F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 31 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ALBERTO SOTO and ISMAEL ORTIZ,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v. No. 97-2231
ARTURO JURADO AND JURADO (D.C. No. 96-CV-184-BB)
FARMS, (D.N.M.)
Defendants - Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Defendants Arturo Jurado and Jurado Farms appeal the district court’s judgment
awarding damages and attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs Alberto Soto and Ismael Ortiz. On
appeal, Defendants contend that the district court erroneously: (1) found that Arturo
Jurado participated in a conspiracy to terminate Plaintiffs; (2) awarded damages to
Plaintiffs; and (3) awarded excessive and unreasonable attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs. Our
jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
I.
Plaintiffs are agricultural workers engaged in the business of picking chile in
southern New Mexico. In October 1995, Plaintiffs worked for farm labor contractor
Agustin Hernandez picking chile on a farm belonging to Steve Bamert. While employed
by Hernandez, Plaintiffs were involved in a lawsuit filed against Defendant Arturo
Jurado. See Palacios v. Jurado, No. 94-CV-792 (D.N.M. 1995). Plaintiff Soto was a
party to the lawsuit and Plaintiff Ortiz participated as a witness.
Plaintiffs testified in Palacios on October 24 and 25 and returned to work that
same week. On October 27, 1995, Defendant Arturo Jurado visited Bamert’s farm.
During this visit, he recognized one of the workers who testified against him in Palacios.
Defendant gave Bamert a list of farm workers who were plaintiffs in Palacios and who
testified for the plaintiffs. Defendant told Bamert that the farm workers, including both
Plaintiffs, were “indiscriminately suing farmers, chile plant owners, whoever” and
warned that Bamert should “watch out for them.”
After discussing the farm workers with Defendant Arturo Jurado, Bamert relayed
the contents of the list to Plaintiffs’ employer, Agustin Hernandez. Bamert told
Hernandez to “watch out for these people . . . they are indiscriminately suing farmers,
chile plant owners, whoever.” Within two work days, Hernandez fired Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs immediately sought the advice of an attorney. That same day, their attorney
contacted Hernandez and told him that it was illegal to retaliate against Plaintiffs for
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participating in the Palacios case. Hernandez called Plaintiffs back to work the next day
and, although neither Plaintiff worked that day, payed them for working the day on which
they were fired. Hernandez had never before paid a worker for a day he or she did not
actually work.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit against Defendants arguing that Defendants,
Hernandez and Bamert participated in a conspiracy to retaliate against Plaintiffs for
bringing suit and testifying against Arturo Jurado in the Palacios case. Plaintiffs claimed
that Defendants actions violated the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers
Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1855 (AWPA), the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 215 (FLSA), and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. As relief, Plaintiffs requested that the district court:
(1) declare that Defendants violated Plaintiffs rights under the three statutes; (2) enjoin
Defendants from engaging in discriminatory practices against them; (3) award Plaintiffs
statutory damages pursuant to the AWPA; and (4) award Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and
costs.
The district court tried the case without a jury. The district court found that
Defendants conspired against Plaintiffs because of their involvement in Palacios.
Accordingly, the court awarded each Plaintiff $5,000 in compensatory damages and
$5,000 in punitive damages, plus attorneys’ fees, for Defendants’ violation of § 1985.
The court further awarded each Plaintiff $30 in liquidated damages and $1,000 in
punitive damages under the FLSA. The court then awarded each Plaintiff $500 under the
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AWPA.
Defendants contested the court’s damage award under the FLSA. The court
agreed and entered a new order which did not contain an award under the FLSA. In its
amended findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court also awarded Plaintiffs
attorneys’ fees of $67,637.50 and costs in the amount of $1,353.89. Defendant then filed
a Motion to Amend Judgment and Attorney’s Fees. The court granted the motion in part
and reduced Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees by $16,868.75. Then, acting on Plaintiffs’
Supplemental Application for Fees, the court awarded Plaintiffs additional attorneys’ fees
of $2,912.50, bringing the entire attorneys’ fees award to $53,681.25.
II.
A.
