F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 20 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 98-1255
v.
(D.C. No. 98-CR-13-M)
(Colorado)
FRANCISCO JAVIER RODARTE-
BARRAZA,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BALDOCK and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Francisco Javier Rodarte-Barraza appeals from the sentence imposed after
his plea of guilty to unlawfully reentering the United States after deportation for
an aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2). Counsel
appointed to represent defendant on appeal filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). For the reasons set out below, we dismiss the
appeal.
The facts supporting defendant’s guilty plea are set forth in the Plea
Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant to Sentencing. The plea agreement
anticipated a sentencing guideline range of 46 to 57 months. The Probation
Department calculated a guideline range of 77 to 96 months and recommended 77
months imprisonment. Defendant’s trial counsel filed a Motion for Downward
Departure, arguing that criminal history category VI overrepresented the
seriousness of defendant’s criminal history and that the unusual circumstances
surrounding defendant’s reentry into the United States supported a downward
departure. The district court agreed on both accounts and sentenced defendant to
30 months imprisonment.
Defendant asked his trial counsel to file a notice of appeal on his behalf.
New counsel was appointed to represent him on appeal. Anders holds that if
counsel finds a case to be wholly frivolous after conscientious examination, he
should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. Counsel must in
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addition submit to both the court and his client a brief referring to anything in the
record arguably supportive of the appeal. The client may then raise any points he
chooses, and the appellate court thereafter undertakes a complete examination of
all proceedings and decides whether the appeal is, in fact, frivolous. If it so
finds, it may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. See id.
at 744.
In his Anders brief, counsel raises two possible points: ineffective
assistance of counsel and a challenge to the sentence. Defendant was notified of
his right to file a pro se brief, and he has not chosen to do so. Accordingly, we
turn to an examination of the proceedings below to determine if the appeal is
wholly frivolous.
To the extent that Mr. Rodarte-Barraza’s notice of appeal can be viewed as
an assertion that his counsel was ineffective, the issue generally must be raised
collaterally rather than on direct appeal. See United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d
1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). We pointed out in Galloway that such
claims brought on direct appeal are presumptively dismissible because most
ineffectiveness claims need further record development. Id. Although we
recognized that in rare instances the merits of an ineffectiveness claim may be
reviewed on direct appeal because the claim needs no further development, id.,
that rare exception is clearly not applicable here. In fact, the record we have
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before us reflects that trial counsel was exceptionally effective in convincing the
district court to significantly reduce defendant’s potential sentence. To the extent
defendant wishes to raise counsel ineffectiveness issues not apparent on this
record, he must do so collaterally.
We have carefully examined the record to ascertain whether any ground
exists to support a challenge to defendant’s sentence. Here, the sentence was not
only below that recommended by the Probation Department, it was also below that
contemplated by the plea agreement. We find nothing in the record to indicate
that the sentence imposed was in violation of the law or the result of a
misapplication of the guidelines. Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to
consider the challenge. See United States v. Sanchez, 146 F.3d 796, 796-97 (10th
Cir. 1998); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
After review of the entire proceedings, we conclude that the record
establishes no non-frivolous ground for appeal. The appeal is therefore
DISMISSED and counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Chief Judge
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