UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 97-20768
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
STEVEN JOSEPH GARZA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(H-92-CR-238-2)
September 14, 1998
Before WISDOM, DUHÉ, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Steven Joseph Garza, a former police officer, appeals his conviction for conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine and for use of a communication facility to commit a felony. He
argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever his trial from that
of his codefendant Gatewood, also a former police officer. Garza argues that he was prejudiced by
the district court’s admission of evidence concerning Gatewood’s prior bad act s including
Gatewood’s theft of money from a murdered drug dealer. We affirm.
In United States v. Musquiz,2 we rejected the identical argument raised by Gilbert Martinez
Musquiz, a codefendant of Garza and Gatewood. We wrote:
“Defendants who are indicted together generally should be tried together, particularly in
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published
and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
2
45 F.3d at 927 (5th Cir. 1995).
conspiracy cases. ‘A district court should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if there is a
serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants.
. . .’ We review for abuse of discretion. Here, the district court was well within its discretion
in relying on limiting instructions. We presume that jurors follow the law. Evidence of one
defendant’s past crimes ‘does not ordinarily justify severance,’ even though it is inadmissible
against a codefendant. The prosecutor did not try to ascribe Gatewood’s theft to Musquiz.
In light of the explicit limiting instruction, the claimed link between the conspiracy instruction
and the spillover guilt is too tenuous to amount to a serious risk of prejudice. There was no
abuse of discretion.”3
This reasoning applies equally to Garza’s argument for severance. His position as a former police
officer is not sufficient to justify treatment different from that of his codefendant. The district court
did not err in denying Garza’s motion.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
3
Id. at 931 (internal citations omitted).
2