Defendants first argue that the district court erred in finding that Defendant Arturo
Jurado conspired with Hernandez and Bamert to terminate Plaintiffs. Specifically,
Defendants argue that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the
finding and that the district court improperly considered Plaintiffs’ hearsay statements as
substantive proof of the conspiracy.
Although apparently independent, Defendants’ hearsay and sufficiency arguments
are necessarily intertwined. In order for a co-conspirator’s out of court statement to be
admissible, the proponent of the evidence must first prove by a preponderance of the
evidence the existence of a conspiracy and that the defendant participated in the
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conspiracy. United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1475 (10th Cir. 1991).1 “The
contents of the [hearsay] statement shall be considered but are not alone sufficient to
establish . . . the existence of the conspiracy and the participation therein of the declarant
and the party against whom the statement is offered . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987). Thus, the proponent may
offer the hearsay statement at issue to prove the existence of a conspiracy, but such
statement must be corroborated by independent evidence. Esparsen, 930 F.2d at 1475.
Defendants ultimately seek a determination that the evidence before the district
court did not support its finding that Defendants participated in a conspiracy to terminate
Plaintiffs. Defendants’ also seek a determination that the district court improperly relied
on hearsay statements made by an alleged coconspirator. Because we must find by a
preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed before we may determine
1
Generally, courts make the predicate finding of a conspiracy in one of two ways;
by holding a separate hearing or by allowing the statements in on the assurance that the
statements and additional evidence will prove the underlying conspiracy. In United States
v. Urena, 27 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1994), we announced that the preferred order of
proof in determining the admissibility of an alleged coconspirator statement is to first
hold a separate hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the plaintiff
can prove a conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence. This order of proof, we
explained, eliminates the possibility of prejudice where the court admits the
coconspirator’s statement over objection, but the offering party subsequently fails to
prove the underlying conspiracy. We emphasized, however, that the order of proof was a
preference, and that the trial judge retained the discretion to admit hearsay statements
with the idea that the statements will later “connect-up” and show the existence of the
predicate conspiracy. Id. In any event, the order of proof is of lesser importance in the
context of a bench trial where the judge acts as the finder-of-fact. Cf. Allen v. McOtter,
804 F.2d 1362, 1363-64 (5th Cir. 1986) (judge acting as finder-of-fact need not conduct
separate hearing on voluntariness).
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whether the hearsay statements were properly introduced under Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(E), Defendants’ first argument is necessarily consumed by their second.
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed. R.
Evid. 801(c). Because courts often view such statements as unreliable, hearsay is
typically not admissible evidence. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990). The
Federal Rules of Evidence, however, classify certain types of statements, which would
normally be inadmissible hearsay, as properly admitted into evidence. See Fed. R. Evid.
801(d). A statement by a “coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy” is such a statement. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
Although not entirely clear, Defendants appear to complain about the following
statements admitted at trial:
1) a statement by Plaintiff Soto that Gregorio Reyes told him that Hernandez
told Reyes that Defendant Arturo Jurado ordered Hernandez to fire Soto
because he was a “bad influence or bad element.”
2) a statement by Plaintiff Soto that Hernandez told him that Bamert had given
Hernandez a list of seven people, including Soto, who were “bad elements.”
3) a statement by Plaintiff Ortiz that Hernandez told him “you cannot continue
picking because this is an order from Arturo [Jurado] and Steve [Bamert].”
We initially note a double hearsay problem with the first statement made by Plaintiff
Soto. Fed. R. Evid. 805 provides that “[h]earsay within hearsay is not excluded under the
hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the
hearsay rule . . . .” The first level of hearsay in this statement is Reyes’ statement that
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Hernandez told him to fire Plaintiff Soto. The second level is Hernandez’s statement that
Defendant Arturo Jurado ordered Hernandez to fire Soto. Even assuming the second
level comes under an exception to the hearsay rule, Reyes account of what Hernandez
told him is inadmissible and, therefore, renders the entire statement inadmissible.
Although the record reveals a good deal of evidence showing a conspiracy between
Defendant Jurado, Hernandez, and Bamert, this statement is the only such evidence
suggesting Reyes participated. Without more, Plaintiffs have not proven by a
preponderance that Reyes participated in the conspiracy. Because Reyes’ statement is not
admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) or any exception to the hearsay rule, any
reliance on the first statement by the district court was misplaced.
