F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
DEC 27 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
SOUTHWESTERN BELL WIRELESS
INC., fka Southwestern Bell Mobile
Systems, Inc. as General Partner of
Kansas City SMSA Limited
Partnership and KANSAS CITY
SMSA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v. No. 98-3264
JOHNSON COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. NO. CV97–2481-GTV)
Donald D. Jarrett, Chief Counsel (Richard J. Lind, Deputy County Counselor,
with him on the brief), Johnson County Legal Department, Olathe, Kansas, for
appellant.
Diane P. Duvall (Curtis M. Holland with her on the brief), Polsinelli, White,
Vardeman & Shalton, Overland Park, Kansas, for appellees.
Before ANDERSON , McWILLIAMS , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
ANDERSON , Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs, referred to collectively herein as SW Bell, 1
brought this suit
against the Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County, Kansas
(“BOCC”), seeking a declaration that federal law preempts a county zoning
regulation involving radio frequency interference 2
(“RFI”), and an injunction
against enforcement of the regulation. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of SW Bell, invalidating the regulation as impliedly preempted
by federal law and implicitly rejecting the BOCC’s contention that such
preemption violates the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of state powers. The
BOCC challenges those conclusions, and also contends that the court’s order is
overbroad, and that issues of fact preclude summary judgment. For the reasons
stated below, we agree with the district court and hold that (1) the BOCC’s RFI
regulation is impliedly preempted by federal law, (2) this preemption does not
violate the Tenth Amendment, (3) the district court’s order is not overbroad, and
(4) the district court did not otherwise err. Accordingly, we affirm.
1
Plaintiffs include Southwestern Bell Wireless Inc., f/k/a Southwestern Bell
Mobile Systems, Inc., as general partner of Kansas City SMSA Limited
Partnership, and Kansas City SMSA Limited Partnership.
2
RFI occurs “when a signal radiated by a transmitter is picked up by an
electronic device in such a manner that it prevents the clear reception of another
and desired signal or causes malfunction of some other electronic device.” H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 97-765, at 21 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2261, 2265.
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I. BACKGROUND
The BOCC exercises planning and zoning authority in the unincorporated
portions of Johnson County, Kansas. SW Bell holds a license from the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC” or “Commission”) to construct and operate
a wireless telecommunications network in the Kansas City Metropolitan Area
including Johnson County. Wireless communications are transmitted by radio at a
frequency assigned by the FCC. Pursuant to its FCC license, SW Bell is obligated
to provide wireless telecommunications services to its customers. The county
public safety departments (including police and fire) also broadcast over
emergency frequencies assigned by and under licenses from the FCC.
On March 21, 1997, SW Bell, acting on behalf of William L. and
Marilyn M. Wolff, applied to the BOCC for a conditional use permit to construct
a 150-foot monopole communications tower for use by SW Bell on the Wolffs’
property in unincorporated Johnson County. On August 21, 1997, the BOCC
approved the conditional use permit subject to certain restrictions including one
entitled “Interference with Public Safety Communications” (“Interference
Stipulation”). See OL-CU7714, Stipulation 15; Complaint, Appellant’s App. Vol.
2 at 155. The Interference Stipulation nearly replicates a zoning regulation
amendment adopted by the BOCC on June 26, 1997 (“Interference Regulation”).
Under the Interference Regulation, communication towers and antennae cannot
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operate in a manner that interferes with public safety communications. See
Johnson County Zoning & Subdivision Regs., art 23, § 6(B)(4)(f). The
Interference Regulation grants the county’s zoning administrator authority to
determine when interference exists and, after proper notice and opportunity for a
hearing, to force the antenna site to cease operations. The Interference
Regulation provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
2) [The permit holder] shall be responsible, immediately upon notification
by the Zoning Administrator or the public safety agency , to investigate the
cause of the interference, disruption, or degradation and to determine a
method . . . to remedy the problem.
...
3) [The permit holder] shall , within 24 hours after receiving notice of the
disruption, remedy the problem or show to the satisfaction of the Zoning
Administrator that the tower or other site equipment is not the cause of the
interference or disruption. If the interference . . . causing the functional
interruption is not remedied within the 24 hours, then the Zoning
Administrator may upon two days written notice to the [permit holder], set
a hearing to show cause why the applicable Permit shall not be terminated
and the site . . . shall not cease operation until the problem is remedied.
