F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUL 9 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 98-2047
MANUEL GUTIERREZ-GONZALEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. CR-96-658-LH)
Sasha Siemel, Assistant U.S. Attorney (John J. Kelly, U.S. Attorney, Charles L.
Barth, Assistant U.S. Attorney, on the brief), Office of the United States
Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Robert E. Kinney, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Ann Steinmetz, Federal
Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Albuquerque, New Mexico for
Defendant-Appellant.
Before BALDOCK , HENRY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
HENRY , Circuit Judge.
The Defendant, Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez, was convicted of reentry
subsequent to deportation following an aggravated felony (second degree murder),
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1)&(2) and 8 U.S.C. §1326(b)(2). On appeal,
Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez alleges that the district court erred in not considering his
defense of entrapment by estoppel. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C
§ 1291 and, for the reasons explained below, affirm Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez’s
conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez, a citizen of the Republic of Mexico, has twice
been deported from the United States, most recently in September of 1994 after he
was convicted of second degree murder. His native language is Spanish, and he
has only a minimal understanding of English. He is married to Dalia Aida
Delgado, a United States citizen, and prior to his deportation, Mr. Gutierrez-
Gonzalez resided in New Mexico with his wife and two children, both of whom
are United States citizens. After his most recent deportation, Mr. Gutierrez-
Gonzalez resided in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. Ms. Delgado and his two children,
however, continued to live in New Mexico and occasionally visited him in Ciudad
Juarez.
At the time of his deportation, Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez received two forms
that are relevant to this appeal. First, he was served with a deportation warrant
from the INS “commanding” officers of the United States to take Mr. Gutierrez-
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Gonzalez into custody and deport him. See Rec. vol. I, doc 56, Exh. B. Attached
to the warrant was a “Notice to Persons Under Deportation or Exclusion
Proceedings in the El Paso District” (the “notice”). The notice, written in both
English and Spanish, gives general information regarding legal assistance for
deported aliens. The notice states: “If you desire legal assistance but are without
funds, one of the following organizations may be able to assist you without
charge or for a nominal fee.” The notice then lists the addresses and phone
numbers of three private organizations in El Paso, Texas, and three private
organizations located in the state of New Mexico that provide legal assistance.
After listing these private organizations, the form provides the telephone number
of the El Paso Bar Association and states: “The El Paso Bar Association
maintains a lawyers referral service. If you can afford to hire a lawyer but have
not contacted one, and you desire legal assistance, it is suggested that you contact
this office.”
In addition to the warrant and notice, according to the government’s
uncontested written proffer, Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez received and signed an
Advisal of Penalty for Reentry: INS Form I-294. See Rec. vol. I, doc. 50, at 3.
Deportation procedure requires that the alien be “served either personally or by
certified mail with Form I-294 informing him in his native tongue of the penalties
which can be imposed should he return to this country after deportation without
3
obtaining permission from the Attorney General.” United States v. Wong Kim
Bo, 466 F.2d 1298, 1303-04 (5th Cir. 1972) (giving an example of the form). In
addition, the form states that “[s]hould you wish to return to the United States you
must write this office or the American Consular Office nearest your residence
abroad as to how to obtain permission to return after deportation.” Id. See also
United States v. Agubata , 60 F.3d 1081, 1082-83 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing the
contents of Form I-294).
Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez alleged the following facts in a written proffer
(with supporting affidavits) to support his defense of entrapment by estoppel. See
Rec. vol. I, doc. 56 & 57. The government does not dispute the proffered facts;
rather, the government argues that, even if Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez’s facts are
true as alleged, they do not support the defense of entrapment by estoppel.
In May 1996, Ms. Delgado contacted Diocesan Migrant and Refugee
Services (“Diocesan Services”), one of the private agencies listed on the
deportation notice received by Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez, to determine if Mr.
Gonzalez could obtain permission to live in the United States again. Ms. Delagdo
spoke with Gloria Castro, an employee of Diocesan Services. Ms. Castro
interviewed Ms. Delgado and asked her to have Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez come to
her office the following week to complete the required paperwork for Mr.
