F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 18 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LINDA FAYE STEADMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-5067
(D.C. No. 96-CV-269-EA)
KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner (N.D. Okla.)
of Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , BARRETT , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner’s
denial of plaintiff’s application for supplemental security income benefits.
Plaintiff filed for benefits in September 1992, alleging she had been disabled
since February of that year due to chest pain and headaches accompanied by
numbness in her face and arm and blurred vision. After plaintiff’s application
was denied initially and on reconsideration, she requested and received a de novo
hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Plaintiff appeared at the
September 21, 1993 hearing with her non-attorney representative. In response to
the ALJ’s questions, plaintiff testified that she was unable to work due to pain in
her back, arms, and legs; she stated that without this pain, she would be able to
work. In response to her representative’s questions, plaintiff also acknowledged
that she had suffered from periodic outbreaks of boils on her body for years. At a
supplemental hearing on January 4, 1994, plaintiff again told the ALJ that she was
unable to work only because of pain in her back, arms, and legs. In response to
questions from her representative, plaintiff also said she had constant pain in her
hands and she continued to suffer from outbreaks of boils.
The ALJ issued a lengthy written decision on October 14, 1994. Based on
April 1993 x-rays showing minimal arthritic processes in plaintiff’s right knee
and degenerative joint disease of her thoracic and lumbar spine, the ALJ
concluded that plaintiff had severe impairments at step two of the sequential
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process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (describing steps). Despite her limitations, the
ALJ concluded that plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) for a
full range of sedentary work. While this RFC precluded plaintiff from returning
to her past relevant work as a nurse’s aide or motel maid, the ALJ concluded that
plaintiff could perform other work in the national economy pursuant to the
medical-vocational guidelines. Therefore, the ALJ denied plaintiff’s application
for benefits at step five of the sequential analysis. See id.
Plaintiff petitioned for review of the ALJ’s decision before the Appeals
Council and submitted additional medical records describing her treatment
between December 1994 and November 1995. The Appeals Council concluded
that the new records did not provide a basis to alter the ALJ’s decision. On
February 6, 1996, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s petition for review and
the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. Thereafter,
plaintiff appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the district court, which
affirmed the denial of benefits. This appeal followed.
Plaintiff raises three challenges to the Commissioner’s decision on appeal.
First, she contends that the ALJ failed to make a proper credibility assessment.
Second, she argues that the ALJ failed to develop the record by obtaining copies
of hospital records that were brought to his attention during the proceedings.
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Finally, she maintains that the ALJ incorrectly shifted the burden of proof to her
at step five of the sequential analysis.
We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the correct
legal standards were applied and whether the findings are supported by substantial
evidence in the record viewed as a whole. See Castellano v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). “If supported by
substantial evidence, the [Commissioner’s] findings are conclusive and must be
affirmed.” Sisco v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 10 F.3d 739,
741 (10th Cir. 1993). “In evaluating the appeal, we neither reweigh the evidence
nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Casias v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991).
We turn first to plaintiff’s challenge to the ALJ’s credibility assessment.
Under the familiar framework set forth in Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 163
(10th Cir. 1987), an ALJ assessing a claimant’s allegations of disabling pain must
first determine whether there is objective medical evidence of a pain-producing
impairment. If the first step is met, the ALJ must then determine whether there is
a nexus between the pain producing impairment and the claimant’s subjective
allegations of pain. See id. If the ALJ finds the necessary nexus, the ALJ must
then consider all the evidence–both objective and subjective–and determine the
credibility of the claimant’s allegations of disabling pain. See id. In making the
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required credibility assessment, the ALJ must link the conclusion to the evidence.
See Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995). While “credibility
determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not
upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence[,] . . .
[f]indings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively linked to
substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.” Id.
(quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s credibility determination was not
sufficiently linked to substantial evidence in the record. While the ALJ’s
decision might have been organized more clearly on this issue, we think a close
reading of his decision shows that he disbelieved plaintiff’s allegations of
disabling pain based on a variety of factors. First, he noted that plaintiff
originally filed for benefits based on her chest pains and headache syndromes, but
the medical records did not show many complaints of these problems after
plaintiff filed her application. Instead, not long after she filed her application,
plaintiff began to complain of a new set of problems, involving musculoskeletal
pain in her back, arms, and legs. The ALJ noted that while x-rays showed some
mild arthritic or degenerative changes in her back and knees, the medical adviser
stated that these changes would not be expected to limit plaintiff’s ability to
perform all work.
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The ALJ also discussed the contradiction between plaintiff’s alleged
functional restrictions and the findings of Dr. Cooper during his thorough
examination of plaintiff in December 1992. Additionally, he noted that the
medical records showed that plaintiff often sought treatment for ailments other
than back, leg, or arm pain, and that she went for long periods without seeking
any treatment at all. The ALJ also found that plaintiff failed to follow doctor
recommendations that she lose weight and exercise to lessen the load on her
musculoskeletal and cardiovascular systems, and he determined that she suffered
no side effects from the medications she was taking for her pain.
Based upon our review, we conclude that the ALJ provided a sufficient link
between the evidence and his determination that plaintiff’s allegations of
disabling pain were not credible. Moreover, we conclude that his credibility
assessment is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ’s decision on the ground that he failed to
obtain records from her brief hospitalization in late September 1993. After the
September 1993 hearing, the ALJ reopened the record to submit written
interrogatories to Dr. Andelman, a medical adviser. The ALJ gave plaintiff’s
representative an opportunity to submit his own interrogatories or to request a
supplemental hearing at which he could cross-examine Dr. Andelman. In an
October 28, 1993 letter to the ALJ, plaintiff’s representative requested a
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supplemental hearing and noted that plaintiff had been hospitalized since the last
hearing. Accordingly, the ALJ scheduled a supplemental hearing for January 4,
1994.