The hearing shall be temporarily stayed [for two days], however, if the
[permit holder] seeks immediate technical assistance and advice . . . from
the FCC.
...
5) [The permit holder] shall be responsible for the payment of costs to cure
the interference . . . including the fees of any experts retained to identify or
correct the problem . . . .
Id. § 6(B)(4)(f) (emphasis added).
Before adopting the Interference Regulation, the BOCC was aware of FCC
authority and regulations in the RFI area. On June 1, 1997, county staff had a
telephone conference with local FCC staff regarding the resolution of possible
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interference with public safety communications. Apparently, the county felt the
FCC could not resolve interference issues as quickly as the county wanted. See
Appellant’s Br. at 5, ¶ 13. Additionally, on about June 18, 1997, after contact
from SW Bell, an FCC representative from Washington, D.C., telephoned the
Johnson County Legal Department and requested an opportunity to discuss the
Interference Regulation. Further, SW Bell and other wireless communications
providers participated in public hearings and provided written comments about
the Interference Regulation and “argued that the BOCC was without authority to
adopt such a regulation because, under federal law, the regulatory authority
governing this aspect of wireless telecommunications services is exclusively
reserved to the FCC, and pursuant to such authority, the FCC has already adopted
regulations governing radio-frequency interference.” Pls.’ Compl. at 5, ¶ 24;
Appellant’s App. Vol. I at 6.
On July 2, 1997, after adoption of the Interference Regulation but prior to
the BOCC approval of the SW Bell permit with the Interference Stipulation,
David L. Furth, Commercial Wireless Division Chief of the FCC’s
Telecommunications Bureau, wrote to Roger Kroh, Johnson County Director of
Planning and Development. Mr. Furth stated that the Interference Regulation was
preempted by the Communication Act of 1934 as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et
seq., citing legislative history and case law. In addition, he advised Mr. Kroh of
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the FCC procedures currently in place to handle public safety interference
complaints, including a twenty-four hour emergency FCC contact number.
II. DISCUSSION
We review summary judgment rulings de novo, applying the same standard
as the district court. See Bell v. United States , 127 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir.
1997). Summary judgment is proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) if “there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
A. Preemption
The BOCC argues that the district court erred in determining that federal
law preempts the Interference Regulation. Congress has the power to preempt
state and local law under the Supremacy Clause, which states that “the Laws of
the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding,” U.S. Const.
art. VI, cl. 2. Congress’s preemption power extends over both state and local
ordinances. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier , 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991).
Federal law preempts state or local law in three situations:
(1) express preemption, which occurs when the language of the federal
statute reveals an express congressional intent to preempt state law . . . ;
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(2) field preemption, which occurs when the federal scheme of regulation is
so pervasive that Congress must have intended to leave no room for a State
to supplement it; and (3) conflict preemption, which occurs either when
compliance with both the federal and state laws is a physical impossibility,
or when the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass’n v. Salt Lake City , 164 F.3d 480, 486 (10th Cir.
1998) (considering preemption of local zoning ordinance) (citing Barnett Bank of
Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson , 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996)). The Interference
Amendment (and thus the Interference Stipulation) is invalid if preempted by
federal law.
1. Express Preemption
To find express preemption, Congress must have explicitly stated by statute
its intent to preempt state and local regulation of RFI issues. The district court
found no express preemption of RFI issues but found both field and conflict
preemption by federal communications law. We agree that federal
communications legislation lacks any statement expressly preempting local
regulation of RFI. See also In re Freeman , 975 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D. Vt. 1997)
(finding no express preemption of RFI regulation). Thus, we next examine
whether the Interference Amendment is impliedly preempted by exclusive federal
occupation of the RFI field.
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2. Field Preemption
“In the absence of an express preemption provision, state or local law may
be preempted if it attempts to regulate conduct in a field that Congress, by its
legislation, intended to be occupied exclusively by the federal government.”
Mount Olivet , 164 F.3d at 487 (citing English v. General Elec. Co. , 496 U.S. 72,
79 (1990)).
Field preemption may be inferred if a federal scheme of regulation is so
pervasive that Congress must have intended to leave no room for a state to
supplement it or if an Act of Congress touches a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant the federal system is assumed to prohibit
enforcement of state laws on the same issue.
Id. at 487 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. , 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). We
examine three aspects of federal communications law to determine whether and to
what extent federal law preempts local regulation of RFI issues: Congressional
legislation, agency regulation, and agency adjudication.