Gutierrez-Gonzalez to return to the United States. At the meeting (which took
4
place in El Paso, with Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez apparently in the United States
illegally), the circumstances of Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez’s deportation and his
prior felony record were discussed. Ms. Castro consulted with another employee
and informed Ms. Delgado and Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez that nothing could be
done because of Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez’s prior felony conviction. However, Ms.
Castro asked Ms. Delgado to leave her home and work telephone numbers in case
any assistance could be provided in the future.
Several days later, Ms. Castro called Ms. Delgado and informed her that
Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez could apply for and receive a work permit. Ms. Castro
took the necessary forms to Ms. Delgado, which included an application for
adjustment of status, an application for work authorization, and an “Affidavit of
Support” for Ms. Delgado to complete. Ms. Castro informed Ms. Delgado that
Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez needed to have a medical examination to receive the
work permit.
On May 28, 1996, Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez (again in the United States
illegally) received a physical examination and proceeded to Diocesan Services for
another meeting with Ms. Castro. At the meeting, Ms. Castro completed Mr.
Gutierrez-Gonzalez’s application for change of status. Though she was aware
that Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez had been deported from the United States, Ms.
Castro responded in the negative to a question that asked if the applicant had ever
5
been deported. She did so at the direction of her supervisor, Ms. Maria de Carbon
Guerrero, who told her to proceed with the application and argue the deportation
issue at a later time. After completing the application, Ms. Castro signed the
document as the person who completed the form. Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez also
signed the form, certifying “under penalty of perjury . . . that this application, and
the evidence submitted with it, is all true and correct.”
On June 19, 1996, Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez (still in the United States
illegally) took his application for adjustment of status to the INS office in El
Paso, Texas, for processing. When submitting the application (which stated that
he had not previously been deported), he told the INS clerk, Patricia Arrambide,
that he was in the United States illegally. Regardless, the INS clerk issued him a
work authorization permit (Form I-688B). However, at that time, the clerk
specifically informed Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez that the work permit was not an
entry document. He responded that was not a problem because he did not plan to
leave the United States. At the INS office, Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez was
fingerprinted and an FBI records check was requested. In total, Mr. Gutierrez-
Gonzalez paid $930.00 to the INS for the Form I-699B employment authorization
permit.
On October 7, 1996, United States border patrol agents encountered Mr. Gutierrez-
Gonzalez in the Dona Ana County Detention Center, where he was being held for failure
6
to pay traffic fines. The agents ran a background check on Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez and
found that he was in the country illegally. Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez was subsequently
indicted, charged, and convicted of reentry subsequent to deportation following an
aggravated felony.
B. Procedural History
At his arraignment on November 14, 1996, Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez pled not
guilty and a jury trial was scheduled to begin March 10, 1997. On March 7, 1997, the
government filed a “Motion in Limine” seeking to exclude all evidence of Mr. Gutierrez-
Gonzalez’s contact with Diocesan Services and the INS regarding his acquisition of the
I-688B work authorization permit. The trial court granted the motion and excluded the
evidence. On March 10, 1997, the trial date was vacated by agreement of the parties.
The parties thereafter agreed to a waiver of Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez’s right to a jury and
agreed to submit testimony and evidence by written proffer. The district court, after
considering the parties’ written proffers, entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order
finding Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez guilty.
C. Standard of Review
Generally, a district court’s grant of a motion in limine is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. See Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076, 1092 (10th Cir. 1997).
7
However, in granting the government’s motion in limine, the district court reached the
legal conclusion that, even taking Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez’s evidence as true, entrapment
by estoppel was not a permissible defense as a matter of law. Whether there is sufficient
evidence to constitute a triable issue of entrapment by estoppel is a question of law. See
United States v. Thompson, 25 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1994) (specifically holding
that district court’s decision that entrapment by estoppel is not a permissible defense is a
question of law). We therefore review de novo the district court’s decision that Mr.
Gutierrez-Gonzalez could not present the defense of entrapment by estoppel.1
II. DISCUSSION
The statute under which Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez was convicted states in relevant
part:
[a]ny alien who--
(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding, and thereafter
1
In many entrapment by estoppel cases, the district court’s conclusion that the
defense is not available will rest on findings of fact. Any findings of fact made by the
district court would be reviewed under the deferential "clearly erroneous" standard as set
forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). See United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (10th
Cir. 1986). See also United States v. Thompson, 25 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1994)
(“[c]onclusions of law are reviewed de novo . . . [f]indings of fact made by the district
court, however, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.”) In the present case,
however, the district court did not make any factual findings. Rather, the court found
that, accepting Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez’s allegations as true, the facts did not establish the
defense of entrapment of estoppel as a matter of law.