At the beginning of the supplemental hearing, the ALJ asked plaintiff’s
representative whether there were any additional documents that he wanted to
have made part of the record, and he said there were not. Thereafter, the ALJ
questioned the plaintiff at some length, and elicited from her information
concerning her recent hospitalization. She testified that she had awoken one
morning with pain in her chest and arm and had gone to the hospital, where she
was placed on a heart monitor and kept overnight. Plaintiff’s representative did
not ask plaintiff any other questions about the hospitalization, nor did he submit
any records from this visit, though he subsequently supplemented the record with
numerous other medical records. Plaintiff now claims that because the ALJ knew
about the hospitalization, he should have obtained the records when plaintiff’s
representative failed to submit them.
“It is beyond dispute that the burden to prove disability in a social security
case is on the claimant.” Hawkins v. Chater , 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir.
1997). Nonetheless, because a social security disability hearing is a
nonadversarial proceeding, the ALJ bears responsibility for ensuring that “an
adequate record is developed during the disability hearing consistent with the
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issues raised.” Henrie v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. , 13 F.3d
359, 360-61 (10th Cir. 1993). Generally, “[a]n ALJ has the duty to develop the
record by obtaining pertinent, available medical records which come to his
attention during the course of the hearing.” Carter v. Chater , 73 F.3d 1019, 1022
(10th Cir. 1996). The degree of effort required by the ALJ to develop the record,
however, varies from case to case. Cf. Battles v. Shalala , 36 F.3d 43, 45 (8th Cir.
1994) (noting that whether ALJ has adequately developed record must be
determined on case by case basis); Lashley v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs. , 708 F.2d 1048, 1052 (6th Cir. 1983) (same).
Here, although plaintiff originally complained of disabling chest pain in her
application for benefits, she did not mention chest pain as part of her disabling
condition at either the September 1993 or the January 1994 hearing before the
ALJ. Plaintiff’s treatment records did not reflect any complaints of chest pain
after December 1991, and when Dr. Cooper examined her in December 1992, she
did not mention any problem with chest pains until specifically asked about it, at
which point she indicated that they did not bother her anymore.
The record shows that plaintiff’s representative was advised in writing that
he needed to gather and submit medical evidence to the ALJ. In addition, the ALJ
specifically asked plaintiff’s representative at both the September 1993 and the
January 1994 hearings if there were any other documents he desired to have made
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part of the record. Plaintiff’s representative never indicated that he wanted to
submit any information concerning plaintiff’s hospitalization, beyond her
testimony, nor did he ask the ALJ’s assistance in obtaining the hospital records.
Plaintiff’s representative did, however, submit numerous other medical records to
the ALJ after the supplemental hearing. Thus, the ALJ could reasonably assume
that plaintiff’s representative purposely chose not to submit the hospital records,
perhaps because they were of only minor importance. See Shannon v. Chater , 54
F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding that plaintiff’s failure to submit
medical records of recent treatment suggested that the alleged treatments had only
minor importance).
Moreover, plaintiff has never provided the missing hospital records to the
Appeals Council, the district court, or this court, to establish that the record
before the ALJ was not adequately developed. Nor has she indicated how the
ALJ’s review of these missing records would have affected his decision to deny
benefits. See Hawkins , 113 F.3d at 1169 (concluding that when the missing
evidence was in existence at the time of the administrative hearing, it may it may
be appropriate to “require[] the claimant to prove prejudice by establishing that
the missing evidence would have been important in resolving the claim before
finding reversible error”) (citing Shannon , 54 F.3d at 488). Under the
circumstances, we conclude that the ALJ did not commit reversible error when he
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failed to obtain records from plaintiff’s overnight stay at the hospital in late
September 1993.
Plaintiff’s final challenge to the ALJ’s decision is rather unclear. While
the caption in her appellate brief and the first few sentences thereunder suggest
that she thinks the ALJ did not correctly put the burden of proof on the
Commissioner at step five of the sequential analysis, plaintiff does not tie this
proposition to the facts in any manner. Instead, she makes the following two
disjointed statements. First, she states: “The ALJ’s failure to obtain hospital
records related to Ms. Steadman’s chest pain cannot affirmatively support a
conclusion that her chest pain was not significant.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. Then,
she states: “The ALJ’s failure to properly consider Ms. Steadman’s nonexertional
impairments created an underlying flaw which tainted the remainder of his
analysis, in that he failed to obtain vocational testimony concerning the impact of
these alleged impairments on Ms. Steadman’s ability to work.” Id. at 20-21.
Plaintiff does not explain what nonexertional limitations the ALJ allegedly failed
to properly consider.
We have previously concluded the ALJ did not commit reversible error by
failing to obtain the hospital records relating to plaintiff’s September 1993
episode of chest pain. Moreover, these hospital records were not the only
evidence concerning plaintiff’s chest pain in the record, and the ALJ was able to
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assess the effects of chest pain on plaintiff’s ability to work from the other
evidence. To the extent plaintiff contends that her chest pains constitute a
nonexertional limitation and that the ALJ failed to properly consider it, we reject
this contention based upon our review of the record.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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