Congress, in the Communications Act of 1934, created a “unified and
comprehensive regulatory system for the [broadcasting] industry.” National
Broad. Co. v. United States , 319 U.S. 190, 214 (1943). Congress stated that a
purpose of the act was “to maintain the control of the United States over all the
channels of radio transmission.” 47 U.S.C. § 301. The Act created the FCC and
empowers it to regulate radio communications including “technical and
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engineering aspects.” 3
National Broad. Co. , 319 U.S. at 215; see also Head v.
New Mexico Bd. of Exam’rs , 374 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1963) (noting FCC’s
exclusive jurisdiction over technical matters regarding radio signal transmission).
The Communications Act applies to “all interstate and foreign transmission of
energy by radio, which originates and/or is received within the United States.” 47
U.S.C. § 152(a).
In 1982, and again in 1996, Congress significantly amended the Act. In the
Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Congress gave the FCC the explicit
authority to regulate home electronic equipment with the potential to cause RFI.
See 47 U.S.C. § 302a(a). The House Conference Report that accompanied the
1982 Amendments clarified that “exclusive jurisdiction over RFI incidents
(including pre-emption of state and local regulation of such phenomena) lies with
the FCC.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-765, at 23 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2261, 2267. It stated further that:
[s]uch matters [involving RFI] shall not be regulated by local or state law,
nor shall radio transmitting apparatus be subject to local or state regulation
as part of any effort to resolve an RFI complaint. The Conferees believe
that radio transmitter operators should not be subject to fines, forfeitures or
other liability imposed by any local or state authority as a result of
interference appearing in home electronic equipment or systems. Rather,
the Conferees intend that regulation of RFI phenomena shall be imposed
only by the Commission.
3
Inexplicably, the FCC has not intervened here when this case concerns a
local government impinging on the FCC’s authority.
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Id. at 33, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2277. Although this discussion addressed the
specific statutory provision over home electronic equipment RFI, it evidences
Congress’s intent that the FCC have exclusive jurisdiction over RFI complaints.
See In re Freeman , 975 F. Supp. at 574.
The BOCC argues that the amendments in the Telecommunications Act of
1996 altered the FCC’s authority such that the Interference Regulation is
permissible under the section entitled “Preservation of local zoning authority.”
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7). However, section 332(c)(7) only preserves local
“decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal
wireless service facilities.” Id. The Conference Report on the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 explains that “[t]he limitations on the role and
powers of the Commission under [§ 332(c)(7)] relate to local land use regulations
and are not intended to limit or affect the Commission’s general authority over
radio telecommunications , including the authority to regulate the construction,
modification and operation of radio facilities.” H. Rep. No. 104-458, at 209
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 223 (emphasis added). Thus, the
1996 amendments did not alter the FCC’s general authority over radio
transmissions granted by earlier communications legislation. The BOCC
Interference Regulation extends beyond traditional zoning authority (placement,
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construction, and modification) and into radio telecommunications, an area of
FCC authority.
We also reject the BOCC’s contention that its Interference Regulation is
permissible under 47 U.S.C. § 253(b), added by the Telecommunications Act of
1996, that states: “Nothing in this section shall affect the ability of a State to
impose, on a competitively neutral basis . . . requirements necessary to preserve
and advance universal service, [and] protect the public safety and welfare . . . .”
Id. We agree with the district court that:
Section 253, by its very title [“Removal of barriers to entry”], is designed
to deal only with barriers to market entry. It is not a mechanism by which
states and municipalities can regulate RFI . . . . Nothing in § 253(b) casts
any doubt on federal RFI preemption. At most, the section merely
preserves certain existing rights of local governing authorities which are
not inconsistent with federal law.
Southwestern Bell Wireless, Inc. v. Board of County Comm’rs , No. 97-2481-
GTV, slip op. at 12 (D. Kan. Aug. 28, 1998); Appellant’s Br. at 404. Also,
section 253(b) applies only to state, not local, regulation, since, in the remainder
of section 253, Congress clearly says “State or local” when it so intends. See 47
U.S.C. § 253(a), (c), (d). Thus, the BOCC cannot rely on section 253(b) for any
authority for its Interference Amendment.
We next examine FCC regulations regarding RFI issues. The Supreme
Court has “held repeatedly that state laws can be pre-empted by federal
regulations as well as by federal statutes.” Hillsborough County v. Automated
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Med. Lab., Inc. , 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). The FCC has authority to promulgate
regulations “as it may deem necessary to prevent interference between stations.”
