departure from the
already reduced sentence. It is well settled in this circuit that we have no
jurisdiction to review the district court’s discretionary refusal to depart
downward. See, e.g. , United States v. Castillo , 140 F.3d 874, 888 (10th Cir.
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1998); United States v. Banta , 127 F.3d 982, 983 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Belt , 89 F.3d 710, 714 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Barrera-
Barron , 996 F.2d 244, 245 (10th Cir. 1993).
No duty compels the district court to consider separately the government’s
substantial assistance motion and any downward departure motion made by
defendant. The district court had full discretion in deciding whether to depart
downward. This was not affected by the government’s motion. Therefore, we
dismiss this portion of the appeal.
III.
Defendant also asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to reconsider his sentence because the district court used the same prior
convictions to calculate both the criminal history category and the base offense
level. Defendant claims that the use of a prior conviction in not one, but two,
sentencing calculations constitutes multiple punishment in violation of the Fifth
Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. We find that this claim is without merit.
The Double Jeopardy Clause “protects a criminal defendant from multiple
prosecutions and from multiple punishments for the same conduct.” United
States v. Overstreet , 40 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v.
Dixon , 509 U.S. 688, 695-96 (1993)). However, the multiple punishment prong
of the Clause “does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing
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greater punishment than the legislature intended.” Missouri v. Hunter , 459 U.S.
359, 366 (1983). The district court sentenced defendant to forty-six months
imprisonment, which was well within the range authorized by 8 U.S.C. §
1326(b)(2). “Calculation under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines of the proper
sentence within the statutory range established by Congress . . . does not
constitute multiple punishment.” United States v. Alvarez , 914 F.2d 915, 920
(7th Cir. 1990), superceded on other grounds by Stinson v. United States , 508
U.S. 36 (1993); see also United States v. Saunders , 973 F.2d 1354, 1365 (7th Cir.
1992); United States v. Amis , 926 F.2d 328, 329-30 (3d Cir. 1991); cf. Witte v.
United States , 515 U.S. 389, 399 (1995) (“[U]se of evidence of related criminal
conduct to enhance a defendant’s sentence for a separate crime within the
authorized statutory limits does not constitute punishment . . . within the
meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”) (emphasis added).
Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in refusing to
reconsider the defendant’s sentence and AFFIRM.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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