F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JAN 20 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
JOHN LEE BRAZIEL, LISA M.
MONTOYA, ROBERT P. CURRY,
PEDRO B. QUINONES,
FELIPE J. KIEDAISCH,
No. 97-2288
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
WILLIAM RUSSELL,
EDDIE L. LEWIS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TOBOSA DEVELOPMENTAL
SERVICES, a nonprofit New Mexico
corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. CIV-96-893-LFG)
Submitted on the briefs:
W.T. Martin, Jr., Carlsbad, New Mexico, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Deborah D. Wells of Kennedy, Moulton & Wells, P.C., Albuquerque, New
Mexico, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before PORFILIO, KELLY, and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
PORFILIO , Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs-appellants appeal from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to defendant-appellee Tobosa Developmental Services on their claims
for unpaid wages, damages, and attorney’s fees sought pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. 1
Appellants brought individual
complaints against Tobosa under the FLSA. 2
Upon Tobosa’s motions for
summary judgment, the district court ruled against appellants on all FLSA claims,
filing five separate opinions and subsequent judgments. Our jurisdiction arises
from 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s dispositions de novo,
1
Original plaintiffs William “Bill” Russell and Eddie L. Lewis were
dismissed by the district court and have not appealed.
2
Plaintiffs Braziel and Curry also originally asserted wrongful termination
claims under state law. The parties agreed, in a stipulated motion, to dismiss
Curry’s termination claim. The district court granted summary judgment to
Tobosa on Braziel’s wrongful termination claim. Because Braziel presents no
argument regarding the termination claim, he is deemed to have abandoned it on
appeal. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon , 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th
Cir. 1994).
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applying the same legal standard as that court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
See Kaul v. Stephan , 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996). Where there are no
genuine issues of material fact in dispute, we examine the appropriate legal
standards to determine whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law. 3
See id.
The following facts are undisputed: Tobosa is a nonprofit corporation
which provides housing and residential care and supervision for developmentally
disabled people. Appellants were in Tobosa’s employ as residential assistants,
and as such, worked in homes leased by Tobosa, assisting Tobosa’s clients with
daily living tasks. While working as residential assistants, appellants each had
their own bedrooms and often their own bathrooms, and use of the house’s
kitchen facilities and other common amenities. Plaintiffs Braziel, Curry, and
Montoya were scheduled to work shifts greater than twenty-four hours in length.
All of appellants’ working schedules included overnights.
Although Tobosa and appellants did not discuss payment for sleep time
when appellants were hired, all of them understood that it was Tobosa’s policy
not to pay for time scheduled as sleep time, generally an eight-hour period from
3
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
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10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. This policy had been in place since 1988, before any of
appellants were hired. None of appellants filed formal grievances about this
policy, although they were aware there was a grievance procedure in place.
Several appellants did complain to supervisors and others about the sleep time
policy after they had been in Tobosa’s employ as residential assistants anywhere
from one month to six months.
Tobosa had a policy of paying residential assistants for any time they were
disturbed during the night, if the disturbance was reported. Although some
appellants alleged that they regularly got less than five hours sleep during the
scheduled sleep time, they often did not report disturbances as required by the
policy. Several appellants said that they did not report disturbances because they
thought the disturbances had to be major incidents and because other employees
told them they wouldn’t get paid for that time. Appellants alleged generally that
Tobosa did not follow its policy of paying for sleep time interruptions, however,
none of them alleged reported disturbances for which they were not paid and none
of them refused any paychecks from Tobosa.
Regulations promulgated pursuant to the FLSA provide that, absent an
express or implied agreement to the contrary, sleep time and meal periods
constitute hours worked. However, an employer and its employees may agree to
exempt sleep time and, in the case of employees residing on-site, other reasonable
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private time, from paid working time. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.22, 785.23. Where
working shifts longer than twenty-four hours are scheduled, adequate sleeping
facilities must be furnished and interruptions in sleep time are counted as hours
worked. If an employee cannot get at least five hours of sleep during the
scheduled sleep period, the entire period counts as time worked. See id. § 785.22.
