UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 97-31304
Summary Calendar
_______________________
MARABETH N. THOMPSON and
HARRY W. THOMPSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
BLAINE E. CARTLIDGE; ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(97-CV-1710)
_________________________________________________________________
September 3, 1998
Before JONES, SMITH, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Marabeth N. Thompson and her husband brought a legal
malpractice suit in Louisiana state court against Blaine E.
Cartlidge, et al., asserting that his negligent representation in
her personal injury case caused her claim to be prescribed under
Texas’ two year statute of limitations. Because all of the
defendants reside in Nevada, they removed the case to federal court
under diversity jurisdiction. The district court granted
appellees’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b),
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
ruling that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendants. We now affirm.
Appellants initially argue that the district court erred
in granting the appellees’ motion to dismiss because they waived
their jurisdictional defense by removing the case to federal court.
Courts have consistently held, however, that, “[r]emoval, in
itself, does not constitute a waiver of any right to object to lack
of personal jurisdiction.” Nationwide Engineering & Control
Systems, Inc. v Thomas, 837 F.2d 345, 347-48 (8th Cir. 1988).
Thus, the appellees retained their jurisdictional defense after
they removed the case to federal court.
Appellants alternatively assert that the district court
erred in ruling that it had no jurisdiction over the appellees.
Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is proper when
the state long-arm statute permits service of process and the
exercise of jurisdiction satisfies the due process clause. Since
Louisiana's long-arm statute allows for service of process as far
as the Constitution permits, we need only address the due process
issue. See Asarco, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd, 912 F.2d 784, 786 (5th
Cir. 1990). The due process clause limits a court’s power to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to
instances where the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with
(the forum state) such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct.
154, 158 (1945). In a specific jurisdiction case such as this one,
2
a defendant satisfies the minimum contacts requirement when he
purposefully directs activities to the forum state and the
plaintiff’s alleged injury arises out of the defendant’s contacts.
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S. Ct.
2174, 2183 (1985).
In support of their argument that Cartlidge made
sufficient contacts with Louisiana justifying the exercise of
jurisdiction over him, appellants note that Cartlidge sent
appellants regular correspondence related to the appellants’
pending lawsuit, including a retainer agreement which they signed
in Louisiana. As the district court correctly held, however, these
contacts were insufficient to maintain jurisdiction over Cartlidge.
Receiving and signing the retainer agreement in Louisiana does not
give Louisiana courts jurisdiction because, “merely contracting
with a resident of the forum state is insufficient to subject the
nonresident to the forum’s jurisdiction.” Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 778 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1015, 107 S. Ct. 1892 (1987). Additionally, even though appellants
and Cartlidge enjoyed an attorney-client relationship, “the bare
existence of an attorney-client relationship” without more, is
insufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts requirements. Trinity
Industries, Inc. v. Myers & Associates, 41 F.3d 229, 230 (5th Cir.
1995).2
2
Appellants assert that the district court has jurisdiction
over the appellees other than Cartlidge due to their association
with Cartlidge. Because we hold that the district court has no
jurisdiction over Cartlidge, it follows that it has no jurisdiction
over the other appellees.
3
Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
4