F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 24 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 98-1135
(D.C. No. 97-CR-271-B)
DOROTHY M. DUVALL, (D. Colo.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
Defendant Dorothy M. Duvall appeals from her conviction for one count of
making a false statement to and concealing a material fact from the Social
Security Administration in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 1
Defendant claims: (1)
admission of other “bad act evidence” violated her right to due process because it
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
was impermissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b); (2) the evidence was
insufficient to sustain her conviction because the government was unable to prove
one of the two false statements it alleged defendant made; and (3) the trial court
erred by allowing the government to introduce irrelevant evidence concerning
what happened to monies obtained by the false application. Our jurisdiction
arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Finding no error, we affirm.
I
In determining whether evidence is sufficient to sustain defendant’s
conviction, we review the evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom, in a light most favorable to the government. See United States v. Voss ,
82 F.3d 1521, 1524-25 (10th Cir. 1996). We review questions concerning
admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard, disturbing the
district court’s ruling only on a showing that it was based on “a clearly erroneous
finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error of
judgment.” Cartier v. Jackson , 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th Cir. 1995).
II
In September 1992 defendant applied for child’s insurance benefits under
the Social Security Act on behalf of her fifteen-year old daughter, Laura Boyer.
Jacquelin Casias, an employee with the Social Security Administration, testified
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at trial that defendant represented to her that (1) there was no other legal
representative, guardian, or conservator of Laura other than defendant, and
(2) that Laura was living in the same household with defendant. See Rec. Vol. II
at 32-34. Ms. Casias filled out the application according to the answers defendant
gave her, see id. at 34, and defendant was instructed to read the completed
application, make any corrections, and to sign and date it, which she did. See id.
at 42. In fact, defendant’s right to custody of Laura had been terminated in 1985
and it is undisputed that Laura had not lived with defendant since that date. See
id. at 80-81. Defendant received benefits as the representative payee for Laura
until 1995, when Laura went to the Social Security Administration and asked to
be made the direct payee of the benefits. See id. at 88. Defendant was then
charged with the count of making false statements to receive Laura’s benefits.
III
At trial, when the government’s attorney began to elicit testimony from
Laura that she was taken away from defendant’s custody in 1985 following a
dependency and neglect hearing, defendant objected to the admission of that
evidence on the basis of relevance. See id. at 76; Fed. R. Evid. 402. The
government argued that the fact that Laura was not in her mother’s custody after
1985 was material to disprove defendant’s statement that Laura was living with
defendant at the time of the application. The government also argued that the fact
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that Laura’s custody was changed on a finding of abuse was a relevant
concealment of fact. See Rec. Vol. II at 77. The court ruled that, while the fact
of loss of custody was relevant and material, the detail of the asserted abusive
relationship would be unfairly prejudicial, and instructed Laura not to testify as to
such details. See id. at 77, 79-80.
Now, defendant changes the basis of her objection to Rule 404(b) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides that “[e]vidence of other . . . wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Because Defendant did not make
this objection at trial, we review for “plain error.” See United States v. Mendoza-
Salgado , 964 F.2d 993, 1008 (10th Cir. 1992).
In general, Rule 404(b) excludes evidence meant to prove a defendant acted
in conformity with her prior “bad acts.” Evidence that Laura was taken from
defendant’s custody after a dependency and neglect hearing is not evidence of a
“prior bad act” by defendant that would be precluded by Rule 404(b), thus we
reject appellant’s argument.
We next address appellant’s second evidentiary challenge. Before trial
defendant objected, for lack of relevance, to introduction of an exhibit that
purported to prove defendant’s alleged misuse of the monies she obtained as
Laura’s representative payee. Offer of the exhibit was rejected. See Rec. Vol. II
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at 10-11. On direct examination of Laura, the government attempted to elicit
testimony tracking the benefits. The court, sua sponte, warned the government
that it was “crossing the line” and instructed counsel that such testimony could
only be garnered on rebuttal. See id. at 87. On cross-examination, defendant
proceeded to elicit testimony that defendant had shown Laura a joint bank account
in her name containing more than $20,000; that defendant was holding the money
for Laura’s benefit; and that defendant had expressed a desire to conserve or save
the money. See id. at 93-94. On redirect, the government then pursued testimony
about whether Laura had ever received the money. The court overruled a defense
objection to such line of questions, holding that defendant had “opened the door.”
Id. at 95. “Admission of rebuttal evidence, particularly when Defendant ‘opens
the door’ to the subject matter, is within the sound discretion of the district
court.” United States v. Burch , 153 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998). Under the
circumstances, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in
admitting the rebuttal testimony.
IV
The grand jury indictment charges that defendant falsely “stated there was
no legal representative for [Laura].” Rec. Vol. I, Doc. 1 at 1. We are
handicapped in determining whether defendant made such a false statement, in
that the parties did not provide this court with any exhibits, let alone the
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application. We learn from the transcript, however, that question number five on
the application, to which appellant responded in the negative, inquired: “Is there
a legal representative, guardian, conservator of the child?” Id. Vol. II at 32.
There is a dispute as to the circumstances under which question five was
answered in the negative. Ms. Casias testified that question five raised the
custody issue--whether the child was living with the person who had legal
custody. See id. On cross-examination, Ms. Casias testified that, regarding
question five, always her practice was to question applicants as to whether
another person had custody of the child for whom the application was being made.
See id. at 51.
Defendant, on the other hand, testified that she understood question five to
inquire whether a lawyer was representing Laura, and that Ms. Casias did not
explain what a legal representative was. See id. Vol. III at 193. Defendant
argues that because the government failed to present evidence identifying Laura’s
“legal representative” in the state legal proceedings, and because the Uniform
Dissolution of Marriage Act requires a child’s “legal representative” to be an
attorney, the government did not present sufficient evidence to prove that
defendant lied when she answered question five in the negative. We disagree.
Ms. Casias’ testimony that she always explained to applicants that the question
regarding “legal representative, guardian, or conservator” asked whether another
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person had custody of the child is sufficient evidence to sustain a jury
determination.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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