F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 27 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 98-6434
(W.D. Okla.)
MODESTO SICAIROS, (D.Ct. No. 98-CR-112-M)
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Modesto Sicairos pled guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
with intent to distribute. The district court sentenced him to 121 months in
prison. On appeal, Mr. Sicairos argues the district court improperly denied his
request for a three-level sentence reduction for his acceptance of responsibility
under United States Sentencing Guideline § 3E1.1. We exercise our jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm his sentence.
BACKGROUND
During a drug investigation, law enforcement officials observed Mr.
Sicairos leave a residence they had under surveillance and drive away in his black
Mercury with a passenger, Ramone Aguilar. The officers followed and began
executing a traffic stop. As soon as the officers turned on their emergency lights,
they observed Mr. Sicairos making furtive or stuffing gestures toward his
floorboard or under his seat. As officers advanced to the vehicle, they again
observed Mr. Sicairos making furtive or stuffing gestures toward the vehicle’s
floor. After exiting his vehicle, Mr. Sicairos consented to a search of the Mercury
and told officers it contained “a gun and dope.” During their search of the
vehicle’s interior, officers found a .380 semi-automatic pistol under the driver’s
seat. A drug detection dog alerted to the vehicle’s trunk where officers found
four bundles of cocaine.
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Following his arrest, Mr. Sicairos pled guilty to the charge of conspiracy to
possess cocaine with intent to distribute. During the plea hearing, the district
court questioned Mr. Sicairos on the factual basis for his guilty plea. In response,
Mr. Sicairos stated “Ramone Aguilar called for me to give him a ride, presumably
he had a box with drugs in it.” The district court then permitted the government
to conduct a voir dire examination during which Mr. Sicairos admitted he knew
the drugs were in the car, the drugs were intended for distribution to others, and
the purpose of transporting Mr. Aguilar was for distribution of those drugs.
However, in attempting to minimize his involvement, Mr. Sicairos stated “All I
did is give him a ride. He asked me to give him a ride. I did take him, but that’s
all.”
Based on Mr. Sicairos’ admissions, the district court found a factual basis
for his guilty plea and referred his case to a probation officer for the purpose of
preparing a presentencing report. In a notarized statement to the probation
officer, Mr. Sicairos assumed responsibility for having the drugs in his vehicle
and “for helping make them available for sale by driving Aguilar to the places he
wanted,” but denied knowing the drugs were in his car.
At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Sicairos’ attorney attempted to explain Mr.
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Sicairos’ prior conflicting statements by relating that Mr. Sicairos could not admit
to knowing the vehicle contained drugs because Mr. Sicairos said “it’s not true.”
In response, the government called an officer witness who testified that Mr.
Sicairos admitted his vehicle contained “a gun and dope.” Following this
testimony, the district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr.
Sicairos did not qualify for reduction of his sentence for acceptance of
responsibility and therefore, denied a downward adjustment.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mr. Sicairos contends the district court erred in refusing to
apply a three-level sentence reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 because he
accepted responsibility by pleading guilty to the offense charged. He contends his
disagreement with the government over whether he knew the vehicle contained
drugs should not preclude him from a three-level reduction because it “had no
affect [sic] on his admission to being guilty of the offense charged.”
In determining whether to award a sentence reduction for acceptance of
responsibility under § 3E1.1, we recognize the district court’s broad discretion
and will not disturb its decision absent clearly erroneous findings. United States
v. Bindley, 157 F.3d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1086
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(1999). In requesting such a reduction, Mr. Sicairos bears the burden of
establishing entitlement to a reduction under § 3E1.1 and must show recognition
and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct. Id.
at 1241. If Mr. Sicairos falsely denied, or frivolously contested, “relevant
conduct” which the district court determined to be true, the district court may find
he acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. 1 Id.; see also
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, Comment. (n.1).
Applying these standards to the instant case, we conclude the district court
did not err in refusing to reduce Mr. Sicairos’ sentence. In so doing, we
acknowledge that Mr. Sicairos was not required to affirmatively admit relevant
conduct, beyond that which was necessary for conviction of the offense charged,
in order to obtain a § 3E1.1 reduction. United States v. Contreras, 59 F.3d 1038,
1040 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), Comment. (n.1)). Instead, Mr.
Sicairos could have remained silent with respect to the relevant conduct. Id. at
1041. Thus, if he had remained silent with respect to his knowledge of the
1
“Relevant conduct” is defined as “‘all acts and omissions committed ... or
willfully caused by the defendant ... that occurred during the commission of the offense of
conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid
detection or responsibility for that offense.’” United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 979,
980-81 (10th Cir.) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1057 (1994).
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existence of cocaine in his vehicle, he may have obtained the requested reduction
following his guilty plea. Id. However, Mr. Sicairos did not remain silent and
instead made conflicting statements about his knowledge concerning the cocaine.
These statements clearly involve conduct relevant to the drug offense. In light of
Mr. Sicairos’ conflicting statements, the district court could reasonably conclude
that Mr. Sicairos falsely denied “relevant conduct” it determined to be true, and
therefore, did not demonstrate acceptance of his responsibility. See, e.g., id. at
1041 (holding no acceptance of responsibility occurred where defendant failed to
remain silent and instead understated his culpability on the transportation of the
drugs he pled guilty to possessing); Anderson, 15 F.3d at 981 (holding no
acceptance of responsibility existed where defendant pled guilty to interfering
with an officer engaged in official duties, but denied possessing a metal weapon
he threw away when fleeing from officers).
For these reasons, we determine that the district court’s denial of Mr.
Sicairos’ request for a downward departure under § 3E1.1 was not clearly
erroneous. In so holding, we need not address Mr. Sicairos’ remaining contention
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that a three-level, and not a two-level, reduction should be granted. Accordingly,
we AFFIRM Mr. Sicairos’ sentence.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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