F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
NOV 13 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-1333
(D.C. No. 96-CR-389-S)
ELGIN PHILLIPS, (D. Colo.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and TACHA , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Elgin Phillips appeals his jury convictions of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and of use and
carrying of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). He contends that (1) the district court erred in denying his
motion for a mistrial or alternatively for the exclusion of the testimony of rebuttal
witnesses; (2) the prosecution’s closing argument was improper, entitling him to a
new trial; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to support his § 924(c)(1)
conviction for carrying a firearm. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and affirm.
Background
On the afternoon of August 27, 1996, Denver police officers Sanchez and
Delmonico were patrolling a north Denver neighborhood looking for suspects or
witnesses to an incident in which someone shot out a window on a patrol car. In
the course of their patrol, they stopped Phillips for running a stop sign. Officer
Delmonico spotted a black, soft-sided briefcase on the back seat of his car. The
briefcase had a bulge which led Officer Delmonico to believe that it might
contain a weapon. After Phillips had exited the vehicle, Officer Delmonico
removed the briefcase from the car and opened it. Inside, he found a large bag of
crack cocaine and a gun. During an inventory search of the briefcase, officers
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also found papers relating to Phillips and his oldest daughter, Joy Phillips.
Phillips was arrested and subsequently indicted for the present offenses.
The government tried Phillips twice. The district court set aside the jury’s
guilty verdict after the first trial. 1
Phillips’ defense theory was the same in both
trials. He admitted that the briefcase was found in his car, but argued that it
belonged to an acquaintance, Michael Tucker. Michael Tucker died before the
first trial and did not testify.
On the morning of the second trial, the government served on the defense a
pleading entitled “government’s witness supplement,” which noted its intent to
present a rebuttal case in the event that a defense case was presented. The
pleading did not identify the rebuttal witnesses which the government intended to
call.
During voir dire, the government sought and obtained an ex parte hearing at
which it disclosed to the court the identities of its two rebuttal witnesses and their
anticipated testimony. Neither witness had been called during the first trial. The
government indicated that it had just discovered the rebuttal witnesses and that
1
The district court set aside the convictions reached in the first trial because
of the possibility that the jurors had relied on unadmitted evidence in reaching
their verdict. After it had retired to deliberate, the jury discovered a business
card in a concealed compartment inside the briefcase. The jury matched a
telephone number on the business card with an entry on a telephone bill for the
cellular phone subscribed to by Phillips’ mother.
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both of them were afraid of Phillips and of his family. Although an order
requiring disclosure of witnesses was in effect, the district court ruled that the
government did not have to disclose the identities of the rebuttal witnesses or the
substance of their testimony to the defense until the defense case was complete.
The defense put on much the same case as it had presented during the first
trial. Phillips testified that he had given Michael Tucker and his girlfriend, Rose
Nelson, a ride in his car the morning of August 27, and dropped them off at
Nelson’s mother’s house. He stated he was unaware that Michael Tucker had left
the briefcase inside his car until the officers found it there. He denied that he had
left the paperwork involving his daughter inside the briefcase. He asserted
instead that at the time of his arrest, the paperwork had been strewn on the car’s
back seat. Phillips also offered an innocent explanation for the large amount of
cash officers found on his person at the time of arrest.
Rose Nelson testified for the defense that she had been Tucker’s girlfriend
before he died; that she and Tucker had met Phillips at a Denny’s restaurant on
the morning of August 27, 1996; that Phillips gave them a ride in his car; and that
Tucker was carrying a black briefcase when he left Denny’s. She further testified
that she and Tucker got into an argument while Phillips was driving them to get
tickets for a concert that evening; that after the argument, Phillips drove them to
her mother’s house and they exited the vehicle; and that Tucker did not have the
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briefcase with him after he left the car and appeared very agitated after Phillips
drove away.
After the defense rested, the government called its first rebuttal witness,
Sharon Tave, Michael Tucker’ mother. Tave testified that on August 27, 1996,
the day Phillips was arrested, Michael Tucker was with her in Louisiana
registering for college.
Before the defense had an opportunity to cross-examine Tave, the
government handed defense counsel a report which summarized the testimony of
its other rebuttal witness, Jendaya Robinson. The report indicated that Robinson
had been Tucker’s girlfriend before he died and that Phillips had offered her
money to testify to the same story that Rose Nelson had presented.
