UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Tenth Circuit
Byron White United States Courthouse
1823 Stout Street
Denver, Colorado 80294
(303) 844-3157
Patrick J. Fisher, Jr. Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk Chief Deputy Clerk
September 10, 1999
TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT
RE: 98-4098, Buzas Baseball v. Board of Regents
Filed on September 2, 1999
The order and judgment filed in this matter contains two clerical errors on
page 5, the sentence which begins on line 5. The corrected sentence should read as
follows:
Plaintiff further asserts it had notified defendant in November 1997 that
it needed a decision before the team owner went to the winter meeting
in December, but it did not receive the proposal until February 1998.
A copy of the corrected order and judgment is attached.
Sincerely,
Patrick Fisher, Clerk of Court
By: Keith Nelson
Deputy Clerk
encl.
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SEP 2 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
BUZAS BASEBALL, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 98-4098
v. (D.C. No. 98-CV-181)
(D. Utah)
THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF
THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF
GEORGIA,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK , BARRETT , and McKAY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Buzas Baseball, Inc., a Utah corporation, appeals from an order of
the district court dismissing this declaratory judgment action without prejudice.
We affirm.
Buzas Baseball operates the Salt Lake Buzz, a minor league Triple A
baseball team which has a bee as its logo. The team was organized in 1993 and
began using the name and logos at that time for both merchandising and
promotional purposes.
Defendant, doing business as the Georgia Institute of Technology, uses a
Yellow Jacket named “Buzz” as its mascot. Defendant obtained a trademark for
the Yellow Jacket design in 1987 and registered the mark “Buzz” in 1988.
Defendant uses its marks for merchandising and promotional purposes.
Defendant learned plaintiff was using the Buzz logo in 1997 at an annual
sports merchandising show held in Atlanta where plaintiff’s merchandise was
displayed. Defendant later discovered that a retailer in Atlanta also sold
plaintiff’s merchandise and that the retailer believed consumers confused
plaintiff’s logo with defendant’s mark. Defendant notified the governing body for
minor league baseball teams that it objected to plaintiff’s use of the Buzz logo.
-2-
The assistant general manager for the Buzz and defendant’s counsel entered
into discussions and, at one point, agreed that plaintiff would discontinue using
Buzz as its name and logo after September 4, 1998, the end of the 1998 season.
Various Salt Lake City media reports also indicated that plaintiff would
discontinue using the logo and that the team owner was leaning towards renaming
the team the “Beezz.”
In February 1998, defendant sent plaintiff a written settlement agreement.
Thereafter, defendant became aware that the Salt Lake City media was reporting
that plaintiff would not discontinue use of the “Buzz.” Plaintiff never directly
informed defendant of that fact. Eleven days after receiving the written
settlement proposal, plaintiff commenced this action. Approximately three weeks
later, defendant filed a trademark infringement action in Georgia federal district
court. The Utah district court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court erred in determining that
plaintiff was not entitled to application of the first-to-file rule and an order
staying the Georgia action. Plaintiff also contends the district court erred in
declining to exercise jurisdiction over this action solely because of an extant,
later-filed lawsuit which addressed the same issue of trademark infringement.
-3-
We review a district court’s decision whether to grant a defendant’s motion
to dismiss a declaratory judgment action for abuse of discretion. See Wilton v.
Seven Falls Co. , 515 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1995).
In deciding whether to dismiss a declaratory judgment action, we have
noted that the district court should consider
[1] whether a declaratory action would settle the controversy;
[2] whether it would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal
relations at issue; [3] whether the declaratory remedy is being used
merely for the purpose of “procedural fencing” or “to provide an
arena for a race to res judicata ”; [4] whether use of a declaratory
action would increase friction between our federal and state courts
and improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; and [5] whether
there is an alternative remedy which is better or more effective.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon , 31 F.3d 979, 983 (10th Cir. 1994)
(quotation omitted).