Whether analyzed under § 785.22 as to work shifts greater than twenty-four
hours or under § 785.23 as to overnight work shifts less than twenty-four hours,
the key issue in this case is whether an agreement existed between Tobosa and
appellants to exempt scheduled sleep periods from hours worked. The district
court granted summary judgment to Tobosa because it concluded, on the relevant
facts discussed above, that an implied agreement existed that appellants would not
be paid for scheduled sleep time. 4
See Appellant’s App., Vol. III, at 575-78,
586-88, 595-98, 605-07, 615-16. On appeal, appellants argue that the district
court erred, relying on an unpublished order and judgment from this court, Brown
v. City of Oklahoma City , No. 93-6389, 1994 WL 721389 (10th Cir. Dec. 23,
1994). They also rely on an Eighth Circuit case, Hultgren v. County of Lancaster ,
913 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1990). Finally, they argue that an analysis of New Mexico
4
Plaintiff Curry also signed an express agreement that he would not be paid
for scheduled sleep time; however the court’s implied agreement analysis applies
to that period of time before the express agreement was in place.
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law indicates that where the evidence conflicts or leads to more than one
inference, the issue should be decided by a jury as an issue in fact.
We agree with the district court both that an agreement to exempt sleep
time from paid work under the FLSA can be implied, and that the undisputed facts
in this case compel the conclusion that there was an implied agreement to do so.
Although it is clear from the record and appellants’ pleadings that they became
unhappy with the policy sometime after beginning their employment with Tobosa,
it is equally clear that appellants understood and acquiesced to the policy when
they were hired. See Ariens v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. , 382 F.2d 192, 197
(6th Cir. 1967) (holding implied agreement existed where employees were
informed of and acquiesced to working schedules exempting sleep time and
accepted pay checks based on those schedules). None of appellants’ allegations
regarding the administration of Tobosa’s sleep time policy or their subsequent
complaints create genuine issues of material fact regarding their understanding at
the time they were hired. Therefore, appellants’ discussion of New Mexico law in
the presence of disputed facts is inapposite. See Rivera v. Sagebrush Sales, Inc. ,
884 P.2d 832, 835 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that undisputed fact was
sufficient to support implied contract for hire, as a matter of law).
Brown does not require a different result. The facts of that case differ
significantly in that the subject of overtime pay for sleep time periods was
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actually discussed in negotiations for a union contract between the parties. There,
the parties’ inability to reach an agreement on this point conflicted with the
employer’s position that an implied contract existed. Thus, a genuine issue of
material fact precluded summary judgment on the contract issue. See 1994 WL
721389, at **3. 5
Similarly, we are not persuaded otherwise by the Eighth
Circuit’s opinion in Hultgren . There, employees were not given separate sleeping
facilities and nightly interruptions were so numerous that the employees could not
get even several hours of sleep. See 913 F.2d at 500. The employer’s sleep time
policy prohibited reporting interruptions lasting less than ten minutes and
provided that the entire sleep time period would not be paid for unless
interruptions totaled three hours or more. See id. at 503. Further, although we
recognize the Hultgren court’s ruling that there was no agreement to deduct sleep
time because the sleep time policy was unilaterally created by the employer and
contracts were presented to the employees on a take-it or leave-it basis, we
disagree with appellant’s apparent argument that an employer cannot enforce such
an existing policy. This case does not involve a change in Tobosa’s sleep time
policy imposed upon appellants after they began their employment with Tobosa.
5
Further, Brown is an unpublished order and judgment and, under the rules
of this court, not binding precedent. See 10th Cir. R. 36.3(A).
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The Eighth Circuit itself disagreed with this argument in a later case, see
Bouchard v. Regional Governing Bd. , 939 F.2d 1323, 1330-31 (8th Cir. 1991).
Finally, appellants argue that 29 C.F.R. § 785.23, addressing the deduction
of sleep time from hours worked where employees reside on an employer’s
premises, should not apply because they did not reside permanently in the houses
where they worked as residential assistants. The district court held that this
regulation applied to those appellants who worked shifts less than twenty-four
hours, noting appellants’ separate bedroom and bathroom facilities, and
concluding that the regulation does not require a continuous stay on site. See
Appellant’s App., Vol. III, at 577, 598, 607. 6
On appeal, appellants simply
contend that disputed issues of fact exist which preclude the district court’s
holding. We agree with the district court that, under the facts of this case,
§ 785.23 applied to appellants who brought claims for work shifts less than
twenty-four hours. The regulation does not require permanent residence, only that
an employee reside on the premises “for extended periods of time.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 785.23.
6
Plaintiffs Kiedaisch and Quinones did not present claims regarding work
shifts less than twenty-four hours in length. Therefore analysis of this regulation
does not appear in the district court’s opinions addressing their claims.
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The judgments of the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico granting summary judgment to defendant Tobosa on all of appellants’
claims under the FLSA are AFFIRMED.
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