F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
DEC 10 1998
PUBLISH
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
LEANORA TEMPLETON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-1106
NEODATA SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 96-D-1576)
On the Briefs:
Leanora F. Templeton, Pro Se.
David D. Powell, Jr. and Jimmy Goh, of Holland & Hart LLP, Denver, Colorado,
for Defendant-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BRORBY and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
SEYMOUR, Chief Judge.
Leonora Templeton, proceeding pro se, sued her former employer, Neodata
Services, asserting a claim for breach of Neodata’s duty to provide reasonable
accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§12101, et
seq. (ADA), and claims under state law for breach of implied contract and
promissory estoppel. The district court granted summary judgment for Neodata,
concluding that Mrs. Templeton’s refusal to provide information from her
physician on her medical condition constituted a breakdown in the interactive
process required under the ADA, and was therefore sufficient to preclude her
claims under that act and state law. 1 We affirm. 2
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, examining the record
and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1337 (10th Cir.
1997). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidence shows no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Id.
1
Mrs. Templeton does not address the district court’s disposition of her
state law claims on appeal and we therefore deem them abandoned.
2
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
-2-
The undisputed facts establish that Mrs. Templeton began employment with
Neodata in 1993. In June 1994, she was involved in an automobile accident and
suffered serious head and neck injuries. As a result, she took a medical leave of
absence through July 1994. Her initial attempt to return to work was unsuccessful
and she took short-term disability leave from January 1995 through July 1995.
Thereafter she sought long-term disability benefits, which were approved in
September 1995.
In August 1995, Mrs. Templeton’s treating physician, Dr. Rae Ann Frantz,
wrote a letter to Neodata’s insurance carrier describing Mrs. Templeton’s current
diagnosis and medications. Dr. Frantz stated that she had “not yet seen a detailed
job description to answer specifically what duties [Mrs. Templeton] can or cannot
perform.” Rec., Def.’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Verified Response to Def.’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, Ex. B. Although Dr. Frantz stated that she expected Mrs.
Templeton to be able to return to work on October 2, 1995, Dr. Frantz qualified
that opinion as follows.
This may be further delayed if she does not respond conservatively to
therapy for her Carpel Tunnel Syndrome or her Cervical
Radiculopaty. Until further evaluation and diagnostic clarification is
made, I cannot say whether she will be a candidate for corrective
surgery. If she is, further delays are expected. I believe her
prognosis of return to her previous occupation full time is only fair.
I base this on her long-term absence from work and her incomplete
and slow response to therapies to date.
Id.
-3-
In response, Neodata’s benefits manager wrote to Dr. Frantz on October 16
enclosing a job description for the position held by Mrs. Templeton before she
took medical leave. The benefits manager further stated:
Lastly, enclosed is an updated Physician Certification we request you
complete providing an updated status regarding [Mrs. Templeton’s]
ability to return to work. The last statement referenced a return date
of October 1, 1995, however, [Mrs. Templeton] has not returned to
work pending resolution of the items addressed in your letter of
August 28, 1995. As we are anxious to work with [Mrs. Templeton]
in her recuperation process, please complete the enclosed
certification and return to my attention by October 23, 1995. Our
insurance carrier is also in need of a medical status update before any
additional disability benefits can be paid to [Mrs. Templeton].
Id. The enclosed certification was captioned “Certification of Health Care
Provider (Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993).” Id.
It is undisputed that the certification was never provided to Neodata. Mrs.
Templeton admitted that she refused to authorize Dr. Frantz to release the
requested information because Mrs. Templeton believed that Neodata was
preparing to place her on medical leave against her wishes. The record reveals
that relations between Mrs. Templeton and the attorneys representing Neodata
degenerated and that no further productive exchange between the parties occurred
with respect to Mrs. Templeton’s desire to return to work. On November 10,
1995, Noedata sent Mrs. Templeton a letter citing her refusal to meet with
Neodata personnel to discuss her return to work and her failure to cooperate with
requests for an updated physician’s certification. The letter again requested the
-4-
updated certification and stated that failure to provide it by November 16, 1995,
would constitute job abandonment and would result in the termination of her
employment. Mrs. Templeton did not provide the certificate and her employment
was terminated effective November 30, 1995.
In granting summary judgment for Neodata, the district court ruled that
Mrs. Templeton was not terminated for reasons remediable under the ADA, but
rather because of her refusal to provide medical information that was reasonably
requested by her employer. We agree that Mrs. Templeton has failed to establish
a violation of the ADA.
The federal regulations implementing the ADA “envision an interactive
process that requires participation by both parties.” Beck v. University of
Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Woodman,
132 F.3d at 1344-45 & n.15. Neodata’s request for updated medical information
was reasonable in light of Dr. Frantz’ August letter indicating real doubt as to
Mrs. Templeton’s ability to return to work in October. It is clear under the
undisputed facts that Neodata needed the requested information in order to
determine appropriate reasonable accomodation for Mrs. Templeton in the event
she was able to return to work at all. 3
3
We agree with the district court that Mrs. Templeton’s duty to provide
Neodata with information on her medical condition as part of the ADA interactive
(continued...)
-5-
The court in Beck considered very similar circumstances and ruled that
“[w]here the missing information is of the type that can only be provided by one
of the parties, failure to provide the information may be the cause of the
breakdown and the party withholding the information may be found to have
obstructed the process.” Beck, 75 F.3d at 1136; see also Steffes v. Stepan Co.,
144 F.3d 1070, 1073 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that when the employee “fail[s] to
hold up her end of the interactive process by clarifying the extent of her medical
restrictions, [the employer] cannot be held liable for failing to provide reasonable
accommodations”). Here, as in Beck, the employee’s failure to provide medical
information necessary to the interactive process precludes her from claiming that
the employer violated the ADA by failing to provide reasonable accomodation. 4
An employer cannot be expected to propose reasonable accomodation absent
critical information on the employee’s medical condition and the limitations it
3
(...continued)
process is not excused by her fear that Neodata intended to place her on medical
leave without her consent. Even assuming such conduct by Neodata could
support a claim under the ADA for failure to provide reasonable accomodation,
that claim would only arise after Mrs. Templeton satisfied her duty “to notify the
employer of the nature of her disability.” Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330,
1345 (10th Cir. 1997).
4
Mrs. Templeton argues that Neodata should have requested her to visit the
company physicians to obtain the requested information. However, in view of her
position that she was justified in refusing to provide the information because she
believed Neodata was seeking it in an attempt to place her on medical leave
against her wishes, we see no significance in Neodata’s failure to direct her to see
the company’s physicians.
-6-
imposes.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment for Neodata. 5
5
Mrs. Templeton argues on appeal that the district court was biased against
her because she was unrepresented by counsel. Our review of the record reflects
that, to the contrary, the district court was commendably solicitious of Mrs.
Templeton and her efforts to pursue her claims. That court, however, like this
court, must base its decision on the record.
-7-