United States v. Hess

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
NOV 5 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, on its own
behalf and on behalf of the Southern Ute Indian
Tribe,

Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant - Appellee, No. 98-1127

v.

LULU MAE HESS; LOYD HESS; ALTON HESS;
LLH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

Defendants-Counter-Claimants - Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 95-Z-1894)

Elizabeth Ann Peterson (Henry Solano, United States Attorney, Denver,
Colorado; Lois G. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.; Michael E. Hegarty, Assistant United States Attorney, Denver,
Colorado; Robert L. Klarquist, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Janet
Spaulding, of counsel, United States Department of the Interior, Albuquerque,
New Mexico, with her on the brief) of the United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant - Appellee.

George Robert Miller of McDaniel, Baty & Miller, LLC, Durango, Colorado, for
Defendants-Counter-Claimants - Appellants.

Christopher G. Hayes, Craig R. Carver, and Don H. Sherwood, of Alfers &
Carver, LLC, Denver, Colorado, filed a brief for amicus curiae The Colorado
Rock Products Association and the National Stone Association.
Michael E. McLachlan and Jeffrey P. Robbins, Durango, Colorado, filed a brief
for amicus curiae Board of County Commissioners of La Plata County, Colorado.

Before BRORBY, HOLLOWAY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

BRORBY, Circuit Judge.

This appeal arises from an action brought by the United States against

Appellants Lulu Mae Hess, Loyd Hess, Alton Hess and LLH Development

Corporation (collectively referred to as the “Hess family”). The government

seeks quiet title to ownership of gravel located on a ranch acquired by the Hess

family as successors-in-interest following a land exchange patent issued pursuant

to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 - 479. At issue is

whether the reservation of “all minerals” in the exchange patent, as reserved by

the government in trust for the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, includes “gravel” as a

matter of law. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The issue before us requires a brief examination of the ownership history of

the land on which the mineral interest is claimed. In 1868, the government set

aside almost sixteen million acres as an Indian reservation for the Confederated

Bands of Utes. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S.

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159, 162 (1971). Under the Act of 1880, the Southern Ute Indian Tribe ceded

their portion of the reservation to the United States in exchange for cash payments

and allotment of land along the La Plata River to individual Tribe members. 1 The

purpose of the Act was to dismantle the Ute reservation, and thereby destroy the

tribal structure, change the Utes’ nomadic ways, and convert them from a pastoral

to an agricultural people. Southern Ute Tribe, 402 U.S. at 163 (citing 10 Cong.

Rec. 2059, 2066 (1880)); see also United States v. Southern Ute Tribe, 423 F.2d

at 349. The government in turn sold the ceded reservation land for cash, set

portions aside for public purposes, or disposed of it as free homesteads under

various public land and homestead acts. See Southern Ute Tribe, 402 U.S. at 160-

61; Amoco Prod., 874 F. Supp. at 1148. One of the last homestead acts Congress

passed for the purpose of opening ceded, non-allotted lands to public entry and

settlement was the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916. 2 This Act provided for

the settlement of homesteads on lands where the surface was deemed “‘chiefly

1
See United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 423 F.2d
346, 348-50 (Ct. Cl. 1970), reversed on other grounds, 402 U.S. 159 (1971);
Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1148 (D.
Colo. 1995), reversed on other grounds, 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 1997).

2
39 Stat. 862, ch. 9 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-302) (repealed by the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2743, 2789, § 7
(codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976)); see also Watt v. Western Nuclear,
Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 38 & n.1 (1983).

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valuable for grazing and raising forage crops,” and reserved to the United States

“all the coal and other minerals’” in lands patented under the Act. See Western

Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 38-39 (quoting 43 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292, 299).

In the 1930s, the government “initiated a marked shift in Indian policy from

‘allotment and assimilation’ which deemphasized tribal existence ... to a ‘revival

of tribalism.’” See Amoco Prod., 874 F. Supp. at 1151. This self-determination

policy culminated in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 which authorized the

Secretary of the Interior to restore tribal ownership in the remaining surplus lands

of any Indian reservation. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 463). As a result of this and

other acts of Congress, the Southern Ute Tribe’s reservation became

a checkerboard of different types of ownership interests including
tribal lands held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the
Tribe, lands held by the Tribe in its own name, individual Indian land
allotments subject to federal trust restrictions, land owned in fee
simple by individual Indians, and lands held in fee simple by non-
Indians.

Id. (citing Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Board of County Comm’rs, 855 F.Supp.

1194, 1196 (D. Colo. 1994)). In order to remedy this “checkerboarding” and

effectuate “land consolidations between Indians and non-Indians within the

reservation,” Congress included a provision in the Indian Reorganization Act

authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to acquire, through purchase, exchange or

relinquishment, any interest in lands within the reservation for the benefit of the

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Indian tribes. 25 U.S.C. §§ 463, 463e. The Act’s only relevant condition

concerning exchanges involved a requirement that the lands exchanged be of

“equal value.” Id. at § 463(e).

