F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 30 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RANDALL CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 98-6350
(D.C. No. CIV-98-560-C)
STATE OF OKLAHOMA; SHERRY (Western District of Oklahoma)
TODD,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant Randall Campbell appeals the dismissal of his pro se
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Oklahoma, the state
District Attorney’s Office, and Assistant District Attorney Sherry Todd. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant to
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments;
nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th
Cir. R. 36.3.
Campbell alleges violations of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to
the federal Constitution arising out of his arrest and prosecution on state grand
larceny charges. Specifically, he claims that Oklahoma violated his due process
and speedy trial rights due to unfounded prosecution and postponements of his
court dates. Campbell also argues that he was subjected to extended pretrial
detention, in retaliation for refusal to sign a plea agreement, which violated the
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. He seeks, inter
alia, compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief from prosecution, and
immediate release from custody.
Defendants-appellees moved to dismiss Campbell’s claims. The district
court referred the motion to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Campbell failed to file a timely response to
the motion to dismiss, and the magistrate deemed the motion confessed pursuant
to W.D. Okla. LCvR7.1(e), which provides that “[a]ny motion, application or
objection which is not opposed within eighteen (18) days may, in the discretion of
the Court, be deemed confessed.” The magistrate also noted “several legal
impediments to further prosecution of this action on the merits,” including
exclusivity of habeas corpus (with prior exhaustion of state remedies) as a remedy
for unlawful detention; absolute prosecutorial immunity as to claims against Todd
and District Attorney Macy; and the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, as a
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bar to injunctive relief against a pending state prosecution. R. doc. 15 at 2-3.
The magistrate recommended that Campbell’s claims be dismissed without
prejudice, and noted that failure to file a timely objection to the findings and
recommendation would waive further review of facts and law by district or
appellate court.
The district court found that it “is compelled to find that this motion is
deemed confessed,” because Campbell had failed to file a timely response to the
motion to dismiss. 1 Also noting that “it appears that the Plaintiff has not filed a
timely objection or appeal” to the magistrate’s recommendation, the district court
then ordered Campbell’s action dismissed with prejudice. R. doc. 17.
The threshold question before us is whether Campbell’s failure to file a
timely objection to the magistrate’s recommendation waives appellate review of
the legal issues therein. “[W]e have adopted a firm waiver rule when a party fails
to object to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate.” Moore v.
United States , 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). But “[t]he waiver rule as a
procedural bar need not be applied when the interests of justice so dictate.” Id.
1
Because it was a matter left to the district court’s discretion under the relevant
local rule, the court certainly could, but was not compelled, to deem the motion
confessed. See W.D. Okla. LCvR7.1(e). Because the district court’s order in no way
suggests that it would have exercised its discretion otherwise had it not considered itself
compelled, we conclude that even if the court understated the scope of its discretion under
W.D. Okla. LCvR7.1(e), this would not constitute reversible error.
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Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the interests
of justice exception does not apply to Campbell’s claims. The magistrate’s order
clearly stated Campbell’s responsibility to file timely objection and the
consequences of failure to do so. Campbell’s claim of ignorance of the deadline
thus does not, absent more, require application of the interests of justice
exception. Because we perceive no compelling reason to overlook the waiver, we
affirm the district court’s dismissal of Campbell’s suit.
We note, however, that failure to object to the magistrate’s conclusions
does not necessarily waive the right to appeal the district court’s decision to
dismiss the claims with prejudice, a legal conclusion distinct from those in the
magistrate’s report. Campbell, however, does not raise a challenge to this
particular issue on appeal.
We further note that the dismissal with prejudice of Campbell’s claims for
damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not bar Campbell from
seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on his unlawful detention
claim. Claims seeking release from custody could not properly be brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 because, as the magistrate judge correctly noted, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 is the exclusive vehicle for challenging the fact or length of custody. See
Preiser v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 475, 499 n.14 (1973). Thus, the dismissal of
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Campbell’s § 1983 suit cannot serve as a preclusive decision on the merits of his
claim for relief from unlawful detention. 2
The judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED. The mandate
shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
We express no view on the merits of such a potential habeas claim or whether it is
2
otherwise procedurally barred.
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