47 U.S.C. § 303(f). FCC’s regulations show its broad authority over RFI issues.
A function of the FCC Compliance and Information Bureau is to “[r]educe or
eliminate interference to authorized communications,” 47 C.F.R. § 0.111(e), with
assistance from the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, see 47 C.F.R.
§ 0.131(h). The FCC has promulgated rules to resolve interference disputes in
various contexts. See e.g. , 47 C.F.R. §§ 22.353, 24.237, 27.58, 90.173(b),
90.403(e). The FCC can assess a fine (“forfeiture”) for failure to comply with an
FCC permit or license. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(a)(1), (b)(4) (suggested forfeiture
amount for interference is $7000 per violation).
Finally, we look to agency decisions that address preemption of local
regulation of RFI issues. As the Supreme Court stated:
If the agency’s choice to pre-empt ‘represents a reasonable accommodation
of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the
statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its
legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would
have sanctioned.
City of New York v. FCC , 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988) (upholding FCC’s choice to
preempt state technical standards over cable television signals) (citation omitted).
In challenges to local zoning ordinances or permit conditions that would regulate
RFI, the FCC has ruled that it has exclusive jurisdiction over RFI. See In re
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Mobilecomm of New York, Inc. , 2 F.C.C.R. 5519 (1987) (invalidating local
zoning ordinance regulating RFI, finding “Congress undoubtedly intended federal
regulation to completely occupy [the RFI] field to the exclusion of local and state
governments”); In re 960 Radio, Inc. , FCC 85-578, 1985 WL 193883 (Nov. 4,
1985) (finding local zoning board preempted from imposing RFI requirement on
radio station in conditional use permit). The statutes and legislative history
indicate that Congress does sanction FCC preemption of RFI issues. RFI is a
federal interest and requires a national approach to regulate the field. See
Fetterman v. Green , 689 A.2d 289, 294 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding RFI
“involves the resolution of technical matters ceded to the FCC due to the need for
national uniformity and consensus”).
This analysis is consistent with decisions of virtually all courts considering
RFI preemption. See In re Freeman , 975 F. Supp. at 574 (finding local zoning
RFI permit conditions preempted “given the FCC’s pervasive regulation in this
area”); Helm v. Louisville Two-Way Radio Corp. , 667 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Ky.
1984) (holding that police chief’s remedy for interference with police broadcasts
is with the FCC because power to “control, regulate, or prohibit radio
transmissions” is preempted by Congress) ; see also Broyde v. Gotham Tower,
Inc. , 13 F.3d 994, 997 (6th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of nuisance suit
regarding interference with home electronic equipment because RFI fell within
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FCC's exclusive jurisdiction over radio transmission technical matters); Still v.
Michaels , 791 F. Supp. 248, 252 (D. Ariz. 1992) (dismissing nuisance suit
claiming interference from radio transmissions because “obstruction[s] to the
FCC’s ability to regulate radio frequencies are preempted”); Monfort v. Larson ,
693 N.Y.S.2d 286, 288 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding tort claims preempted and
“claims of radio frequency interference must be brought to the FCC . . . which has
exclusive jurisdiction”); Fetterman , 689 A.2d at 294 (holding Congress preempted
state common law claims involving RFI); Smith v. Calvary Educ. Broad.
Network , 783 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding dismissal of
injunction action as preempted finding “that interference caused by radio
transmission is . . . a technical matter and that the FCC’s control thereof is
exclusive”); Still v. Michaels , 803 P.2d 124, 125 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (finding
exclusive FCC regulation of RFI precludes nuisance action); Blackburn v.
Doubleday Broad. Co. , 353 N.W.2d 550, 556 (Minn. 1984) (affirming dismissal
of nuisance suit against radio stations because Congress delegated to the FCC
exclusive jurisdiction over RFI regulation and preempted the claims). But cf.
Winfield Village Coop. v. Ruiz , 537 N.E.2d 331, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (finding
no preemption of breach of contract action between landlord and tenant based on
RFI claim because no state RFI regulation was involved and “dispute is private in
nature”).
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We agree with these courts and the district court in this case that based on
statutes and agency regulations and adjudications, Congress intended federal
regulation of RFI issues to be so pervasive as to occupy the field. Thus, the
Interference Amendment and Interference Stipulation are void as preempted. 4
Because we find field preemption, we need not address whether the Interference
Amendment actually conflicts with federal law.