With this legislative and historical background in mind, we next chronicle

the Hess family’s acquisition of the property at issue. In 1935, Lulu Mae Hess’

father, Arvil Brown, proved-up his homestead under the Stock-Raising Homestead

Act and received a United States patent for 640 acres located in La Plata County,

near Durango, Colorado, and adjacent to reservation lands eventually restored to

the Southern Ute Tribe. Pursuant to the provisions of the Stock-Raising

Homestead Act, Mr. Brown’s land patent contained a reservation to the United

States of “coal and other minerals.”

In 1941, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Interior’s authority under

the Indian Reorganization Act, the government began several years of

negotiations with Mr. Brown for the purpose of exchanging his 640-acre

homestead for 440 acres of land held by the government in trust for the Southern

Ute Tribe. The purpose of the exchange was to consolidate the Tribe’s lands into

manageable, contiguous tracts.

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 As part of the government’s proposed land exchange, an appraiser viewed

both properties in 1945, valuing each at $770 and assigning no value to the

properties’ oil, gas and mineral rights. Following the appraisals, the Ute Tribal

Council agreed to the exchange by formal resolution. However, because Mr.

Brown did not own, and therefore could not convey, the mineral rights to his

homestead, the Superintendent of the Southern Ute Agency recommended to the

government that “a reservation should be made on the lands ... proposed for

exchange with Mr. Brown.” In June 1946, Mr. Brown signed an Offer to Convey

his homestead which contained the government’s added reservation “that all oil

and gas, coal and other minerals” be reserved for the Southern Ute Tribe. On July

1, 1946, Mr. Brown deeded his homestead to the government.

For the next two years, various government officials and agencies examined

the details and filing requirements involved in the land exchange and determined

the exchanged lands were of equal value, and the reservation of minerals would

not adversely affect the administration, use or value of the land. Finally, on

October 6, 1948, the government issued an exchange patent to Mr. Brown

“subject to the reservation of all minerals in and to the land, including oil and

gas, to the United States for the use and benefit of the Southern Ute Tribe.”

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 In 1963, Mr. Brown’s daughter, Lulu Mae Hess, and her husband, Loyd

Hess, purchased the 440 acres of Tribal land Mr. Brown acquired by exchange

(i.e., the Hess Property). In 1968, the Hess family began extracting Animas

gravel from a pit (Hess pit) located on their property for use on their roads and to

construct a feed lot. It is important to note that an extremely large volume of

commercial grade gravel, known as “Animas” gravel, comprises the surface, or

near-surface, of the ground in the area surrounding Durango, Colorado, and is of

similar quality throughout the region. Almost all of the Hess property is

underlaid with gravel, including commercial quality “Animas” gravel deposits and

noncommercial quality “Florida” alluvial and colluvial gravels.

In 1980, the Hess family used gravel from the Hess Pit and another pit on

their property to construct roads in a subdivision created on their property known

as Juniper Heights. 3 Later, Lulu Mae and Loyd Hess’ son, Alton Hess, sold the

3
In 1993, the Hess family obtained approval from the County
Commissioners to develop another subdivision on their property, known as “San
Juan Vista Estates.” The Tribal Council expressed concern over the proposed
subdivision based on the future mineral development potential of the property.
On appeal, the Hess family suggests the Tribe’s claim to the oil, gas and gravel
deposits on their property prevents them from subdividing or selling their
property and has caused them to lose over one million dollars in revenues.
However, because the Hess family did not raise this claim in their counterclaim,
we decline to address it on appeal. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120
(1976).

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leftover Animas gravel from the Hess Pit area to local ranchers. Three years

later, Alton Hess obtained a gravel lease from his parents and began obtaining

state and county permits for operation of the Hess pit, using the name “Sunnyside

Gravel.” In 1984, Alton Hess erected a 4' by 4' business sign on the state

highway near the Hess family property which states:

SUNNYSIDE GRAVEL
247-1596
GRAVEL, TOPSOIL, HAULING, EXCAVATION

He also placed a “permit sign” at the turnoff of the highway giving the required

notice concerning his operation of the gravel pit. In addition, the Hess pit is

clearly visible from numerous locations on the Southern Ute Tribal lands. Alton

Hess also has placed advertisements in the yellow pages of the Southwest

Colorado telephone directory every year since 1985. Similarly, he distributed

numerous brochures and placed numerous advertisements in the Durango Herald

offering gravel for sale.

