F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 27 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LANCE E. SHEPLER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 99-7021
ED EVANS, Warden; ATTORNEY (D.C. No. 96-CV-231-S)
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF (E.D.Okla.)
OKLAHOMA,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, KELLY and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Lance Shepler, a state prisoner represented by retained counsel, seeks a
certificate of probable cause to appeal from the district court’s denial of his 28
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
*
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. 1
Because Shepler has failed to make a “substantial
showing of the denial of [a] federal right,” Barefoot v. Estelle , 463 U.S. 880, 893
(1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), we deny a certificate of
probable cause and dismiss the appeal.
I.
Shepler was charged in November 1992 in the District Court of Johnston
County, Oklahoma with one count of rape by instrumentation of his infant
daughter. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1111.1 (West Supp. 1999). Three
months later, the court combined Shepler’s preliminary hearing on the rape charge
with an adjudicatory hearing designed to assess whether his daughter had been
“deprived,” see Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1101(4) (West Supp. 1994), and should
be placed in protective custody. Following this combined hearing, the court
concluded the state had not proved sexual abuse (or, more specifically, rape by
instrumentation) by clear and convincing evidence as is required to establish that
a child has been deprived. See Matter of C.G. , 637 P.2d 66, 70-71 (Okla. 1981).
The court nevertheless found the state had shown, by clear and convincing
evidence, that Shepler had used unreasonable and excessive force against his
1
Because Shepler filed his petition on March 19, 1996, the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, which became effective April 24, 1996, and
mandates the issuance of a certificate of appealability as a prerequisite to the
appeal of a denial of a § 2254 petition, does not apply. See Lindh v. Murphy , 521
U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997).
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daughter and thus adjudicated the child “deprived.” In a signed minute order, the
court specifically noted that its ruling on the sexual abuse allegations was
confined to the clear and convincing evidence proof standard and that it would
issue a subsequent opinion regarding whether the state had advanced probable
cause of rape by instrumentation. Less than one month later, the court concluded
probable cause of rape by instrumentation had been established and ordered
defendant bound over for trial.
After a two-day jury trial, Shepler was convicted of rape by instrumentation
and was later sentenced to thirty-five years’ imprisonment. The Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed Shepler’s conviction in a summary opinion. In
March 1996, Shepler filed the instant habeas petition asserting his conviction
must be reversed because (1) the doctrine of collateral estoppel should have
barred the state from pursuing the prosecution based on the trial court’s rulings at
the “deprived child” adjudication hearing, and (2) the criminal information
charging him with rape by instrumentation was deficient. The district court,
adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge, denied relief.
II.
Collateral Estoppel
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The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution, as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, embodies the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Ashe v. Swenson , 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970). Collateral estoppel, or, as it is often
known, issue preclusion, “means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has
once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be
litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Id. at 443. The
doctrine is inapplicable here. As the state trial court made clear in its rulings, the
burden of proof requirement at the initial “deprived child” adjudication hearing
was considerably greater than the proof standard at the preliminary hearing. The
fact that the state did not establish evidence of rape by clear and convincing
evidence did not necessarily mean the state did not demonstrate probable cause of
rape. The differences in proof standards preclude application of the collateral
estoppel doctrine. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms , 465 U.S.
354, 362 (1984); Helvering v. Mitchell , 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938).
Sufficiency of Indictment
Shepler also contends the criminal information charging him with rape by
instrumentation failed to allege the victim was under sixteen years old and thus
was deficient as a matter of law. We need not reach the merits of this argument.
“The sufficiency of an indictment or information is primarily a question of state
law.” Tapia v. Tansy , 926 F.2d 1554, 1560 (10th Cir. 1991). “[F]ederal habeas
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corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle v. McGuire , 502 U.S.
62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers , 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)). Although the
notice provided by a charging instrument must comport with the due process
guarantee of a fair trial, see Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 314 (1979), there
is no suggestion here that Shepler did not have adequate notice of the specific
charges being leveled against him.
Shepler’s application for a certificate of probable cause is DENIED and his
appeal is DISMISSED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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