UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 97-41534
Summary Calendar
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KATHERINE M. MILLIKEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL GRIGSON; BARBARA GRIGSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court,
for the Southern District of Texas
(G-97-CV-232)
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September 1, 1998
Before KING, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Katherine Milliken appeals the summary judgment dismissing her
diversity action against Michael and Barbara Grigson for recovery
of $137,346, allegedly the balance of fees (those allegedly in
excess of services not covered by health insurance, workers’
compensation, or otherwise) owed for providing mental health
services and case management. The district court held that
Milliken was collaterally estopped from pursuing her claim against
the Grigsons, because that issue had been resolved in an
arbitration in which the Grigsons were a party and Milliken in
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
privity. Of course, we review a grant of summary judgment de novo.
E.g., Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 216 (5th Cir. 1997).
In 1994, Barbara Grigson gave Milliken a $75,000 check,
allegedly in partial payment of the fees; but the Grigsons stopped
payment on the check. However, First Interstate Bank of Texas
wrongfully honored the check, giving Milliken a certified check.
Upon realization of this mistake, the Bank stopped payment on the
certified check.
The Bank entered arbitration with Milliken and the Grigsons.
As a result of the arbitration with Milliken, the Bank paid her the
$75,000, in exchange for her assigning to the Bank her claim for
the $75,000 against the Grigsons. In the arbitration between the
Bank and the Grigsons, the arbitrator found that “Dr. Milliken’s
invoices and records tendered in evidence and the testimony given
at the hearing are too ambiguous, inconclusive and erroneous to
establish what if anything further is owed by the Grigsons to Dr.
Milliken for the [s]ervices in addition to the insurance monies ...
already received”.
Milliken contends that she is not collaterally estopped
because, in the agreement to assign her rights to the Bank, she
specifically reserved the right to her claim for amounts in excess
of the $75,000. Therefore, she contends, the arbitration between
the Grigsons and the Bank concerned only whether the $75,000 was
owed, not whether she is entitled to the balance.
Milliken made these contentions before the district court;
we, likewise, find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, for essentially
2
the reasons stated in the district court’s order, Milliken v.
Grigson, No. 97-CV-232 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 1997), the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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