Between 1983 and 1996, Alton Hess removed approximately 147,619 cubic

yards of Animas gravel from the Hess pit for the Hess family’s use, for small

individual sales to local ranchers for private road use, and for sale to the Colorado

Department of Transportation for use on roads apparently located near the Hess

property. Because of the long haul distance and exorbitant cost of trucking the

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gravel to distant markets, the Hess family claims the gravel on their property is

only marginally economic and can only compete for an extremely restricted local

and rural market. The parties dispute whether the useable Animas gravel deposits

would have been considered commercial quality at the time Mr. Brown exchanged

his homestead for this land. The parties generally agree the gravel located on the

Hess property cannot be mined without disturbing or destroying the usefulness of

the surface. 4

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

It is against this historical backdrop and the Hess family’s utilization of the

gravel deposits that the government seeks quiet title to the mineral interest in the

Hess property and to recover damages for trespass. In 1995, the United States on

behalf of the Southern Ute Indian Tribe filed its complaint requesting that the

district court declare the sand and gravel located on the Hess property a mineral,

within the terms of the mineral reservation in the exchange patent; quiet title to

the sand and gravel in the name of the United States as trustee for the Tribe;

enjoin further mining by the Hess family; and award it a monetary judgment for

4
We recite primarily those facts necessary for resolution, or an
understanding, of the issues presented on appeal, leaving further relevant findings
of fact for determination by the district court on remand.

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trespass damages caused by the Hess family’s past mining activity.

In turn, the Hess family filed an answer raising several affirmative

defenses, including a contention that any damages for trespass are barred by the

statute of limitations, and counterclaimed to quiet title to the sand and gravel

deposits in their name, claiming ownership through the surface estate patented to

Arvil Brown. Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment

for title to the gravel located on the Hess property. At a hearing on the summary

judgment motions, the district court declined to consider evidence of the intent of

the parties involved in the exchange and issued a bench ruling denying the Hess

family’s summary judgment motion, determining: (1) federal law, not state law,

controls the construction of the exchange patent, and (2) as a matter of law, the

mineral reservation contained in the Brown exchange patent reserves gravel to the

United States for the benefit of the Tribe. At a trial on the remaining issues, the

district court rejected the Hess family’s contention that the statute of limitations

completely barred the government’s trespass claim for damages, and entered a

final order and judgment awarding the United States $59,946.53 for the value of

the gravel extracted after April 29, 1989, together with prejudgment and post-

judgment interest. Appellants filed a motion for new trial which the district court

denied. This appeal followed.

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 On appeal, the Hess family raises a host of issues challenging the district

court’s summary judgment determination that gravel is a “mineral” under the

mineral reservation contained in the exchange patent. In addition, the Hess

family asserts the district court erred in failing to: (1) consider the parties’ intent

in making the exchange; (2) apply state law; and (3) bar the government’s damage

claim under the applicable statute of limitations for trespass, and its title claim

under the principles of equitable estoppel. 5

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The determinative issue in this appeal is whether the reservation of “all

minerals” in the exchange patent, as reserved by the government in trust for the

Southern Ute Indian Tribe, includes “gravel.” The district court granted summary

judgment to the United States, relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s holding

in Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. 36, in determining that gravel is a “mineral” as a

5
The County Commissioners of La Plata, Colorado, and The Colorado
Rock Products Association and the National Stone Association (Associations)
filed amicus briefs on behalf of the Hess family. In its brief, La Plata County
asserts the district court’s ruling that gravel is a “mineral” as a matter of law will
have far-reaching impacts beyond the Hess property at issue, including surface
rights the county owns on the same Indian reservation. The Associations
represent member gravel operators who, in part, own or lease surface rights
nationwide for extraction of sand and gravel. They claim their expectations, as to
their right to extract those materials, will be greatly disturbed by a ruling that
gravel is a “mineral” as a matter of law.

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matter of law.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal

standard used by the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).

Utah v. Babbitt, 53 F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is

appropriate if no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the government as the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. We construe the

facts and record in the light most favorable to the Hess family as the party

opposing the motion. Id. We also review de novo the district court’s

interpretation of the federal statute at issue – the Indian Reorganization Act of

1934. Id. In construing a federal statute, we “‘give effect to the will of

Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that

language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.’” Negonsott v. Samuels, 507

U.S. 99, 104 (1993) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564,

570 (1982)).

DISCUSSION

A. Quiet Title Action

Because the district court relied primarily on Western Nuclear, in quieting

title to the gravel in the government on behalf of the Tribe, our analysis begins

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with an examination of that decision. In Western Nuclear, a mining company

acquired a fee interest in land covered by a patent issued under the Stock-Raising

Homestead Act, and began removing gravel from a pit located on its land. 462

U.S. at 39-40. A dispute arose with the government over the ownership interest

in the gravel. Id. at 40-41. Because Congress explicitly reserved all “minerals”

in the Act itself, the United States Supreme Court limited its analysis to a study of

congressional intent. Id. at 44, 52. In so doing, the Supreme Court determined

that because the Act expressly applied only to lands where the surface was

deemed “‘chiefly valuable for stock-raising and raising forage crops,’” Congress

intended homesteaders to use only the surface of lands patented under the Act.

