UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-10936
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WILLIE FRANK KING, a.k.a. FRANK KING, a.k.a. WILLIE F. JAMES,
a.k.a. FRANK JORDAN, a.k.a. PENNY; ROY LEE TAYLOR,
Defendants-Appellants,
Appeal from the decision of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:97-CR-83-D)
October 13, 1998
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JONES, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM:*
Willie Frank King (“King”) and Roy Lee Taylor (“Taylor”)
appeal their convictions of conspiracy to possess, with intent to
distribute, cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846; possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(ii);
and aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. § 2. King also appeals his
conviction for the use of a communication facility in order to
facilitate a felony, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Likewise, Taylor appeals
his individual conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), felon in
possession of a firearm. Based on our review of the record and
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
briefs and girded with the assistance of counsels’ statements at
oral argument, we affirm.
Both defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
as it relates to their convictions. Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could
have found each of the essential elements of the charged offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Sanchez, 961 F.2d
1169, 1173 (5th Cir. 1992).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting extrinsic evidence of King’s prior drug trafficking
activities in order to demonstrate knowledge or intent. See United
States v. Chavez, 119 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1997). When a
defendant contests the existence of knowledge or intent with
respect to a charged crime, the government may introduce extrinsic
evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 403 and 404(b) in order to establish
the requisite elements. See United States v. Anderson, 933 F.2d
1261, 1268 (5th Cir. 1991).
The admission of the evidence seized from King’s truck
pursuant to an inventory search, if error at all, was harmless.
See United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1993).
Substantial evidence of King’s guilt, including recorded
conversations, documentation, and testimony of his supplier,
existed in the record. Accordingly, we cannot say that the
admission of the small amount of circumstantial evidence found in
King’s truck during the inventory search had a “substantial impact”
on the jury’s verdict. Id. (citing United States v. El-Zoubi, 993
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F.2d 442, 446 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Reviewing the district court’s denial of Taylor’s motion
to suppress, we examine factual findings for clear error and legal
conclusions de novo. See United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200,
1212 (5th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Dickey, 102 F.3d
157, 162 (5th Cir. 1996) (denial of Franks hearing reviewed de
novo). Preliminarily, the district court did not abuse his
discretion in holding that Taylor’s motion to suppress and request
for a Franks hearing was untimely. But even if, like the district
court, we review this issue on the merits, a misrepresentation made
in a probable cause affidavit will not invalidate a warrant so long
as a sufficient basis exists for the warrant’s issuance once the
inaccurate statements are omitted. See United States v. Privette,
947 F.2d 1259, 1260-61 (5th Cir. 1991). A sufficient factual basis
existed here without the erroneous assertions. Moreover, because
the district court found that misstatements made in this affidavit
were merely negligent and not intentional, and that finding is not
clearly erroneous, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule applies to the evidence seized from Taylor’s home pursuant to
the search warrant. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-
23, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3420-21 (1984); see also United States v.
Webb, 950 F.2d 226, 229-30 (5th Cir. 1991) (discussing restrictions
on Leon good-faith exception). Thus, the district court neither
erred in failing to conduct a Franks hearing nor in admitting the
seized evidence.
Finally, King maintains that the district court committed
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clear error at sentencing by affixing an offense level of thirty-
eight based on the 170 kilograms of cocaine attributed to the
conspiracy. See United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225, 1230, 1231
n.17 (5th Cir. 1994) (factual findings regarding drug amounts
reviewed for clear error). We find no error in the district
court’s factual determination.
AFFIRMED.
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