B. Tenth Amendment
The BOCC argues that preemption of the Interference Regulation violates
the Tenth Amendment and federalism principles because zoning and public safety
4
The BOCC also appears to argue against preemption claiming it leaves the
county without a remedy because the FCC allegedly cannot adequately address its
RFI concerns. To the contrary, administrative remedies are clearly available. The
BOCC can petition the FCC to resolve interference problems. See e.g., 47 C.F.R.
§§ 0.471, 0.473. The FCC can hold proceedings for investigation, see 47 C.F.R. §
1.1, issue declaratory rulings, see 47 C.F.R. § 1.2, and consider informal written
complaints, see 47 C.F.R. § 1.41. The BOCC may also file petitions to deny SW
Bell license or renewal applications filed with the FCC. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(d);
47 C.F.R. §§ 26.320, 27.320. After taking such action, aggrieved parties may
seek review of FCC decisions and orders in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6). In addition, the
FCC recently announced Memoranda of Understanding between the FCC
Compliance and Information Bureau, the FCC Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau, the Industrial Telecommunications Association, and the Association of
Public Safety Communications Officials “to dramatically streamline the
Commission’s compliance and enforcement process in the resolution of
interference complaints.” FCC Compliance and Information Action, Rept. No. CI
98-7, 1998 WL 207911 (Apr. 29, 1998); Rept. No. CI 98-12, 1998 WL 396675
(July 17, 1998).
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are traditional powers reserved to the states. Although the BOCC relies on
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc. , 471 U.S. 707 (1985), the case
does not support their argument. The Supreme Court in Hillsborough upheld a
county ordinance regulating health—an area of traditional state power—despite
federal regulation in the area. However, the Court found no implied preemption
because the federal agency explicitly stated its intention not to preempt state and
local regulations. See id. at 714, 716. Thus, Hillsborough is inapplicable here
because the FCC has explicitly stated its intention to preempt local regulations on
RFI, see In re Mobilecomm , 2 F.C.C.R. 5519; In re 960 Radio , FCC 85-578, 1985
WL 193883, and the statutes and legislative history support Congress’s intent to
occupy the field of RFI issues.
“[H]istoric police powers of the States” are not to be preempted by federal
law “unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Mortier , 501
U.S. at 605 (quoting Rice , 331 U.S. at 230). However, as the Supreme Court has
noted, preemption principles apply even to a “matter of special concern to the
States: ‘The relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when
there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution
provided that the federal law must prevail.’” Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.
de la Cuesta , 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (evaluating preemption of state real
property law) (quoting Free v. Bland , 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)). Although the
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BOCC characterizes the issue as local police power, RFI regulation is not a
traditional local interest but a national interest preempted by federal legislation.
Congress can regulate communications pursuant to the Commerce Clause. See
FCC v. League of Women Voters , 468 U.S. 364, 375 (1984). Indeed, as the
BOCC concedes, the local police and fire departments obtain their communication
licenses from the FCC. A patchwork of varied local regulations across the
country would prevent a functional national telecommunications network. Thus,
federal preemption of RFI regulation does not violate the Tenth Amendment.
C. Limit of District Court’s Order
We reject the BOCC’s contention that the district court erred by concluding
that federal law preempted the entire zoning regulation rather than limiting its
ruling to specific provisions. The district court order is limited to the specific
relief sought in SW Bell’s Complaint and Motion for Summary Judgment, i.e. that
the Interference Amendment, art. 23, § 6(B)(4)(f), and the Interference
Stipulation, OL-CU-1714, Stipulation No. 15, are void. Contrary to the BOCC’s
suggestion, the court could not read the Interference Regulation narrowly so as to
be consistent with federal law because the field of RFI regulation is entirely
preempted by federal legislation.
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D. Issue of Material Fact
Also, we reject the BOCC’s assertion that the district court erred by finding
no genuine issue of material fact. The BOCC argues discovery was incomplete,
the court failed to consider issues of material fact, and “the Court clearly drew
inferences of fact favorably for SW Bell rather than the County as the nonmoving
party.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify
which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). On the
determinative issue of preemption, the material facts regarding the Interference
Amendment, Interference Stipulation, and federal communications laws and
regulations are not in dispute and, thus, no further discovery is necessary.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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