Id. at 50, 53 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 292). The Court further reasoned that because

Congress statutorily reserved all mineral interests in the government, Congress

expected the government to retain any valuable subsurface resources, including

gravel. Id. at 53. Hence, the Court declared that “gravel is a mineral reserved to

the United States in lands patented under the [Stock-Raising Homestead Act].”

Id. at 59-60.

The district court summarily concluded the Western Nuclear ruling must

extend to this case because the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 enveloped the

same polices as the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916.We disagree.

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 This case involves an “exchange” patent issued pursuant to the Indian

Reorganization Act, and not a “land grant” patent issued under the Stock-Raising

Homestead Act. These Acts are very different with respect to their treatment of

mineral reservations. Unlike the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, the Indian

Reorganization Act makes no mention of mineral reservations and thus, does not

statutorily mandate the reservation of minerals in patents issued under it. Instead,

the Indian Reorganization Act provides the Secretary of Interior with complete

discretion to negotiate and issue exchange patents with or without mineral

reservations so long as the lands exchanged are deemed of equal value. 25 U.S.C.

§ 463e; see also 63 I.D. 408, 410-11, Sol. Op. No. M-36393 (Dec. 26, 1956).

Recognizing these two Acts differ considerably on the issue of the reservation of

mineral interests, we cannot conclude, without further analysis, that the holding in

Western Nuclear applies to this case as “a matter of law.”

In so proceeding, we are struck by the similarity of the Indian

Reorganization Act to another land act passed by the same Congress in the same

year – namely, the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 48 Stat.1269 (codified at 43

U.S.C. §§ 315-315(o)). Specifically, we note the provision in the Indian

Reorganization Act authorizing the Secretary of Interior to acquire land by

exchange is strikingly similar to a provision in the Taylor Grazing Act, which

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states:

[T]he Secretary [of Interior] ... is authorized and directed to accept
on behalf of the United States title to any privately owned lands
within the exterior boundaries of said grazing district, and in
exchange therefore to issue patent ... not to exceed an equal value of
surveyed grazing district land or of unreserved surveyed public land
....

43 U.S.C. § 315(g) (repealed 90 Stat. 2792 § 705(a) (1976) (emphasis added)).

While both the Indian Reorganization Act and the Taylor Grazing Act

authorize the Secretary of Interior to issue exchange patents, the Taylor Grazing

Act, unlike the Indian Reorganization Act, contains some language concerning

mineral reservations. In short, it expressly allows the parties to a land exchange

to reserve minerals so long as mineral values are duly considered in determining

the value of the exchanged lands. Id. While the Taylor Grazing Act specifically

mentions mineral reservations and the Indian Reorganization Act does not, both

Acts are nevertheless alike, and dissimilar to the Stock-Raising Homestead Act,

because they contain no congressional mandate for the reservation of mineral

interests and instead leave such reservations to the sole discretion of the Secretary

of the Interior.

Bearing in mind the similarities of the Indian Reorganization and Taylor

Grazing Acts, we proceed to our decision in Poverty Flats Land & Cattle Co. v.

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United States, 788 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1986), which we find helpful in resolving

the issue before us. In Poverty Flats, a dispute arose over an exchange patent

issued under the Taylor Grazing Act. Id. at 677-78. The exchange patent

contained an express reservation to the United States of “[a]ll mineral deposits.”

Id. at 677. Because the Act did not mandate the reservation of minerals and

provided the Secretary of Interior with complete discretion in making land

exchanges with or without mineral reservations, we held no congressional intent

or expectations as to the meaning of “minerals” in the patent existed. Id. at 678.

Thus, we concluded that the congressional intent, as to the meaning of “minerals,”

as articulated in the Stock Raising Act and relied on by the Supreme Court in

Western Nuclear, did not exist with respect to the Taylor Grazing Act. Poverty

Flats, 788 F.2d at 678. Applying the same analysis, we hold that because

Congress did not mandate a reservation of minerals in the Indian Reorganization

Act, but provided the Secretary with discretion to make such reservations, no

congressional intent or expectation existed as to the meaning of “minerals” in the

patent before us. 6

6
Even though the result is different, our holding is consistent with our
decision in Millsap v. Andrus, where, like Western Nuclear, we considered the
congressional intent of the meaning of “mineral” because Congress enacted a
statute which explicitly mandated the reservation or disposition of minerals on the
lands affected. 717 F.2d 1326, 1327-28 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that
congressional intent as to meaning of minerals must be examined because patent
was issued pursuant to the Osage Allotment Act of 1906, which explicitly

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 Our conclusion is supported by an examination of Congress’ overall

purpose in passing the Indian Reorganization Act. While the purpose of the

Stock-Raising Homestead Act was to transfer to the grantee surface lands deemed

“chiefly valuable for stock-raising and raising forage crops,” id. at 681, the

purpose of the Indian Reorganization Act did not center on the patentee’s

intended use of either the surface or subsurface of the patented lands. Rather, the

Act itself states that its purpose is to restore lands to tribal ownership and

effectuate “land consolidations between Indians and non-Indians within the

reservation.” 25 U.S.C. §§ 463, 463e. Thus, the exchange provision in the Indian

Reorganization Act, like that in the Taylor Grazing Act, does not assume the land

patented by the government will be used for livestock grazing or raising crops.

See Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 681. As we stated in Poverty Flats:

Since the exchanges need not have been of grazing lands of the
Government it cannot be assumed ... that the surface use was
preordained .... Nor can we say as the Court did in Western Nuclear
that “the determination of whether a particular substance is included
in the surface estate or the mineral estate should be made in light of
the use of the surface estate that Congress contemplated.” ... Under
the Taylor Act the existing or expected surface use by the patentee
could be anything, and no element of Congressional intent or
expectation existed.

Id. We similarly conclude Congress did not preordain Mr. Brown’s surface or

mandated the reservation of minerals to the Osage Tribe).

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subsurface use of lands exchanged under the Indian Reorganization Act. For

these reasons, we hold that the district court erred in relying on Western Nuclear

in determining, as a matter of law, that gravel is a “mineral” for the purpose of

the patent reservation at issue and therefore, quieting title to the gravel in the

government. 7

Having determined the district court applied the wrong legal precedent

where, as here, the relevant statute provides no evidence of congressional intent,

we next examine the scope of evidence relevant to determining the meaning of

“all minerals” used in the exchange patent.

Before examining the evidence useful in construing the mineral reservation

at issue, we address a threshold issue. The district court cursorily stated that

7
In so holding, we reject the government’s unsupported argument that
gravel must somehow be a “mineral” under the exchange patent because an
“exchange of equal value,” must mean the reservation interests exchanged in 1948
were equal or identical. In other words, the government contends the mineral
interest Mr. Brown held under the Stock-Grazing Homestead Act in his original
homestead must be identical to the mineral interest exchanged under the Indian
Reorganization Act. As previously indicated, the Secretary of the Interior
retained complete discretion to determine whether and what mineral interest
would be exchanged so long as the overall exchange was of equal value. Thus, it
is not readily evident, without considering the parties’ intent and the
circumstances thereto, what was meant by inclusion of the word “mineral” in the
exchange patent.

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federal, and not state law, applies in this case in determining whether gravel is a

“mineral.” The district court based its conclusion on the Supreme Court’s holding

in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979). We agree federal law

applies under the principles articulated in Wilson, given the government never

relinquished the mineral interest under which this dispute arises. Id. at 670-71.

In the circumstances of the present case, however, we agree with the Hess

family that the decision to apply federal law does not conclude the inquiry.

Instead, we must decide whether, like Wilson, this is a case in which the content

of federal law should be determined by incorporation of state law. The Court in

Wilson explained that

“controversies ... governed by federal law do not inevitably require
resort to uniform federal rules.... Whether to adopt state law or to
fashion a nationwide federal rule is a matter of judicial policy
‘dependent upon a variety of considerations always relevant to the
nature of the specific governmental interests and to the effects upon
them of applying state law.’” United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,
440 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979), quoting United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310 (1947).

Wilson, 442 U.S. at 671-72.

In deciding this question, the Court went on, “we should consider whether

there is need for a nationally uniform body of law to apply in situations

comparable to this, whether application of state law would frustrate federal policy

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or functions, and the impact a federal rule might have on existing relationships

under state law.” Id. at 672-73. Elsewhere, the Court has noted that “even

assuming in general terms the appropriateness of ‘borrowing’ state law, specific

aberrant or hostile state rules do not provide appropriate standards for federal

law.” United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 595-96 (1973).

We believe the application of these principles in this case also is guided by

the discussion in Wilson. In that case, the Court found little need for a uniform

national rule, concluding instead that there was no strong reason for deciding

federal interests under different property rules than those applied to private

property holders in the same area. Id. at 673. Although this approach might lead

to different results in different states, the Court saw in this prospect “little

likelihood of injury to federal trust responsibilities or to tribal possessory

interests.” Id. Perhaps most importantly, the Court held that the controversy in

Wilson was one in which the state interest in application of its own law was

“substantial.” Id. at 674.

Although the instant case involves aspects of property law different from

those presented in Wilson, the state’s interest in uniform rules of property seems

to us to be the same. We are also unaware of any relevant state law that is

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aberrant or hostile to federal interests. Seeing no compelling need for the

development of a federal common law concerning the construction of reservations

of mineral rights in instruments effecting land exchanges, we conclude that here,

as in Wilson, the content of federal law should be determined by reference to state

law. On remand, the district court should examine Colorado law and from it

identify the governing rules for decision of the case.

