F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 1 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MARY K. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-1170
(D.C. No. 95-N-3141)
FRANK HARRINGTON, (D. Colo.)
individually and in his official
capacity as an Officer of the City
and County of Denver Police
Department; JIM COLE, individually
and in his official capacity as a Cadet
Officer of the City and County of
Denver Police Department; RANDY
PENN, Sergeant, individually and in
his official capacity as an Officer of
the City and County of Denver Police
Department; MARK VASQUEZ,
Lieutenant, individually and in his
official capacity as an Officer of the
City and County of Denver Police
Department; JOHN and/or MARY
DOES, individually and in their
official capacity as Officers of the
City and County of Denver Police
Department, and the CITY AND
COUNTY OF DENVER;
Defendants-Appellees,
ALEX WOODS, JR., individually and
in his official capacity as an
Officer of the City and County
of Denver Police Department,
Defendant-Cross-
Claimant-Appellee,
v.
DENVER, CITY AND COUNTY OF
Defendant-Cross-
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO , BALDOCK , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Mary K. Taylor appeals from the district court’s order granting defendants’
motions to dismiss her claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. 1
Her federal civil rights
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1
The district court’s order also disposed of cross-claims brought by
defendant Woods against the City and County of Denver and declined to exercise
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suit against defendants sought money damages, costs, and attorneys fees for
injuries she allegedly suffered as a result of defendants’ actions following
a domestic violence assault by defendant Woods.
“We review the denial or grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, applying
the same standard used by the district court.” Breidenbach v. Bolish , 126 F.3d
1288, 1291 (10th Cir. 1997). Further, “w e must accept all of the well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true. However, we need not accept conclusory
allegations. We must liberally construe the pleadings and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents ,
159 F.3d 504, 510 (10th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). In this case, the district
court’s grant of defendants’ motion to dismiss was based on its conclusion that
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. See Dill v. City of Edmond ,
155 F.3d 1193, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 1998). We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the district court applied improper legal
standards to dismiss her claims and asserts that defendants should not have been
granted qualified immunity. She also argues several theories of liability not
presented to the district court, including her contentions that defendant police
jurisdiction over appellant’s pendent state law claims. These rulings were not
appealed.
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officers failed to intervene despite a duty to do so and that the City and County
of Denver was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s rights. We decline to address
theories or arguments not presented to the district court. See Bancamerica
Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel of Kan., Inc. , 100 F.3d 792, 798-99
(10th Cir.), opinion amended on other grounds , 103 F.3d 80 (10th Cir. 1996).
The district court, in a thorough and reasoned opinion, concluded that,
while plaintiff had adequately pleaded a conspiracy claim under § 1983, see
Appellant’s App. at 121, she had failed to demonstrate that any of her federal
or constitutional rights had been thereby deprived or even implicated. See id.
at 123-27. We agree with the district court’s analysis rejecting plaintiff’s claims.
However, we part company with the district court in its grant of qualified
immunity to defendants on each of those claims. Although examination of
a qualified immunity defense in a motion to dismiss is necessarily restricted to
a review of the pleadings and involves a heightened pleading standard, see Dill ,
155 F.3d at 1203-04, we conclude that the interplay of standards does not require
that the motion to dismiss be determined solely on the basis of the grant or denial
of qualified immunity. “We must first assess whether Plaintiff has asserted a
violation of a constitutional right. If the complaint alleges a valid claim, then we
must determine whether the constitutional right was clearly established so that
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reasonable officials would have understood that their conduct violated that right.”
Dill , 155 F.3d at 1204 (quotation and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
We are free to affirm the district court’s judgment on alternate grounds,
provided the record is sufficient to permit conclusions of law. See United States
v. Sandoval , 29 F.3d 537, 542 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994). In accord with the district
court’s analysis, we conclude that the following claims should have been
dismissed for failure to state a claim: a) plaintiff’s conclusory assertions of rights
to safety and security, freedom from threats from the state, and exercise of federal
and state constitutional rights; b) any claims based on violation of state law;
c) plaintiff’s free speech claim; d) her due process claim; and e) her equal
protection claim. To the extent that the district court construed plaintiff’s
pleadings as including claims regarding access to the courts, those claims should
have been dismissed both on grounds of standing (as to claims regarding
prosecution of defendant Woods) and for failure to state a claim (as to claims
regarding plaintiff’s access to the courts). Similarly, without an underlying
deprivation of federal or constitutional rights, plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against
defendant the City and County of Denver fail to state a claim.
In light of the above conclusions, we need not address plaintiff’s arguments
that the district court wrongly granted defendants qualified immunity on her
claims. However, we note again that, contrary to those arguments, liability under
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§ 1983 cannot be based on violation of state law alone. See Jones v. City &
County of Denver , 854 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 1988).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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