8
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States,
unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the United States or
his application for admission from foreign contiguous territory, the
Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for
admission; or (B) with respect to an alien previously denied admission and
removed, unless such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain
such advance consent under this chapter or any prior Act, shall be fined
under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the case of any alien
described in such subsection--
....
(2) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an
aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined under such Title, imprisoned
not more than 20 years, or both . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1326 (emphasis added). The statute expressly excludes any specific intent
regarding entry into the United States and makes it a crime for a deported alien to be
found “at any time” in this country “unless” he has the “express” consent of the Attorney
General. As we have previously held, “nothing more than a showing of general intent is
required” and “the government need not show that defendant willfully and knowingly
engaged in criminal behavior, but only that the defendant's acts were willful and knowing
– that the defendant willfully and knowingly reentered the United States and that he did
so without the Attorney General's permission.” United States v. Miranda-Enriquez, 842
F.2d 1211, 1212 (10th Cir. 1988).
As Judge Posner has noted, Congress has been faced with the increasingly difficult
task of stemming the flood of illegal immigration to this country. See United States v.
Anton, 683 F.2d 1011, 1020 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J. dissenting).
9
It frequently happens that aliens of the criminal and other classes who are
deported under the general immigration law reenter the country unlawfully.
As a matter of fact, in some instances such aliens have been deported four
or five times, only to return as soon as possible to the United States in an
unlawful manner.
....
It is true . . . that if criminal prosecution fails, the previously deported
alien can be deported again; but having to deport the same illegal alien
again and again is just the tedious cycle that Congress was trying in section
1326 to break . . . . The fact that possible deportation is not a sufficient
deterrent to discourage those who seek to gain entry through other than
regular channels is demonstrated by the frequency with which (the
Department of Labor) is compelled to resort to deportation proceedings for
the same alien on several succeeding occasions.
Id. at 1020 (quotations omitted) (further explaining how the legislative history of section
1326 reveals Congress’s intent to place the burden of a mistake as to legal status in the
United States on the deported alien and quoting S.Rep.No.1456, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1929)). In response to these problems and in the hope of deterring illegal reentry,
Congress, in the plain language of the statute, has imposed a severe penalty if a
previously deported felon is found “at any time” in the United States. Further, by
excluding a specific intent requirement, Congress placed the burden of correctly obtaining
permission from the Attorney General and reentering the United States legally on the
alien.
Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez does not challenge the fact that the government proved
every element of the crime required by the statute: that Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez was (1)
knowingly in the United States, (2) without the permission of the Attorney General, (3)
after prior deportation for an aggravated felony. Rather, Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez argues
10
that the government should be estopped from prosecuting him because an “agent of the
government” led Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez to believe that he was in the country legally.
Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez contends that he reasonably believed he was in the United States
legally as a result of his interaction with Diocesan Services and the issuing of a work
permit by the INS. Based on this contention, Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez argues that the
district court erred in denying his defense of entrapment by estoppel.
A. Entrapment by Estoppel
In United States v. Nichols, 21 F.3d 1016, 1018 (10th Cir. 1994), we set forth the
elements of entrapment by estoppel.
The defense of entrapment by estoppel is implicated where an agent of the
government affirmatively misleads a party as to the state of the law and that
party proceeds to act on the misrepresentation so that criminal prosecution
of the actor implicates due process concerns under the Fifth and Fourteenth
amendments. There must be an “active misleading” by the government
agent, and actual reliance by the defendant. Further, the defendant’s
reliance must be reasonable in light of the identity of the agent, the point of
law misrepresented, and the substance of the misrepresentation.
Nichols, 21 F.3d at 1018 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Applying this test, the
district court properly concluded that Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez was not entitled to present
the defense of entrapment by estoppel.
We have not specifically addressed the type of authority – actual, apparent, or
otherwise – necessary for a government agent to estop the enforcement of federal
criminal laws. However, we have held that “[t]he courts invoke the doctrine of estoppel
11
against the government with great reluctance.” United States v. Browning, 630 F.2d 694
(10th Cir. 1980).