B. Interpretation of the Reservation

We turn to the hearing of evidence on the issue of interpretation of the

reservation before us. In Poverty Flats, we examined extraneous evidence to

reveal the parties’ intent, including the circumstances surrounding the reservation

at issue. 788 F.2d at 679-83. We did so because “minerals” is a general word

susceptible to different meanings. Cf. Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264,

266 (10th Cir. 1963). In this case, like Poverty Flats, the meaning of “minerals”

used in the exchange patent is not clear. In order to ascertain its meaning, we

must, as in Poverty Flats, look at the intent of the parties as to the meaning of the

word “minerals,” as used in the exchange patent at issue. Id.; cf. Bumpus, 325

F.2d at 266. In determining the parties’ intent, we may, as in Poverty Flats,

examine extrinsic evidence, including the language of the instrument in which the

word “mineral” occurs, the relative position of the interested parties, and the

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substance of the transaction. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 679-83; Bumpus, 325

F.2d at 266. Because the district court did not review such evidence in granting

summary judgment to the government, we feel compelled to remand this case for

further proceedings. In so doing, we note that where interpretation of a contract

requires examination of extrinsic evidence to determine intent, and where more

than one inference may be drawn therefrom, a question of fact is presented.

United States v. 1,253.14 Acres, 455 F.2d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir. 1972) (citing

Carlock v. National Co-op. Refinery Ass’n, 424 F.2d 148, 151 (10th Cir. 1970)).

Thus, we leave to the district court the examination of the extrinsic evidence

involved in this case and the resolution of any questions of fact presented.

Because of the lapse in time since Mr. Brown’s land exchange and lack of direct

evidence on the parties’ intent, we encourage the district court to look at the

circumstances and conditions surrounding the exchange, including any records,

documents and acts of the parties relevant in determining intent. See Downstate

Stone Co. v. United States, 712 F.2d 1215, 1217 (7th Cir. 1983). In determining

Mr. Brown’s and the Secretary of Interior’s and his agents’ intent, the

circumstances in this case may warrant examination as to the common occurrence

and value of gravel at the time the instrument was executed, see Poverty Flats,

788 F.2d at 682-83, as well as the known and intended consequences, if any, in

disturbing the land’s surface to extract the gravel id. at 681; see also Bumpus, 325

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F.2d at 267. For the foregoing reasons, we direct the district court to make a

further inquiry into whether “gravel” is a “mineral” included in the reservation of

the exchange patent, which in turn will resolve which party has title thereto. 8

C. Trespass Action

In addition to its quiet title action, the government also seeks monetary

damages related to its trespass claim against the Hess family. In light of our

remand on the issue of title to the gravel, we discuss this point in the event the

district court may decide the title issue in favor of the government, making the

limitations issue germane. In reviewing this claim, the district court determined

that under 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b), the limitation period for bringing a trespass

action ran for six years and ninety days after the action accrued. In determining

when the action accrued, the district court concluded the government reasonably

could have known of the Hess family’s excavation and sale of the gravel at the

time Alton Hess placed advertisements in the yellow pages of the local telephone

directory, erected the large business sign clearly visible from the highway, and

made certain sales public. While the district court determined the statute of

limitations applied, it nevertheless concluded, without any analysis, that the

8
We note no statute of limitation bars the government from bringing an
action to establish title to the gravel at issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(c).

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action was not barred “altogether,” and that an action existed for the six years and

ninety days before the government filed its complaint on July 28, 1995.

Accordingly, the district court awarded the government trespass damages for all

gravel sales after April 29, 1989.

In an effort to provide some analysis supporting the district court’s damage

award, the government suggests the district court viewed each distinct gravel sale

as an individual trespass and thus, a new cause of action arose with each

individual act. However, it is the government’s position the district court erred

by not finding that these series of trespasses comprise a “continuing wrong.”

Under the “continuing wrong” doctrine, the government asserts it should be

entitled to damages dating from the first commercial gravel transaction on the

Hess Property, and not limited to damages since 1989. In support, the

government relies on Tiberi v. CIGNA Corp., 89 F.3d 1423, 1430-31 (10th Cir.

1996), where we recognized the “continuing wrong” doctrine in a statute of

limitations case. In contrast, the Hess family argues the district court erred in

failing to determine the government’s claim for trespass is completely barred by

the statute of limitation. 9

9
Because it began extracting gravel for commercial use in 1980, the Hess
family suggests the government’s action is barred because its claim accrued prior
to May 30, 1989, which is six years and ninety days prior to the date of service of

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 We review de novo the construction and applicability of a federal statute of

limitation. United States v. Telluride Co., 146 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 1998).

