F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 2 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
PETER RAY ARAGON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 98-2192
(D.C. No. CIV-96-1208-BB)
JOHN SHANKS, Warden; (D. N.M.)
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , EBEL , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner Peter Ray Aragon appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus for failure to exhaust all the claims
contained therein. We affirm.
On September 3, 1996, petitioner filed this habeas petition pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging nine claims for relief. The district court dismissed
four of the claims and appointed counsel to represent petitioner on the remaining
claims. Petitioner, through appointed counsel, moved to amend the petition to
add six claims related to his habitual offender sentence enhancement. The motion
was granted, and on February 24, 1998, petitioner filed his amended petition.
On March 27, 1998, respondent moved to dismiss the petition because it
contained exhausted and unexhausted claims. The matter was referred to a
magistrate judge, who recommended dismissing the “mixed” petition pursuant to
Rose v. Lundy , 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). In his objections to the magistrate
judge’s recommendation, petitioner made the following statement:
If this court adopts the Magistrate’s findings and finds that
new claims 11, 12, 13, and 15 . . . are not exhausted, then Mr.
Aragon asks this court to dismiss those claims without prejudice and
to remand this matter to the Magistrate for further proceedings on the
exhausted claims.
R. I, doc. 43, p. 2. The district court noted that it could not dismiss only the
unexhausted claims, but was required to dismiss the entire petition. This appeal
followed.
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In Rose v. Lundy , the Supreme Court held that a “district court must
dismiss . . . ‘mixed petitions,’ leaving the prisoner with the choice of returning to
state court to exhaust his claims or of amending or resubmitting the habeas
petition to present only exhausted claims .” 455 U.S. at 510 (emphasis added).
Throughout the opinion, the Court reiterated that a petitioner who chooses to
abandon his unexhausted claims must actually amend the petition to delete such
claims. See, e.g. , id. at 520 (noting that prisoners who submit mixed petitions
“are entitled to resubmit a petition with only exhausted claims,” and that they
always have the option to “amend the petition to delete the unexhausted claims,
rather than returning to state court”). Nowhere does the Court authorize a district
court to retain exhausted claims while simply dismissing the unexhausted claims
without prejudice.
The Tenth Circuit has held specifically that a district court must dismiss an
entire mixed petition rather than dismissing only the unexhausted claims. See
Harris v. Champion , 48 F.3d 1127, 1131, 1133 (10th Cir. 1995) (disapproving
dismissal of unexhausted claims only and clarifying that “a court cannot
adjudicate the exhausted claims in a mixed petition unless the petitioner amends
the petition to delete the unexhausted claim”).
Contrary to petitioner’s argument on appeal, a request for dismissal of
unexhausted claims without prejudice is not the same as actively amending the
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petition to present only exhausted claims. Such a deliberate act makes clear that
the petitioner is choosing to abandon his unexhausted claims, knowing that any
attempt to bring such claims later will probably result in their dismissal as a
successive petition. It is the act of the petitioner, then, that abandons the claims,
not the court’s act of dismissing such claims without prejudice. Despite clear
case law requiring petitioner to abandon his unexhausted claims by amending or
resubmitting the petition, he did not do so. Further, based on petitioner’s earlier
amendment of his petition, it is clear he knew how to ask for the court’s
permission to amend. The district court did not err, therefore, in dismissing the
entire mixed habeas petition based on Rose v. Lundy .
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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