F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 1 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 97-4177
(D. Ct. No. 96-CR-270-J)
MONNIE LASHAWN ANDERSON, (D. Utah)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, PORFILIO, and TACHA, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Monnie Lashawn Anderson was found guilty on two
counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and was
sentenced to 60 months imprisonment, followed by a three-year period of
supervised release. On appeal, defendant challenges the validity of her
conviction, asserting that the district court improperly denied her motion to
suppress the evidence used to convict her. Defendant also challenges her
sentence, claiming that the district court erred when it failed to depart downward
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
from the mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to the “safety valve” provision of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”)
§ 5C1.2. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We affirm.
On the morning of November 10, 1996, Utah Highway Patrolman Lance
Bushnell monitored Interstate 70 in a marked patrol car. He observed a
late-model white Chevrolet Suburban slow from 70 m.p.h. to 55 m.p.h. as it
approached his patrol car, despite the posted speed limit of 75 m.p.h. After
observing the vehicle’s deceleration, Officer Bushnell crossed the center median
and drove at speeds approaching 100 m.p.h. in pursuit of the Suburban. As the
patrol car approached the Suburban, Officer Bushnell observed the vehicle cross
over into the emergency lane by a few inches on two occasions. While pursued,
the Suburban accelerated to 70 m.p.h. and again reduced its speed to 55 m.p.h.
Officer Bushnell believed these acts indicated an impaired or fatigued driver. He
pulled alongside the Suburban and noticed through a tinted window that the driver
had a “withdrawn look.” He then stopped the vehicle to investigate his belief that
the driver was either falling asleep or impaired. As Officer Bushnell approached
the car on foot, he noticed an “overpowering” odor of marijuana. During these
events, defendant sat in the front passenger seat of the Suburban. Backup officers
soon arrived and administered field sobriety tests to the driver of the Suburban,
-2-
Rodrell Castine. They found Mr. Castine to be driving while under the influence
of drugs. The officers subsequently searched the Suburban for narcotics. This
search yielded approximately forty pounds of marijuana and two kilograms of
cocaine. The officers arrested the defendant along with Mr. Castine, and she was
charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B),
(b)(1)(C).
After her arrest, Ms. Anderson filed a motion to suppress the drugs
recovered during the search of the Suburban, alleging that the officers seized the
evidence as the result of a warrantless traffic stop in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress and
denied it, holding that Officer Bushnell’s observation of Mr. Castine violating the
Utah traffic code justified the stop under the Supreme Court’s holding in Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996). On August 12 and 14, 1997, a jury
trial was held. The defendant was convicted on both counts. The trial court
imposed a sentence of 60 months imprisonment, departing downward three
months from the statutory minimum sentence, based on grounds other than the
safety valve provision. The judge also imposed a three-year period of supervised
release to follow Ms. Anderson’s incarceration. This appeal followed.
Ms. Anderson argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to
-3-
suppress and that she is therefore entitled to have her case remanded. In
particular, she claims that the search of the Suburban violated the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches because Officer Bushnell
did not have a justifiable basis for initially stopping the vehicle. We review
determinations of reasonable suspicion de novo. See United States v. Edwards,
103 F.3d 90, 92 (10th Cir. 1996). We must consider the totality of the
circumstances in which the officer acted and view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government. See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345,
1348 (10th Cir. 1998).
“[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based
on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable
suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.”
United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc);
accord Whren, 517 U.S. at 819. Therefore, if Officer Bushnell had a reasonable
suspicion that the driver of the Suburban violated Title 41 of the Utah Code by
not keeping his vehicle within a single lane, see Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-61(1), or
by operating a vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, see Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a), the stop did not offend defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights. Mr. Castine, the driver of the Suburban, raised this identical
issue in his appeal. See United States v. Castine, 156 F.3d 1244, 1998 WL
-4-
516842 (10th Cir. Aug. 17, 1998) (unpublished opinion). The Castine panel held
that the testimony of Officer Bushnell was “sufficient for us to conclude that the
totality of the circumstances supported the officer’s reasonable suspicion that a
violation of the law was occurring.” Id. at *2. We agree with the decision in
Castine. The Suburban’s erratic speed changes, swerving outside the lane, and
the driver’s “withdrawn” look, combined with the Officer Bushnell’s knowledge
and experience with drivers on that section of the road during that time of day,
provide sufficient evidence to support a finding of reasonable suspicion that a
traffic violation was occurring. We thus conclude that the district court did not
err in denying Ms. Anderson’s motion to suppress.
Ms. Anderson also appeals the sentence imposed by the district court. She
claims that the district court erred when it failed to reduce her sentence under the
safety valve provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. We
disagree. Although we review the district court’s interpretation and application of
the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, see United States v. Hershberger, 962 F.2d
1548, 1550 (10th Cir. 1992), we review the district court’s factual findings
underlying a Sentencing Guideline departure for clear error, see United States v.
Flinn, 987 F.2d 1497, 1500 (10th Cir. 1993).
U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 states that the district court shall, in the case of an
offense under 21 U.S.C. § 841, impose a sentence without regard to any minimum
-5-
statutory sentence, provided the defendant meets the five criteria of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f). 1 This court has held that the defendant has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he or she is entitled to a safety valve
reduction. See United States v. Verners, 103 F.3d 108, 110 (10th Cir. 1996).
Contrary to Ms. Anderson’s claim that the court failed to make an
independent finding as to her eligibility for the safety valve reduction, the court
did make such a finding. After hearing arguments from both defense counsel and
1
Those criteria are:
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as
determined under the sentencing guidelines;
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or
possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant
to do so) in connection with the offense;
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person;
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of
others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and
was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in section
408 of the Controlled Substances Act; and
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has
truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the
defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same
course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the
defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the
Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a
determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this
requirement.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5).
-6-
the prosecution regarding the applicability of the safety valve provision, the
district court explained that it agreed with the jury, which found that Ms.
Anderson had knowingly possessed illegal drugs. Specifically, the court stated:
“I have no reason to quarrel with the jury’s determination. I believe that they
made the correct determination, and I know of no reason why I should, in any
way, in this instance where I have an independent obligation, find differently.”
Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 22. Ms. Anderson continued to assert that she did not
know the drugs were in the Suburban. By finding Ms. Anderson knew the drugs
were in the truck, the district court had to conclude that she had not provided the
government with all the information she had concerning the offense, as required
by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). Ms. Anderson, therefore, failed to demonstrate her
entitlement to a sentence reduction under the safety valve provision. Even
assuming, as the defendant urges, that the district court, for the purpose of
sentencing, has the discretion to make findings different than those made by the
jury, see United States v. Sherpa, 110 F.3d 656, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1997), nothing
prevents the district court from reaching the same conclusions as the jury.
Additionally, upon review of the record, we find no clear error in the
district court’s finding that the defendant has failed to satisfy her burden of proof
in this case. A finding is clearly erroneous only when it is “without factual
support in the record, or if after reviewing the evidence[,] we are left with the
-7-
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v.
Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir. 1990). The record in this case contains
facts that adequately support the district court’s finding that Ms. Anderson did not
qualify for the safety valve reduction. The record reveals that Ms. Anderson had
frequently used marijuana and was familiar with the smell of raw marijuana.
Despite her knowledge and experience with marijuana, she consistently denied
knowing anything about the marijuana that was concealed in the Suburban,
notwithstanding the testimony of the police officers that the odor of raw
marijuana emanating from the Suburban was “very strong” and “overpowering.”
Ms. Anderson’s denials under such circumstances indicate that the district court
did not clearly err in finding she did not satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) and
U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.
For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM defendant’s conviction and
sentence.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
-8-