F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 4 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DALENE F. CHARLES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-3147
(D.C. No. 97-1400-JTM)
WICHITA EAGLE AND BEACON (D. Kan.)
PUBLISHING COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Dalene F. Charles appeals from an order of the district court that
granted summary judgment to defendant Wichita Eagle and Beacon Publishing
Company on her claims that her termination from employment violated the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34, and breached an
implied-in-fact employment contract. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and affirm.
Plaintiff worked in defendant’s Classified Advertising Department for
about twenty-six years. She was discharged after being held responsible for
certain mistakes, the last one being the omission of approximately 165 garage
sale ads from the May 2, 1997 edition of the newspaper. Defendant asserted
that plaintiff’s mistakes, especially the last one, were expensive and embarrassing
for the company. Plaintiff was fifty-eight years old when she was fired. She
contended that other employees shared responsibility for the referenced mistakes,
that nobody else was fired on account of them, that she did not receive the
progressive discipline the company had promised her, and that defendant’s true
motivation for her discharge was illegal age discrimination. The district court
reviewed the evidence in detail, and concluded that “the uncontroverted facts
show the primary responsibility [for the mistakes] was [plaintiff’s], and [her]
termination was not a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Appellant’s App.,
Vol. IV at 942 (district court’s Memorandum Order at 1).
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We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 that the district court used. See Adler v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment
is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c). “Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein.” Rule 56(e).
Plaintiff argues on appeal that the district court: (1) improperly found that
there were no genuine issues of material fact to be tried; (2) failed to construe all
inferences from the evidence in her favor as the nonmoving party; and (3) failed
to apply this court’s standards concerning the establishment of the prima facie
case and burden of proof in an age discrimination case.
We find plaintiff’s arguments to be misplaced. The district court struck
twelve of the affidavits plaintiff presented in opposition to defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on the basis that they were not admissible under Rule 56(e).
Yet, most of the evidentiary cites in her brief on appeal are to these excluded
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affidavits. She does not challenge on appeal, except in the most conclusory
fashion, the district court’s exclusion of her evidence.
In response to defendant’s summary judgment motion, it was plaintiff’s
burden to “go beyond the pleadings and ‘set forth specific facts’ that would be
admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact
could find for” her. Adler , 144 F.3d at 671 (quoting Rule 56(e)). It was
plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that her evidence was admissible under
Rule 56(e). See id. at 671, 672. In the face of the district court’s determination
that plaintiff’s affidavits were not admissible under Rule 56(e), it became
incumbent upon plaintiff to point out to this court why her evidence was
improperly excluded before she relied on it. Because she makes no reasoned
argument to this effect in her brief on appeal, we deem the issue waived.
See, e.g. , id. at 679; Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co. , 53 F.3d 1531, 1547
(10th Cir. 1995).
The result is that plaintiff’s appeal is left essentially unsupported by
citation to admissible evidence. However, “bald assertions in briefs that there
are genuine issues of material fact are insufficient to merit reversal of summary
judgment.” Adler , 144 F.3d at 679. The few remaining assertions of fact that
appear to be validly supported are insufficient to overcome the grant of summary
judgment to defendant. Thus, plaintiff’s appeal fails.
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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