Counsel expressed his concern to the court that if the report were true, it
presented him with an ethical problem, because the report described what could
be construed as criminal activity. He requested a mistrial, which the district court
denied. At his request, however, the district court allowed the government to
make a proffer of Robinson’s testimony outside the presence of the jury, during
which defense counsel cross-examined her. Afterwards, defense counsel renewed
his motion for mistrial and moved in the alternative to exclude Robinson’s
testimony. The court denied both motions.
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When proceedings resumed the next morning, Robinson took the stand.
She testified consistently with the government’s report. Phillips took the stand in
surrebuttal, against counsel’s advice. Defense counsel attempted but was unable
to obtain a stipulation from the government to have both sides waive closing
argument. In the prosecutor’s closing argument, she stated several times that
Phillips and his witnesses had lied and that he had suborned perjury. Defense
counsel presented a brief closing argument which did not address Phillips’ theory
of the case.
Discussion
I. Unlisted Rebuttal Witnesses
Phillips argues that the district court should either have granted his motion
for mistrial or excluded the undisclosed rebuttal witnesses because of unfair
prejudice. “We review the admission of testimony from an unlisted rebuttal
witness for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Talk , 13 F.3d 369, 371 (10th
Cir. 1993).
He argues, first, that the government was under a disclosure order requiring
it to disclose its witnesses. This argument misses the mark, because after the ex
parte hearing, the district court relieved the government of its obligation to
disclose the rebuttal witnesses. It is that decision which Phillips must attack, as
he does in his remaining arguments.
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Phillips argues that the government had a duty to disclose the witnesses to
him because the prosecutor told the court they were afraid of him. This fear, he
claims, was potential impeachment material pursuant to Brady v. Maryland , 373
U.S. 83 (1963). Phillips speculates that had he known that the witnesses were
afraid of him, and who they were, he might have been able to show there was
“bad blood” between the witnesses and himself and thereby to impeach their
testimony on the basis of bias or prejudice.
Brady does not create a general constitutional right to discovery in criminal
cases. See Weatherford v. Bursey , 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). It only requires
disclosure of favorable evidence which is material to either guilt or punishment.
See Brady , 373 U.S. at 87. Evidence is “material” when, had it been disclosed,
“there [would have been] a reasonable probability of a different result at trial.”
United States v. Woodlee , 136 F.3d 1399, 1411 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, No.
97-9239, 1998 WL 289773 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1998). Phillips’ argument is purely
speculative. He fails to establish that any material evidence was actually
withheld. We reject his Brady claim.
Phillips next argues that it was unfair for the government to withhold the
names of the witnesses because the prosecution had already been exposed to his
defense during the first trial. He fails to show why the government’s advance
knowledge of his defense strategy obligated it not to use undisclosed witnesses.
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Use of a surprise witness or unexpected evidence, without more, does not violate
a defendant’s constitutional rights. See Weatherford , 429 U.S. at 560.
Phillips also argues that by not requiring advance disclosure, the district
court deprived him of an opportunity to investigate the credibility of the rebuttal
witnesses. The district court allowed Phillips’ counsel to cross-examine
Robinson outside the presence of the jury and to prepare overnight for her
testimony and for his cross-examination of Tave. Phillips contends that these
steps were an insufficient substitute for a full investigation of the undisclosed
rebuttal witnesses. Because Phillips’ counsel did not request a continuance to
conduct further investigation, however, we must reject this argument. We
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
government to present the testimony of the undisclosed rebuttal witnesses.
II. Failure to grant mistrial
As part of his argument concerning advance disclosure, Phillips argues that
the district court should have granted his attorney’s motion for mistrial. His
attorney made the motion after it became clear that Robinson would testify that
his client had attempted to bribe her to testify falsely. Analytically, this is a
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separate claim from Phillips’ claim about disclosure of witnesses, 2
and so we
analyze it separately.
We must first narrow Phillips’ claim to matters that may be considered in
this appeal. In making his argument about the mistrial, Phillips argues that his
attorney should have remained a vigorous advocate for Phillips’ theory of the case
after the motion for mistrial was denied. We are not concerned here, however,
with what Phillips’ counsel did after the motion for mistrial was denied. If
Phillips’ attorney pursued an improper strategy as the result of the denial of his
motion for mistrial, that may be grounds for a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, but such a claim should be brought on collateral proceedings rather than
in this direct appeal. See United States v. Galloway , 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th
Cir. 1995).