It is fundamental that the United States is not estopped by representations
made by an agent without authority to bind the government in a transaction.
Jackson v. United States, 573 F.2d 1189 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Albrechsten v.
Andrus, 570 F.2d 906 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 818, 99 S.Ct. 79,
58 L.Ed.2d 109 (1978); Enfield v. Kleppe, 566 F.2d 1139 (10th Cir. 1977);
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Hickel, 432 F.2d 587, 591-592 (10th Cir. 1970);
Massaglia v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 286 F.2d 258, 262 (10th
Cir. 1961). It has been held that one who relies on a legal interpretation by
a governmental official assumes the risk that it is in error. Airmotive
Engineering Corp. v. United States, 535 F.2d 8, 11 n.3, 210 Ct.Cl. 7 (1976).
It has also been held or said that “the government could scarcely function if
it were bound by its employees' unauthorized representations.” Goldberg v.
Weinberger, 546 F.2d 477, 480 (2nd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937,
97 S.Ct. 2648, 53 L.Ed.2d 255 (1977).
Browning, 630 F.2d at 702. Whether viewed in terms of the requirement that the
reliance itself be “reasonable” or in terms of the “authority” necessary for a government
official to estop prosecution, an individual is not justified in seeking out any public
official for advice and then proceeding in reliance upon the opinion received.
The Supreme Court first addressed the defense of entrapment by estoppel, though
it has never used that terminology, in Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959). In Raley, three
people were called before the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission and questioned
about their activities and involvement with the Communist party. The commission
chairman informed the witnesses that they could decline to answer the commission’s
questions by invoking their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, which they
did. However, after their appearance before the commission, the witnesses were
12
successfully prosecuted for contempt under a state immunity statute that compelled the
witnesses to answer the commission’s questions. The Supreme Court held that the
convictions violated due process and that the advice given by the commission was a
defense to the contempt charge. In allowing the defense, the Court emphasized that the
advising official “clearly appeared to be the agent of the State in a position to give such
assurances . . . .” Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), the Court again applied criminal
estoppel to overturn a conviction under a state statute that prohibited demonstrating
“near” a courthouse. In Cox, the appellants were protesting the arrest of several students
who had been picketing segregated lunch counters. The defendant, a leader of the
demonstration, was advised by police that the group must keep to the west side of the
street away from the courthouse. The defendant was subsequently arrested and convicted
for demonstrating in that area. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and, quoting
Riley, stated that the conviction was “‘an indefensible sort of entrapment by the State.”
Id. at 571. The Court found that the lack of specificity in stating what was “near” the
courthouse, while not rendering the statute void for vagueness, “foresees a degree of on-
the-spot administrative interpretation by officials charged with responsibility for
administering and enforcing it.” Id. at 568 (emphasis added) (further emphasizing that
the defendant was misled by “the highest police officials in the city”).
13
More recently, in United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655
(1973) (“PICCO”), the Supreme Court applied criminal estoppel to overturn a
corporation’s conviction for discharging industrial refuse into the Monongahela River, in
violation of 33 U.S.C. § 407. In PICCO, the appellant, a manufacturing corporation, was
convicted under a statute that prohibited the discharging of “refuse matter of any kind . . .
other than that flowing from streets and sewers” into navigable waters. Id. at 672.
However, a regulation of the Army Corps of Engineers construed the statute to prevent
only the discharging of refuse that might affect navigation. The district court refused to
consider appellant’s argument that it acted in reliance on the administrative construction
of the statute because the evidence was irrelevant. The Supreme Court, however,
reversed the decision of the trial court and held that the evidence should have been
admitted: “The Corps is the responsible administrative agency under the [statute], and the
rulings, interpretations and opinions of the [the Corps] . . . , while not controlling upon
the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which . . . litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Id. at 674 (emphasis
added).
Influenced by these cases, we hold that the defense of entrapment by estoppel
requires that the “government agent” be a government official or agency responsible for
interpreting, administering, or enforcing the law defining the offense. This view is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s application of the defense discussed above, and is
14
the view taken by the Model Penal Code and several other circuits. See United States v.
Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 466 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a defendant must show “reliance
either on a federal government official empowered to render the claimed erroneous
advice, or on an authorized agent of the federal government who has been granted the
authority from the federal government to render such advice”); United States v. Austin,
915 F.2d 363, 366-67 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a license to sell firearms does not
“transform [pawn shop owners] into government officials, at least for purposes of the
entrapment by estoppel defense”); United States v. Ethridge, 932 F.2d 318, 321 (4th Cir.
1991) (holding that advice from a state court judge to a felon, that he could hunt with a
gun, was not a defense to felony possession charges because “the government that
advises and the government that prosecutes is not the same”); Model Penal Code §
3(b)(iv) (requiring an “official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law
with responsibility for the interpretation, administration, or enforcement of the law
defining the defense”); Lafave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §5.1(3) (1984)
(same).
One case, United States v. Talmadge, 829 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1987), has broadly
construed the defense and held that a federal licensee (a private pawn-shop owner with a
federal license to sell firearms) was an “agent of the government” whose representations
could estop the prosecution of a felon whom the owner erroneously told could purchase
a gun. But we need not decide if it is possible for the government, by issuing a license,
15
to grant an individual or group the authority to interpret, administer, or enforce the law
defining the offense as that is not the situation presented in this case. Diocesan Services
is clearly not licensed by the government.
B. Diocesan Services
In the present case, the district court was correct to deny Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez
the defense of entrapment by estoppel based on Diocesan Services’ alleged
misrepresentations. Diocesan Services is not a government agency. Rather, it is a
private entity that provides assistance to indigent aliens who have been deported. Even
if the acts of this private company could somehow be considered “state action” because
it is listed on a form provided by the government, Diocesan Services and its employees
are not government officials charged with interpreting, administering, or enforcing the
immigration laws of the United States. Thus, the district court properly denied Mr.
Gutierrez-Gonzalez’s entrapment by estoppel defense based on Diocesan Services’
alleged misrepresentations.
Further, Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez’s alleged reliance on Diocesan Services is
unreasonable “in light of . . . the point of law misrepresented, and the substance of the
misrepresentation.” Nichols, 21 F.3d at 1018. Had Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez wanted to
legally enter the United States, he should have written the INS office or the American
Consular Office nearest his residence abroad as to how to obtain permission to return
16
after deportation, as he was specifically instructed on the INS Form I-294 he received
when he was deported. Instead, Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez twice chose to enter the
country, without the permission of the Attorney General and without any misconception
as to his illegal status in the United States, to meet with Diocesan Services. Moreover,
Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez, after his last meeting with Diocesan Services, admitted he was
“in the country illegally” to the INS clerk in El Paso, Texas, when he presented his
application for a temporary work permit. Under these circumstances, Mr. Gutierrez-
Gonzalez’s alleged reliance on Diocesan Services was unreasonable.
C. The INS Clerk
Finally, Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez argues that the INS “affirmatively misled him as
to the state of the law” and that he “relied on that misrepresentation,” when the INS clerk
issued him a temporary work permit. While it would seem that Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez
should have immediately been taken into custody when he admitted to the INS clerk that
he was “in the country illegally,” the INS’s failure to arrest Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez “on
the spot” and the erroneous issuance of a work permit does not estop the federal
government from later arresting and prosecuting Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez for illegally
reentering the country. Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez did not inform the INS clerk that he had
previously been deported from the United States. Rather, Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez
submitted a fraudulent application that affirmatively stated that he had never been
deported. The INS clerk specifically informed Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez that the work
17
permit “was not an entry document.” Under these facts, even if an INS clerk could be
considered an “agent of the government” charged with interpreting, administering or
enforcing immigration law and the actions in this case considered “active misleading” as
to the state of the law, Mr. Gutierrez-Gonzalez’s alleged “belief” that he was in the
United States legally was not reasonable.
III. CONCLUSION
The district court properly concluded that, as a matter of law, entrapment by
estoppel is not a permissible defense in this case. Consequently, we AFFIRM Mr.
Gutierrez-Gonzalez’s conviction for reentry subsequent to deportation following an
aggravated felony.
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United States v. Gutierrez-Gonzalez
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 1999-07-09
Citations: 184 F.3d 1160
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