F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 16 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
VINCENT M. LUCERO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 99-1070
(D.C. No. 97-WM-2259)
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE (D. Colo.)
STATE OF COLORADO;
ARISTEDES W. ZAVARAS,
Executive Director, Colorado
Department of Corrections,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , BARRETT , and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Vincent M. Lucero appeals from the district court’s denial of his
habeas corpus petition, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Our jurisdiction over
this appeal arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2291 and 2253. 1
Because appellant’s habeas
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
(continued...)
petition was filed after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, the certificate of appealability provision created by that Act
is applicable to his case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). The district court
denied appellant a certificate of appealability and denied appellant’s request to
proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. See Rec. Vol. II, doc. 55 at 2; id. , doc. 57.
We grant appellant leave to proceed in forma pauperis. To obtain a certificate of
appealability, appellant must demonstrate “a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Respondent has not filed a brief
in this appeal.
“In reviewing a denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we are
generally subject to two different modes of analysis. If the claim was not heard
on the merits by the state court, and the federal district court made its own
determination in the first instance, we review the district court’s conclusions of
law de novo and its findings of fact, if any, for clear error. But when reviewing
the merits of a claim already decided by the state courts, we are bound to deny
relief unless the state court’s decision ‘was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
1
(...continued)
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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Supreme Court’ or ‘resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonably
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.’” LaFevers v. Gibson , 182 F.3d 705, 711 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)) (further citations omitted). The state court’s factual
findings are afforded a rebuttable presumption of correctness. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1).
Appellant plead guilty and was convicted in Colorado state court on
charges of second degree murder and first and second degree assault. He entered
an Alford plea, maintaining his innocence of the charges. 2
On direct appeal, the
state appellate court affirmed and the state supreme court denied review.
Appellant also filed a state post-conviction motion alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel, which was denied after a hearing. That denial was affirmed on appeal
and the supreme court again denied review. Appellant then filed for habeas relief
in federal district court, raising issues from both his direct appeal and post-
conviction motion, together with other claims. The district court denied his
habeas petition because it concluded that many of the issues he raised were
procedurally barred, and the remaining issues lacked merit.
2
In North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the Supreme Court held
that where a defendant pleads guilty while still maintaining his innocence, the
plea may still be “the product of a free and rational choice, especially where the
defendant was represented by competent counsel whose advice was that the plea
would be to the defendant’s advantage.” Id. at 31.
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On appeal, appellant challenges his sentence as unfair and excessive in
light of his Alford plea and his self-defense arguments, contends that his sentence
is a fundamental miscarriage of justice, and argues that the sentencing court paid
more attention to aggravating factors and less attention to his mitigating claims of
self-defense. After careful consideration of these arguments, the record on
appeal, and the applicable law, we conclude that the district court correctly
rejected these arguments. We decline to grant appellant a certificate of
appealability on those issues.
Appellant also contends that his trial counsel were ineffective with respect
to the advice they gave him about parole eligibility. He alleges that his counsel
told him he would be eligible for parole after serving 50% of his sentence,
whereas the applicable law requires him to serve 75% of his sentence before he is
considered for parole. He asserts that, had he known about the 75% requirement,
he would have gone to trial rather than plead guilty. Appellant raised this issue in
his state post-conviction motion and the state court held a hearing at which his
trial counsel testified. The state trial court concluded that appellant had been
properly advised as to parole and that, therefore, he had not demonstrated
ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court agreed, but also noted that
appellant had failed to establish prejudice, as required by Strickland v.
Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984). Under these circumstances, appellant
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must demonstrate that but for his counsel’s advice regarding parole eligibility, he
would have gone to trial. See Braun v. Ward , 190 F.3d 1181, 1188 (10th Cir.
1999) (citing Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
In light of the various factors involved in appellant’s decision whether to
stand trial, we cannot conclude that the required prejudice has been shown.
Appellant faced a strong case on charges of murder and assault, including facts
which weighed against his self-defense arguments and potentially damaging
testimony from his co-defendant. He also faced habitual offender charges which
he had tried, unsuccessfully, to have removed. These charges could have resulted
in a life sentence, a possibility appellant wanted to avoid. See Rec. Vol. I, doc. 3,
Attachment C at 12, 21, 25-26. Under these circumstances, we conclude that
appellant would have plead guilty to the lesser charges had he been properly
advised by counsel as to parole eligibility. Therefore, without consideration
whether appellant’s counsels’ performance was deficient, we agree with the
district court that appellant’s ineffective assistance claim lacks merit. See Foster
v. Ward , 182 F.3d 1177, 1184 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that appellate court may
address Strickland performance and prejudice prongs in any order, and need not
address both if appellant fails to satisfy one prong). Accordingly, we deny
appellant a certificate of appealability on this issue as well. See Scoggin v.
Kaiser , 186 F.3d 1203, 1206 n.1 (10th Cir.) (holding the grant of a certificate of
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appealability on ineffective assistance claim unnecessary where no prejudice
demonstrated), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 377 (1999).
Appellant raises several issues challenging procedural rulings of the district
court. He contends that the court did not perform an adequate de novo review of
his objections; objects to the use of a magistrate judge and asserts that both the
magistrate judges and the district court judge should have been disqualified;
challenges the district court’s ruling striking and disallowing pleadings filed on
his behalf by another prisoner; complains that the district court failed to rule on
his motions for appointment of counsel or his constitutional challenge to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act fee provisions; and contends that he was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing before the district court. Our review of the record
demonstrates that these issues have no merit.
In light of the above discussion, we conclude that appellant has not made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). Therefore, we DENY appellant a certificate of appealability and
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DISMISS the appeal. Appellant’s motions for appointment of counsel and for
disqualification of the district court judge and the magistrate judges are DENIED.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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