FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 28, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
JERRY LEWIS DEDRICK,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 10-1183
v. (D.C. No. 1:10-CV-00517-ZLW)
CHARLES DANIELS, Warden, (D. Colo.)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Jerry Lewis Dedrick, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We
agree with the district court’s decision that Mr. Dedrick has failed to assert a
denial of his due-process rights. Accordingly, we affirm.
On April 21, 2009, Mr. Dedrick was involved in a fight with another
prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution (Medium) in Beaumont, Texas.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
The incident was investigated, and on April 23 Mr. Dedrick was provided with a
copy of an incident report prepared by Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff informing
him that he was being charged with fighting. On April 27 the Unit Disciplinary
Committee (apparently after a meeting) referred the matter to the Disciplinary
Hearing Officer, who conducted a hearing on May 20. Mr. Dedrick was
sanctioned by the loss of 27 days of good-conduct time, 100 days’ confinement in
the special housing unit, and transfer to USP-Florence.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Mr. Dedrick filed his
application under § 2241 in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado on March 5, 2010. He contended that his due-process rights were
violated (1) because he did not receive written notice of the disciplinary process
against him within 24 hours of the incident, as required by Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974), and prison rules; (2) because he did not receive a hearing
within 72 hours; and (3) because prison officials sabotaged his administrative
remedies. The district court dismissed the action.
On appeal Mr. Dedrick claims only that his due-process rights under Wolff
and prison rules were violated because he was not given notice of the proceedings
against him within 24 hours of the incident. Because there are no material factual
disputes, we review his claim de novo. See United States. v. Eccleston, 521 F.3d
1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 2008).
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Mr. Dedrick’s Wolff argument fails because he misreads that opinion.
Wolff requires that the accused in a prison-disciplinary action be given written
notice of the charges no less than 24 hours before a hearing on those charges. It
sets no time limit for providing notice of charges after an incident.
Mr. Dedrick’s argument based on prison rules also fails. To begin with, “a
failure to adhere to administrative regulations does not equate to a constitutional
violation.” Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1068 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993).
Moreover, Mr. Dedrick has not established a violation of prison rules. He relies
on two rules. First, a BOP regulation states: “Staff shall give each inmate
charged with violating a Bureau rule a written copy of the charge(s) against the
inmate, ordinarily within 24 hours of the time staff became aware of the inmate’s
involvement in the incident.” 28 C.F.R. § 541.15(a) (emphasis added). Second,
BOP internal rules state: “The investigating officer is ordinarily appointed within
24 hours of the time the violation is reported. It is suggested that the
investigation be initiated and ordinarily completed within 24 hrs. of this
appointment.” BOP Program Statement 5270.07, Ch. 5 § 1(b) (emphasis added).
The language employed in these rules makes clear that the time frames are
aspirational, not mandatory. And Mr. Dedrick makes no showing, or even a
claim, that he was prejudiced by the slight delay beyond the optimal timing.
Accordingly, this argument has no merit.
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We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. We GRANT Mr. Dedrick’s
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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