F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SEP 29 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RICHARD C. TOLBERT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-3323
(D.C. No. 98-CV-2081-KHV)
KPHN RADIO; MIKE SHANIN; (D. Kan.)
STEPHEN G. MIRAKIAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff-appellant Richard C. Tolbert, proceeding pro se, filed this action
in district court alleging that defendants-appellees KPHN, a radio station; Mike
Shanin, a talk-show host on KPHN; and Stephen G. Mirakian, an attorney for
KPHN, had engaged in employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court appointed counsel to represent
Tolbert, but then permitted counsel to withdraw due to a conflict of interest.
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, primarily on the ground that
Tolbert, an occasional “guest co-host” on Shanin’s show, was never a KPHN
employee. When Tolbert failed to respond to defendants’ motions, the district
court ordered him to show cause why the motions should not be granted. Tolbert
did not respond to the show cause order within the allotted time and the court
entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. This appeal followed.
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard applied by the district court. We construe the factual
record and inferences reasonably made from it in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. See McGarry v. Board of County Comm’rs , 175 F.3d 1193,
1198 (10th Cir. 1999).
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“‘District courts must take care to insure that pro se litigants are provided
with proper notice regarding the complex procedural issues involved in summary
judgment proceedings.’” Jaxon v. Circle K Corp ., 773 F.2d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir.
1985) (quoting Garaux v. Pulley , 739 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1984)). The grant
of an unopposed motion for summary judgment against a pro se litigant may, in
some circumstances, be an abuse of discretion. See id.
Pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than those applicable to
licensed attorneys. See Meade v. Grubbs , 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir. 1988).
Nevertheless, they must “‘follow the same rules of procedure that govern other
litigants.’” Oklahoma Federated Gold & Numismatics, Inc. v. Blodgett , 24 F.3d
136, 139 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Green v. Dorrell , 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir.
1992)). Tolbert has admitted receipt of defendants’ summary judgment motions.
Additionally, he responded to KPHN’s motion for dismissal, which called the
court’s attention to Tolbert’s failure to respond to the show cause order. In that
filing, Tolbert asserted that he had not received a copy of the order and speculated
that it had been mailed to his former attorney. He did not, however, challenge the
legal or factual premise of the summary judgment motions.
The failure to respond to defendants’ motions has its consequences.
Defendants have submitted evidence and argument demonstrating that Tolbert was
not their employee. Tolbert has not provided any basis for disputing this
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conclusion. Accordingly, the record is bereft of any support for an element
essential to Tolbert’s case: that is, proof that defendants were his employers.
See Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc. , 162 F.3d 1062, 1069 (10th Cir. 1998) (“In order
to establish a prima facie case under Title VII, [plaintiff] was required to prove,
among other things, that [defendant] was her employer.”). After reviewing the
record on appeal, we determine that summary judgment was the appropriate
disposition of this case.
Tolbert also contends that the district court erred in refusing to appoint
replacement counsel. “We review the denial of appointment of counsel in a
civil case for an abuse of discretion.” Rucks v. Boergermann , 57 F.3d 978, 979
(10th Cir. 1995). The district court should consider the merits of the litigation,
the factual issues raised, the litigant’s ability to present his claims, and the
complexity of the legal issues involved. Id. When the plaintiff is indigent, the
district court has discretion to appoint counsel when, under the totality of
circumstances, the denial of counsel would result in a fundamentally unfair
proceeding. See McCarthy v. Weinberg , 753 F.2d 836, 839-40 (10th Cir. 1985).
After reviewing the district court’s consideration of Tolbert’s application,
we conclude that the district court considered the required factors in exercising its
discretion. Moreover, the denial of counsel did not result in a fundamentally
unfair proceeding.
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AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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