We begin by examining the statutes at issue – the statute of limitation, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2415(b), and the tolling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2416(c). In interpreting these

statutes, we begin with their language, and if that language is clear, we give effect

to its meaning. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Lujan, 4 F.3d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1993)

(citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)). “The

best evidence of Congressional intent is the text of the statute itself and where the

language is unambiguous, our inquiry is complete.” Phillips Petroleum, 4 F.3d at

861. We must give statutes of limitation which bar the government’s rights, like

those at issue here, a strict construction in the government’s favor. Foutz v.

United States, 72 F.3d 802, 806 (10th Cir. 1995).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b), an action by the United States for money

damages resulting from a tort “shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within

three years after the right of action first accrues,” provided that “an action to

recover damages resulting from a trespass on lands of the United States ... on

behalf of a recognized tribe, band or group of American Indians, ... may be

the complaint.

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brought within six years and ninety days after the right of action accrues.” Thus,

the language of § 2415 is plain and unambiguous, providing a six-year and ninety-

day limitation period from the date a trespass action accrues. In determining

when an action accrues under § 2415, we have explained:

Generally, “a cause of action ‘accrues’ when ‘it comes into
existence.” .... In other words, “[u]nder federal law governing
statutes of limitations, a cause of action accrues when all events
necessary to state a claim have occurred.’”

Phillips, 4 F.3d at 861(interpreting § 2415(a)) (internal quotations and citations

omitted).

For the purpose of computing the limitation period, we also have

determined certain exclusions apply which toll the limitation period. Id. at 861

(relying on 28 U.S.C. § 2416(c)). Excluded from the limitation period is the time

during which “facts material to the right of action are not known and reasonably

could not be known by an official of the United States charged with the

responsibility to act in the circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2416(c). In Phillips, we

stated the language of this section is subject to only one reasonable interpretation:

the limitation period “is tolled until such time as the government could reasonably

have known about a fact material to its right of action.” 4 F.3d at 861-62. We

further concluded the “‘reasonableness’ requirement expressly set forth under

§ 2416(c) is a complex factual determination to be made by the district court.”

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Id. at 863.

In this case, the district court found that government officials could not

have reasonably known about the Hess family’s gravel extraction until Alton Hess

erected his highly visible business sign advertising gravel sales in 1984, or placed

advertisements in the yellow pages of the Southwest Colorado telephone directory

starting in 1985. 10 In so finding, the district court did not err in determining that

the statute of limitations tolled until the time the government could have

reasonably known of the extraction, which occurred no later than 1985. Phillips,

4 F.3d at 861-63.

The district court then, without further explanation, determined that an

action existed for the six years and ninety days before the government filed its

complaint on July 28, 1995, and granted damages to the government for trespass

for all gravel sales after April 29, 1989. In so doing, the district court implicitly

10
We agree with this finding, which is supported further by the fact the
Hess pit is also clearly visible from numerous locations on the Southern Ute
Tribal lands and Alton Hess over the years has distributed numerous brochures
advertising his business and placed numerous advertisements in the Durango
Herald offering gravel for sale.

-27-
determined these gravel sales constituted a continuing trespass. 11 While we prefer

explicit rulings, we agree that if the gravel is titled in the government, the Hess

family’s gravel extractions over the years constitute a continuing trespass. 12

Claiming this case involves a continuing trespass, the government suggests

that under Tiberi and the “continuing wrong” doctrine it can recover damages as

far back as the Hess family’s first commercial gravel transaction. In Tiberi, we

applied the “continuing wrong” doctrine to facts supporting a series of fraudulent

11
Only in continuing trespass cases is the statute of limitations period
calculated back from the date of filing the complaint, see discussion infra, thereby
leading us to conclude the district court implicitly determined the gravel sales
constituted a continuing trespass.

12
The crucial question in regard to the applicability of the statute of
limitations for trespass is whether the injuries sustained are permanent (fixed) or
continuing (sometimes referred to as “temporary”). See Miller v. Cudahy, 858
F.2d 1449, 1453 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926 (1989); see also 1
Am. Jur. 2d Adjoining Landowners § 126 (1994); 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trespass §§ 201,
203 (1991). The circumstances of this case, including the continuing series of
gravel extractions and sales, along with a review of the various distinctions
between permanent and continuing trespass, lead us to conclude the Hess family’s
gravel extraction constitutes a continuing trespass. See generally 51 Am. Jur. 2d
Limitation of Actions § 121 (1970); 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trespass §§ 2, 114 (1991);
accord Archer v. Greenville Sand & Gravel Co., 233 U.S. 60, 65 (1914)
(concluding dredging of sand on river bed is a continuing trespass); Thompson v.
United States, 308 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding, without analysis, that
removal of minerals is a continuing trespass); Moore v. Rotello, 719 S.W.2d 372,
378 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (determining removal of gravel from railroad’s right-of-
way constitutes a continuing trespass).

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torts, stating that “where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury, the cause

of action accrues at, and limitations begin to run from, the date of the last injury.”

