UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 97-41336
Summary Calendar
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TAURUS KARTIK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(6:96-CR-59-3)
September 3, 1998
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Taurus Kartik appeals his conviction following a jury trial
for armed robbery of a bus, possession of a firearm during a crime
of violence, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun during a
crime of violence. Kartik argues that the district court’s jury
instruction on duress improperly placed the burden of proof on him
and that, in any event, he demonstrated by a preponderance of the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
evidence that he acted under duress.
We reject Kartik’s argument that the trial court incorrectly
instructed the jury on duress. In the Fifth Circuit, “justification
defenses are affirmative defenses,” and the burden to establish
each element of the duress defense rests with the defendant. See
United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1165 (5th Cir. 1982). The
trial court drew its instruction from the Fifth Circuit pattern
jury instructions and correctly stated our law on duress.1 See
United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 179 (5th Cir. 1994).
We also reject Kartik’s argument that he established by a
preponderance of the evidence that he acted under duress. As the
district court noted, the evidence tended to show that Kartik was
under “serious coercion” from the other participants in the bus
robbery. The district court, however, gave Kartik full latitude to
present this argument to the jury; the jury simply rejected it.
Because we review a jury verdict only to determine whether a
rational trier of fact could not have “found the essential elements
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt,” United States v. Gallo,
927 F.2d 815, 820 (5th Cir. 1991), we conclude that Kartik’s
challenge to the jury verdict must fail. Moreover, as a legal
matter, in order to succeed on a duress defense, a defendant must
show, inter alia, that no opportunity to escape or to avoid the
threatened harm existed. See United States v. Liu, 960 F.2d 449,
1
To the extent that Kartik argues that we should overrule our prior
case law on duress, we note our firmly established rule that one panel lacks the
power to overrule a binding decision of a prior panel. See, e.g., Harris v.
Sentry Title Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 1272, 1282 (5th Cir. 1987). Kartik should press
this argument, if he so desires, to this court en banc or to the Supreme Court.
-2-
454 (5th Cir. 1992). Kartik had ample opportunity to call the
police in the two days prior to the robbery. See Gant, 691 F.2d at
1164 (rejecting duress defense because defendant had the
opportunity to call police, but did not do so).
AFFIRMED.
-3-