The real issue presented is whether the revelation that Phillips and his
witness may have offered perjured testimony entitled Phillips to a mistrial. The
answer clearly is no. Where a defendant “put[s] into evidence the testimony of
which he now complains” and “ill-advisedly cho[oses] to present evidence which
[is] subject to devastating impeachment,” he “must accept the consequences of the
2
Phillips attempts to tie this claim to the district court’s refusal to require
disclosure of witnesses. His argument on this point is unconvincing, however.
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evidence he offers.” See United States v. Funt , 896 F.2d 1288, 1296 (11th Cir.
1990).
A similar analysis would apply even if counsel had been certain the
evidence was perjurious. The additional fact that defense counsel faces an ethical
dilemma where he knows his client has presented perjured testimony is not
grounds for a mistrial. Faced with perjured testimony, defense counsel is
responsible for taking “reasonable remedial measures,” Colo. R. of Prof’l
Conduct 3.3(a)(4), such as seeking to withdraw from representation or, as counsel
did in this case, refusing to present the defense theory in closing argument.
Phillips fails to substantiate his argument that the proper remedy for the ethical
dilemmas posed here was a mistrial. “It would be a perversion of adversary
process to permit a party to obtain a mistrial based on his own evidence.” Funt ,
896 F.2d at 1297 n.7.
III. Improper Argument by Prosecutor
Phillips next argues that the prosecutor in closing argument improperly
attacked the credibility of defense witnesses, 3
and vouched for the credibility of
3
He complains of the following remarks by the prosecutor: (1) “Rose
Nelson owed [Tucker and his mother] a big favor, and she paid them back
because she got on that stand and she lied to you,” R. Vol. 15 at 324-25;
(2) “[D]efendant got up on the stand, and he told you Michael Tucker left the
drugs in that car, and that, ladies and gentlemen, was a lie. It was a flat out, bald-
faced lie,” id. at 326; (3) “What went on here, ladies and gentlemen, was perjury,
(continued...)
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the government’s own witnesses. 4
Since counsel did not object when these
comments were made, we review them for plain error. See United States v.
Nichols , 21 F.3d 1016, 1018 (10th Cir. 1994). We will reverse a conviction for
plain error only in circumstances where a miscarriage of justice would otherwise
result. See id.
Although the prosecutor’s comments here were improper, see id. , we cannot
say that they rise to the level of plain error. Conflicting testimony about
Phillips’ story required the jury to conclude that someone was lying. Taken in
context, the comment concerning Tave’s credibility underscores her lack of
motivation to lie. The prosecutor immediately followed the comment by
exhorting the jury to examine the evidence rather than simply taking Tave at her
word. See R. Vol. 15 at 326.
Moreover, it does not appear that the prosecutor made the comments to
distract or mislead the jury. The evidence against Phillips was overwhelming.
The district court instructed the jury that arguments of counsel were not evidence
3
(...continued)
with a clear attempt to buy witnesses, to buy a defense and to suborn perjury.
That’s what Elgin Phillips did in this courtroom,” id. at 326-27; (4) “Ladies and
gentlemen, I submit to you that the entire defense case was a disgrace . . . . [With
the exception of witness Bobby Fox the defense witnesses] lied to you from start
to finish, a made-up, bought-for-$10,000 story,” id. at 327.
4
Phillips complains of the prosecutor’s statement that prosecution witness
Sharon Tave “has no motive to lie to you. She’s telling you the truth,” R. Vol. 15
at 325-26.
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in the case, and that they were the sole judges of the credibility of witnesses.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the remarks affected the outcome
of his trial. See United States v. Moore , 11 F.3d 475, 482 (4th Cir. 1993).
IV. Conviction for “Carrying” a Firearm
In his final issue, Phillips contends that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain his conviction for “carrying” a firearm during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). He argues that he did not
“carry” a firearm because the gun involved was located inside a briefcase in the
back seat of his car. This argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Muscarello v. United States , 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1919 (1998), in which
the Supreme Court defined “carrying” for purposes of § 924(c)(1) broadly enough
to encompass Phillips’ conduct in this case.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
James E. Barrett
Senior Circuit Judge
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