We now review the second two statements to determine whether they are non-
hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). The first step in this inquiry is to determine
whether Plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Hernandez, Bamert and
Defendant Arturo Jurado participated in a conspiracy. In making this determination, we
look at the hearsay statements themselves, as well as any additional evidence presented to
the district court. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181.
To prove a civil rights conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), Plaintiffs were
required to show: (1) a conspiracy by Defendants; (2) to injure a party or witness in his or
her person or property; (3) because of attending federal court or testifying in any matter
pending in federal court; (4) which actually results in injury or damages to Plaintiffs.
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Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, (9th Cir. 1993) (citing 42 U.S.C.
1985(2)). Considering the evidence in its entirety, and viewing it in a light most
favorable to the district court’s finding, we conclude Plaintiffs proved that Jurado,
Hernandez and Bamert conspired to terminate Plaintiffs because they participated in
Palacios.
The record clearly shows that Defendant Arturo Jurado is a major player in the
southern New Mexico chile industry. For the past several years, Defendant Jurado has
purchased Bamert’s entire chile crop. Hernandez is a labor contractor providing chile
pickers to area farmers. Although other labor contractors exist, both Bamert and
Defendant Jurado contract with Hernandez to have their chiles picked.
Plaintiffs participated in and testified against Jurado in Palacios. Shortly
thereafter, Jurado compiled a list of workers involved in the lawsuit. One day, Jurado
recognized that one of Hernandez’ chile pickers, who was working on Bamert’s farm, had
participated in the lawsuit against him. Jurado warned Bamert about the worker and
provided him a list naming seven workers who were involved in Palacios. Jurado told
Bamert that the workers were litigious and that he needed to be careful in dealing with
them.
Bamert forwarded the list to Hernandez and relayed what Jurado told him about
the workers on the list. The next day, Hernandez personally fired Ortiz and ordered
Reyes to fire Soto. Hernandez told Soto about the list and that Bamert told Hernandez
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that Soto was a “bad element.” Hernandez told Ortiz that Jurado and Bamert would not
allow him to work anymore. The day Hernandez fired Soto and Ortiz, the men visited a
lawyer who contacted Hernandez. The lawyer told Hernandez that it was illegal to
retaliate against the two men for participating in Palacios. The next day, Soto and Ortiz
were both called back to work and paid for the previous day. No other workers on the list
were subsequently fired.
From these facts, we believe a reasonable finder-of-fact could conclude by a
preponderance that Jurado, Hernandez and Bamert conspired to terminate Soto and Ortiz
because they participated in Palacios. We further conclude that the challenged statements
were made during the course, and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Thus, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the coconspirator statements. As noted
above, our disposition of Defendants’ argument that the district court improperly admitted
Plaintiffs’ hearsay testimony also disposes of Defendants’ contention that the evidence
did not support the district court’s finding that Defendant Arturo Jurado conspired to
terminate Plaintiffs for participating in Palacios. For the sake of clarity, however, we
formally reject Defendants’ sufficiency argument and conclude that its finding that Jurado
conspired to terminate Plaintiffs was not clearly erroneous.
B.
Defendants next contend that the “district court erred in awarding damages to
plaintiffs, because the evidence was insufficient to support the damages awarded and
9
because the district court relied on matters outside the record in fixing the amount of
damages awarded. “Our review of a damages award is constrained by familiar principles.
The award itself must be supported by substantial evidence.” Wulf v. City of Wichita,
883 F.3d 842, 874 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156,
159-60 (1968)). Compensatory damages are not limited to lost wages and other monetary
harms, but also include injuries such as damage to reputation, personal humiliation, and
emotional distress. See Memphis Comm. School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307
(1986).