On appeal we do not engage in a de novo review of these factors, but
rather we ask only whether the district court’s assessment of them “was so
unsatisfactory as to amount to an abuse of discretion.” Id.
The district court found that the parties were evenly matched as to all the
factors except number three. The court determined that plaintiff had filed this
action in anticipation of the Georgia lawsuit. The court noted that the parties had
been involved in settlement negotiations “[a]lmost from the beginning of the
controversy” and plaintiff had received a proposed settlement agreement only
-4-
eleven days before it commenced this action. District court order at 3. Further,
plaintiff never informed defendant that the proposal was unacceptable.
Plaintiff contends it was forced to file the action because no settlement had
been agreed to and, as the new baseball season was about to start, it needed to
determine whether it could continue to use its logo. Plaintiff further asserts it had
notified defendant in November 1997 that it needed a decision before the team
owner went to the winter meeting in December, but it did not receive the proposal
until February 1998. The court found that plaintiff had not informed defendant
that any delay would be unacceptable. We further note that under the terms of the
proposed settlement, defendant agreed that plaintiff could use the logo throughout
the 1998 season. Thus, any need to avoid delay would not have been obvious to
defendant.
Plaintiff asserts it had reason to believe defendant would soon be filing suit
thus forcing it to forfeit its 1998 season. “[A] federal declaratory judgment is not
a prize to the winner of the race to a courthouse” but rather obviates the need for
a race to the courthouse. Perez v. Ledesma , 401 U.S. 82, 119 n.12 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) . In addition, plaintiff’s
assertion is belied by defendant’s submission of a proposed settlement.
Plaintiff maintains that the first-to-file rule mandates that the district court
retain this case. Federal courts have recognized that, as courts of coordinate
-5-
jurisdiction and equal rank, they must be careful to avoid interfering with each
other’s affairs in order “to avoid the waste of duplication, to avoid rulings which
may trench upon the authority of sister courts, and to avoid piecemeal resolution
of issues that call for a uniform result.” Sutter Corp. v. P&P Indus., Inc. ,
125 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). To aid in achieving this
goal, the “first-to-file” rule permits a district court to decline jurisdiction where
a complaint raising the same issues against the same parties has previously been
filed in another district court. Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods., Inc. , 946 F.2d
622, 625 (9th Cir. 1991). However, “simply because a court is the first to obtain
jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that it should decide the merits of the
case.” Hospah Coal Co. v. Chaco Energy Co. , 673 F.2d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir.
19 82). We review the district court’s decision whether to rely on the first-to-file
rule only for abuse of discretion. Alltrade , 946 F.2d at 625.
A district court may decline to follow the first-to-file rule and dismiss a
declaratory judgment action if that action was filed for the purpose of anticipating
a trial of the same issues in a court of coordinate jurisdiction. See Tempco Elec.
Heater Corp. v. Omega Eng’g, Inc. , 819 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1987) (where
declaratory judgment action is filed in anticipation of trademark infringement
action, “infringement action should proceed, even if filed” after the declaratory
judgment action); Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Marshall , 381 F.2d 661, 663
-6-
(5th Cir. 1967). Here, plaintiff has admitted that one consideration in filing this
action was its concern that defendant would file suit. See Appellant’s Br. at 5-6;
Reply Br. at 1. This consideration, combined with defendant’s prior agreement
that plaintiff could continue to use its logo throughout the 1998 season, supports
our determination that the district court’s assessment did not amount to an abuse
of discretion.
Upon review of the record, we cannot say that the district court abused its
discretion in assessing the relevant factors or in concluding that plaintiff filed this
declaratory judgment action in anticipation of a filing in Georgia. The judgment
of the United States District Court for the District of Utah is AFFIRMED.
The decision of the Georgia court regarding whether to certify its decision
that it has personal jurisdiction over plaintiff is immaterial to our determination
of the propriety of the Utah district court’s exercise of discretion. Therefore,
defendant’s motion to supplement the record is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
-7-