Tiberi, 89 F.3d at 1430 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In so holding, we

stated “‘the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the wrong is over and

done with,’” id. (quoting Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1118 (7th Cir. 1983)),

which, if applied in this case, would lend support to the government’s argument.

However, both Tiberi and Meirick involved inculpatory parties who fraudulently

concealed their conduct so the plaintiffs were prevented from timely coming

forward to seek redress. Tiberi, 89 F.3d at 1431; Meirick, 712 F.2d at 1118-19.

An examination of these cases leads us to conclude they are inapplicable to the

circumstances in this case. 13

First, in this case, the Hess family made no attempt to conceal their gravel

extractions and sales. Moreover, the concept of “continuing trespass” developed

apart from, and follows slightly different legal principles than, the “continuing

13
In Tiberi, we acknowledged that the “continuing wrong” doctrine
“cannot be employed where the plaintiff’s injury is ‘definite and discoverable,
and nothing prevented the plaintiff from coming forward to seek redress.’”
Tiberi, 89 F.3d at 1431 (quoting Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 743 (7th Cir.
1992)). Thus, under Tiberi, the “continuing wrong” doctrine described by the
government cannot apply given the district court’s finding that the government
should have reasonably known of the Hess family’s gravel extraction.

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wrong” doctrine applied in fraudulent concealment cases like Tiberi. In trespass

cases, where the statute of limitations has expired with respect to the original

trespass, but the trespass is continuing, we and other courts have calculated the

limitation period back from the time the complaint was filed, 14 rather than

forward from the date of the original trespass, or where applicable, back to the

reasonable discovery date. See, e.g., Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546, 1559-

60 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming concept that recovery for continuing trespass

damages includes only those damages incurred within the statute of limitation

period prior to filing the lawsuit); Tucker v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co., 28

F.3d 1089, 1092 (11th Cir. 1994) (same); Miller, 858 F.2d at 1456 (same). 15

In light of these cases and the well-established method of applying the

statute of limitations back from the filing of the complaint in continuing trespass

actions, we cannot agree with the Hess family that the government’s action is

14
See also 1 Am. Jur. 2d Adjoining Landowners § 126 (1994); 51 Am. Jur.
2d Limitations of Actions § 121 (1970); 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trespass §§ 2, 26, 201,
203 (1991).

15
In applying the six-year limitation under 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b), the Ninth
Circuit, in a case similar to the one here, limited the government’s continuing
trespass damages to only those damages occurring six years prior to
commencement of its action. United States v. Rice, 886 F.2d 334, 1989 WL
112460 at *8 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 1989) (unpublished opinion).

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totally barred, or with the government that it is entitled to damages commencing

with the Hess family’s first commercial gravel sale in 1980. Rather, on remand,

damages for the Hess family’s continuing trespass, if any, should be computed six

years and ninety days from the filing of the complaint, or April 29, 1989.

Applying the statute of limitations in this manner comports with the competing

interests of affording the statutes at issue a strict construction in the government’s

favor, Foutz, 72 F.3d at 806, while recognizing Congress’ effort to encourage

prompt agency action on trespass claims by barring those claims the government

delays in bringing. 16 See Phillips, 4 F.3d at 863.

For these reasons, we agree with the district court’s determination that the

government is not barred from seeking trespass damages. However, in light of

our remand on the issue of quieting title to the gravel, we must vacate and remand

the district court’s award of monetary damages to the government pending a

determination of that issue.

D. The Estoppel Claim

16
In this case, because the government did not act diligently in bringing its
trespass claim, the limitation period bars it from recovering damages for the four
year period from the date of reasonable discovery in 1985 to April 29, 1989.

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 In their opening brief, the Hess family argues that the equitable doctrine of

estoppel bars the United States from revising its position and asserting a claim to

gravel deposits fifty years after issuing a patent to Brown. More specifically, the

Hess family says that a changed BIA policy was initiated by a memorandum to all

area directors in September 1990; that the memorandum acknowledged that the

BIA was “aware of the confusion that now exists in the status of sand and

gravel”; that the prospective 1990 change of BIA procedures cannot affect the

stability of title vested fifty years earlier by the Brown Patent; and that equity

principles require that the BIA’s attempt to retroactively apply its 1990 change of

policy be barred by estoppel.

That theory of equitable estoppel should be considered on remand by the

district court in determining the viability of the gravel claim of the Hess family

under federal law with its incorporation of state law principles as explained

earlier. The district judge should consider the estoppel claim in light of the

limitations on estoppel against the government reviewed in Penny v. Guiffrida,

897 F.2d 1543, 1546-49 (10th Cir. 1990), and the Supreme Court precedents there

surveyed.

Accordingly, the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United

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States in its action to quiet title the ownership of the gravel at issue is

VACATED and the case REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion. For the reasons stated, the district court’s decision awarding

trespass damages to the United States is also VACATED and REMANDED.

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