F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 25 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DELOIS C. ANTWINE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-5060
(D.C. No. 97-CV-41-J)
KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner (N.D. Okla.)
of Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , BARRETT , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Claimant filed an application for disability insurance benefits on
December 20, 1994, alleging disability since November 15, 1992, because of pain
in her back, neck, right shoulder, and hips. Claimant’s insured status expired on
March 31, 1995, so in order to be entitled to benefits, she must have shown that
she was disabled by that date. Her application was denied initially and upon
reconsideration.
After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that claimant was
not disabled. Pursuant to the sequential analysis, see Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d
748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (detailing five-step analysis), the ALJ found that
claimant retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work, with
certain limitations resulting from her physical condition and pain. The ALJ
elicited testimony from a vocational expert and, based on that evidence, found
that there were a significant number of jobs that claimant could perform, given
her exertional and non-exertional limitations. The Appeals Council denied
claimant’s request for review, and, therefore, the ALJ’s denial of benefits stands
as the final decision of the Commissioner.
We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our
task is to review the Commissioner’s decision to see whether it is supported by
substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied in
reaching that decision. See Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 388 (10th Cir. 1995).
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“Substantial evidence is adequate relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion.” Id. at 388-89.
On appeal, claimant argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate her
physical impairments and did not properly consider the vocational impact of her
impairments in finding that she could perform a significant number of light work
jobs. Claimant also argues that the hypothetical questions the ALJ posed to the
expert did not accurately reflect her impairments, and, therefore, the ALJ’s
finding that there were a significant number of jobs claimant was able to perform
was error. Into both of these arguments on appeal, claimant incorporates the
contention that the ALJ improperly discounted treating physician opinions in
favor of the consulting physician’s opinion. We will not consider this facet of
claimant’s argument because the issue was not presented to the district court. See
Crow v. Shalala , 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994).
After thorough review of the record, we hold that it contains substantial
evidence to support the Commissioner’s finding that claimant is not entitled to
benefits and that the correct legal standards were applied in reaching the decision.
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We affirm the Commissioner’s decision for substantially the reasons stated in the
district court’s order of February 6, 1998. 1
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
James E. Barrett
Senior Circuit Judge
1
The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
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