F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 8 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
PETER JAMES ROBINSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. Nos. 98-7145, 98-7149, 98-7193
99-7028 & 99-7030
GARY GIBSON, Warden Of (D.C. No. 96-CV-676-B)
Oklahoma State Penitentiary; RON (E.D. Okla.)
WARD, Warden of Prison-OSP;
JOHN EAST; BESSIE GREENWAY;
NEAMYRA RIDDLE; JAMES
SOCKEY, Unit Manager of the East
Cellhouse; BRENT FATKIN;
DELORES RAMSEY,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , BARRETT , and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
In these consolidated appeals, Peter James Robinson, an inmate at Cimarron
Correctional Facility in Cushing, Oklahoma, appearing pro se , appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1
Robinson alleges violations of his Eighth Amendment rights based on the
conditions of his confinement while he was incarcerated in the East Cell House
(ECH) of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary in McAlester, Oklahoma. After
providing factual information in a Martinez report, see Martinez v. Aaron , 570
F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978), the defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the
1
We initially questioned whether this court had jurisdiction over Robinson’s
appeal because it appeared that his motion for reconsideration was not timely
filed so as to the toll the time to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). The
district court dismissed Robinson’s complaint on September 11, 1998.
Robinson’s motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1998;
however, it contains a certificate of service indicating that Robinson mailed it on
September 25, 1998. Under Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(2)(C), which was in effect at
the time the motion was filed, the motion is considered a timely filing because
Robinson, an inmate, deposited it in his prison mail system prior to the expiration
of the filing deadline. Thus, the time to appeal the district court’s September 11
order was tolled pending disposition of the motion for reconsideration under
Rule 4(a)(4). The district court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order
entered on October 13, 1998, and Robinson filed timely notices of appeal on
October 19 and October 22.
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alternative, a motion for summary judgment. The district court dismissed
Robinson’s claims as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring
dismissal of frivolous in forma pauperis claims); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)
(authorizing dismissal of frivolous prisoner civil rights suits concerning prison
conditions). We review the district court’s dismissal of the complaint as frivolous
under § 1915 for abuse of discretion, see McWilliams v. Colorado , 121 F.3d 573,
574-75 (10th Cir. 1997), and we affirm.
Robinson alleges that from August 28, 1996 to November 25, 1996, he was
housed under hazardous conditions in the East Cell House. He complains that the
roof leaked, portions of the ceiling were beginning to cave in, raw sewage flowed
through the area, the electrical wiring was dangerous, and the food was not hot
and sometimes contained insects. Robinson also complains that inmates were
denied access to the law library and that he was forced to work without pay, while
other inmates were paid for their work.
In Craig v. Eberly , 164 F.3d 490 (10th Cir. 1998), we summarized the
applicable standards for constitutional challenges to prison conditions:
[J]ail officials [must] provide . . . humane conditions of confinement
by ensuring inmates receive the basic necessities of adequate food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care and by taking reasonable measures
to guarantee the inmates’ safety. To hold a jailer personally liable
for violating an inmate’s right to humane conditions of confinement,
a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements, consisting of an objective
and subjective component.
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The objective component requires that the alleged deprivation be
sufficiently serious. . . . [J]ail conditions may be restrictive and even
harsh without violating constitutional rights. Indeed, only those
deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth
Amendment violation. This inquiry turns not only on the severity of
the alleged deprivations, but also on their duration.
***
The subjective component requires the jail official to have a
sufficiently culpable state of mind. In the context of
prison-conditions claims, the required state of mind is one of
deliberate indifference to inmate health and safety. In other words,
the jailer is liable only if he or she knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference. It is not enough to establish that the official should have
known of the risk of harm.
Id. at 495-96 (quotations and citations omitted).
Applying these standards, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that
Robinson has failed to allege facts demonstrating either the objective or
subjective components of a valid claim. Giving the allegations their most liberal
construction because Robinson is appearing pro se , see Haines v. Kerner , 404
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), we agree with the district court that Robinson’s
allegations are vague and conclusory. In order to state a bona fide claim, even
pro se plaintiffs must support their allegations with sufficient facts. “This is so
because a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts
surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to
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determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted.” Hall v.
Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). This Robinson has failed to do.
His allegations are insufficiently specific to indicate either the severity or
duration of any alleged deprivations, and none of his allegations establish that he
was denied “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” or that a
responsible official acted with “deliberate indifference” to his health and safety.
Craig , 164 F.3d at 495 .
Robinson asserts that the district court erred by not holding an evidentiary
hearing to resolve material issues of facts and by not giving adequate reasons for
its dismissal. Contrary to Robinson’s contention, the district court did not resolve
any factual dispute between the allegations in his complaint and the Martinez
report, but rather dismissed Robinson’s complaint as frivolous because his
allegations are vague and conclusory. Thus, the district court was not required to
hold an evidentiary hearing. See § 1915(e)(2) (requiring a court to dismiss sua
sponte any in forma pauperis action that is frivolous).
The district court thoroughly discussed Robinson’s claims in its order
dismissing this action and gave adequate legal and factual reasons for its decision
to dismiss the complaint. We find no reversible error in that order. Therefore,
we DISMISS this appeal as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for substantially the
reasons stated by the district court in its order of September 11, 1998. We
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consider the district court’s disposition as one “prior occasion” and our dismissal
of the frivolous appeal as a second “prior occasion” for purposes of the
three-strikes provision set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Jennings v. Natrona
County Detention Ctr. Med. Facility , 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999). We
remind Robinson that he remains obligated to pay all installments of the deferred
appellate filing fee until it is paid in full. No exception is made for dismissed
appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) ; Jennings , 175 F.3d at 781.
Robinson’s February 26, 1999 Motion Requesting That Order Be Sent
regarding the duties of the attorney hired to assist inmates at Cimarron
Correctional Facility is denied. We construe Robinson’s Objections to the
Appellees’ Response filed May 27, 1999, as a reply brief. Appellees’ Motion to
Strike Appellant’s Brief is denied as moot since it requests that they be allowed to
file one consolidated brief, which they did on May 17, 1999.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
James E. Barrett
Senior Circuit Judge
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