Plaintiffs testified that Jurado’s participation in the conspiracy damaged their
reputation with area farmers and caused them to fear that they would not be able to get
work in the area. In addition, the record contains evidence showing that Jurado’s acts
actually damaged Plaintiffs’ reputations. For example, the record shows that after Jurado
told Bamert that Plaintiffs were litigious and needed to be watched, Bamert felt the need
to warn Hernandez. Drawing the inferences in favor of the district court’s findings, the
information undoubtedly harmed their reputation with respect to Hernandez – he fired
them. Moreover, considering the fact that Hernandez was the labor contractor who
provided Plaintiffs with work, it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that they
legitimately feared their future ability to obtain work in the area. Although Plaintiffs
“testimony and the evidence presented are not the most graphic and detailed display” of
reputation damage and emotional distress, we cannot conclude that the district court’s
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damage award is not supported by substantial evidence. See Wulf, 883 F.2d at 875.
Defendants further contend that the district court improperly based its award on
facts not in the record. Specifically, Defendants contend that the district court improperly
concluded that: (1) Jurado farms had been valued at $4,819,858; (2) Plaintiffs had a
legitimate fear they would not be able to work on area farms; and (3) Plaintiffs feared
they would not be able to provide for their families. Viewed in a light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, the record supports the district court’s findings that Plaintiffs feared they would
not be able to get work in the area and that Plaintiffs feared they would not be able to
provide for their families. Furthermore, Defendants’ argument that the district court
erroneously considered the value of Jurado farms is of little relevance. Assuming
Defendants are correct regarding the issue of value, the evidence nonetheless supports the
damage award.
C.
Defendants finally complain that the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees must
be reversed because the award was both excessive and unreasonable. We review the
district court’s award of attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion. Anderson v. Secretary
of Health and Human Services, 80 F.3d 1500, 1504 (10th Cir. 1996). In doing so, we
generally defer to the district court’s judgment because its first-hand knowledge of the
attorneys’ work gives it a far better means of knowing what is fair and just than an
appellate court can glean from the record on appeal. Id. Nonetheless, the district court
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should provide a clear and concise explanation of its reasons for awarding fees. New
Mexico Citizens For Clean Air And Water v. Espanola Mercantile Company, Inc., 72
F.3d 830, 834 (10th Cir. 1996). Although the explanation need not identify and justify
each hour permitted or denied, the order should be specific enough to provide this court
with an adequate basis for review. Id.
The most useful starting point for determining whether the district court’s award of
attorneys’ fees is proper is the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate. Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 552 (10th Cir. 1983). We have
described this basic concept – reasonable hours times reasonable rate – as the “lodestar
figure.” Anderson, 80 F.3d at 1504. The party seeking attorneys’ fees bears the burden
of proving that the time expended was reasonable and what rate is reasonable for that
particular litigation. Case v. Unified School Dist. No. 233, Johnson County, 157 F.3d
1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998). A reasonable rate is generally the going rate for an attorney
of the same experience level, in the same community, for the same type of work. Id. at
1255-56. Reasonable hours generally include the time necessary for a competent attorney
to thoroughly prepare and try the case. See id. at 1250. A party may not recover
attorney’s fees for tasks easily delegated to a non-professional assistant. Espanola
Mercantile, 72 F.3d at 835. Thus, in order to prevent paying “a Michelangelo . . . Sistine
Chapel rates for painting a farmer’s barn,” the court must scrutinize the records and weed
out non-professional and excessive tasks. Id. (quoting Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719
12
F.2d 670, 677 (3d Cir. 1983)).
Although the district court’s judgment does not contain meticulous detail
describing its award of attorneys’ fees, our review of the record convinces us it did not
abuse its discretion. The record demonstrates that after Plaintiffs presented their billing
records and evidence of reasonable rates in their legal community, the district court
determined what it deemed a reasonable lodestar figure. Defendants’ filed a motion to
amend the judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs’ fee requests were unreasonable. Defendants’
specifically pointed to duplicative work and non-professional tasks which it believed
should not be compensated at legal service rates. The district court agreed, and cut
Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees by approximately $16,000. The district court specifically
marked the time entries it struck in reducing Plaintiffs attorney’s fees. In sum, we uphold
the district court’s fee award. We do note, however, that a more detailed analysis of the
fee application would have made our review of the award considerably less demanding.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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